PSQ

# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Alexander Keyssar — Shoring Up the Right to Vote for President: A Modest Proposal

Panel Discussion

Charles A. Kupchan — The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy

Joseph P. Viteritti — Schoolyard Revolutions: How Research on Urban School Reform Undermines Reform

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Summer 2003

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

# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics, and international affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.



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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3295, E-ISSN 1538-165X) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274; (212) 870-2500; fax: (212) 870-2202; aps@psqonline.org. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

Regular membership: one year, $47; two years, $85; three years, $113; student, $32 a year. Libraries and institutions $249 a year for a combined subscription to the print and electronic versions. Periodicals postage paid at New York, N.Y. and additional mailing offices. Foreign postage is $8 surface or $32 air mail additional per year. Volume 118 Number 2, Summer 2003. Special membership: contributing, $75; fellow, $150; patron, $250; benefactor, $1,000. *Contributions are tax deductible.* Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to Loren Morales Kando, Business Manager, the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274; fax: (212) 870-2202.

PREPARATION OF ARTICLE MANUSCRIPTS: *PSQ* is a fully refereed journal. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout in 12 point type and submitted in triplicate with a 200 word abstract. Two of the copies should be prepared for blind refereeing. Place all tables, figures, and notes at the end of manuscript. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed.

PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Social Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, *Political Science Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *Lancaster Index*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

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ORDERS: Back issues of *PSQ* and reprints of articles may be ordered from the Academy. Single issue when available, $12.50; single article, $10.50. Checks should be made payable in U.S. dollars to the Academy of Political Science. Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

Visit our Website at http://www.psqonline.org

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# *From the Editor:*

## *In this issue . . .*

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR argues that the 2000 presidential election has made clear the desirability of a constitutional amendment guaranteeing to all American citizens the right to vote for president and to have those votes determine each state's vote in the electoral college. Tracing certain features of the history of suffrage in the United States, he maintains that such an amendment would make the Constitution consistent with the now broadly based consensus (not present at the nation's founding) that voting is a right that inheres in all citizens.

THE PANELISTS (D. Caraley, L. Greenhouse, S. Issacharoff, R. Pildes, G. Pomper, J. Rakove, R. Shapiro, R. Smith) discuss the points raised by the Keyssar article. They end up with consensus on the need for a constitutional right to vote for president, but have some differences on additional aspects of reforming the system.

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN argues that America's position of global dominance is far less durable than commonly presumed, as shown by lack of support for the war in Iraq. He contends that the next challenge to America's might comes not from the Islamic world or an ascendent China, but from an integrating Europe that is rising as a counterweight to the United States. The waning of American primacy will be expedited by the erosion of liberal internationalism in the United States, inducing other nations to resist rather than rally behind U.S. leadership.

JOSEPH P. VITERITTI examines the research on urban school reform, finding scholars so wedded to the traditional common school model that they are unable to address its failure to educate the majority of children who attend city schools. Instead of supporting equitable forms of school choice, he argues that they place the burden of proof on those who would extend the range of educational options for children consigned to failing schools.

NIKOLAOS ZAHARIADIS examines the impact of three external interventions on ethnic relations in Yugoslav Macedonia. Political strategies crafted by Macedonian elites since 1991 to deal with the Greek opposition to the country's name, the presence of troops under the aegis of the United Nations, and the outbreak of war in neighboring Kosovo have had unintended adverse consequences in undermining interethnic relations in the long term.

STEPHEN WOOD examines the effects on Germany of the European Union's enlargement to eastern Europe. He challenges the view that Germany will be the primary beneficiary of this development. Rather than a clearly positive balance, the consequences are uncertain, as the process is characterized by political bargaining and conflict.

NORMA J. KRIGER evaluates three recent books on Robert Mugabe's violent rule in Zimbabwe. The authors offer different perspectives on Mugabe's motives for power and on the relationship between his use of violence in the liberation war against white rule and his postindependence violence.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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# Shoring Up the Right to Vote for President: A Modest Proposal*

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR

One of the more remarkable features of election 2000 was its bringing to the surface of political life the peculiar fact that Americans do not possess a constitutionally-guaranteed right to vote for president of the United States. Even for those of us who study politics professionally, it was a bit as though a half-forgotten corpse had suddenly been jarred loose from the river bottom and floated upward into view.

This happened in two ways, both of which jolted political junkies without penetrating public consciousness very broadly. The first, of course, was when the Republican majority in Florida's legislature announced that the legislature itself would select the state's delegates to the electoral college if the outcome of the popular election remained legally unsettled on 12 December, the date by which electors were to be chosen. The legal basis of such an action, they claimed, was located in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, which specifies that "each state shall appoint in such manner as the legislature thereof may

* On 27 September 2002, there took place in the Iphigene Sulzberger Tower Suite at Barnard College, a symposium on various aspects of the question: "Should Americans Have the Constitutional Right to Vote for Presidential Electors?" The symposium was sponsored by the Academy of Political Science and the Barnard College Department of Political Science and was funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The question addressed was provoked by the part of the Supreme Court decision in *Bush v Gore* which asserted that there is no constitutional right to vote for president, so voting directly for presidential electors can be given and taken away by state legislatures even after a popular vote. In this issue, we are publishing the paper prepared for the first panel of the symposium and the discussion that followed.

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR is the Stirling Professor of History and Social Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is the author most recently of *The Right to Vote: the Contested History of Democracy in the United States* and coauthor of *Inventing America: A History of the United States*.



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direct, a number of electors" who will meet and cast ballots for president. Happily for the future reputation of the sunshine state's legislature, the Supreme Court's rapid decision in *Bush v Gore* rendered this legislative hijacking of the election unnecessary. Yet there can be little doubt that a majority of Florida's legislators were prepared to take that step—and to assert their primacy over the state's citizenry—to guarantee the election of George W. Bush; had they done so, a political firestorm would almost certainly have ensued.

The second sighting of the floating corpse was provided by the Supreme Court itself. Justice Antonin Scalia cheerfully pointed to it on 1 December 2000 during oral arguments in *Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board*, the first of the two cases to be heard by the high tribunal. While interrogating Al Gore's attorney, Laurence Tribe, Scalia noted that "in fact, there is no right of suffrage under Article II." Ten days later, in *Bush v Gore*, the majority opinion drove the point home, emphasizing that "the individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college." Citing the 1892 case of *McPherson v Blacker*, the Court even went a step further, pointing out that the state, "after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors." Thus had Florida's legislators acted on their own, the Supreme Court would have backed them up.[1]

The Court's flat assertion that American citizens have no constitutional right to vote for president attracted little public attention: few people ever read the convoluted opinion, and the press was understandably focused on the fact that George W. Bush had just become president-elect. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, moreover, the Court's assertion was not far-fetched and not nearly as much of a stretch as other ingredients in *Bush v Gore.* The federal Constitution never has contained any affirmative guarantee of a citizen's right to vote in federal elections. Article II, Section 1 does clearly seem to leave key decisions to state legislatures. All of the amendments to the constitution dealing with the right to vote (and they are numerous) are phrased negatively rather than positively: they prevent the states from denying people the franchise on particular grounds, but they do not directly confer the right to vote on anyone.

Yet as a statement about contemporary American political institutions, the Supreme Court's pronouncement, which is now the law of the land whether or not it was before December 2000, is extraordinary. The citizens of the nation that prides itself as the standard bearer of democracy on the world stage do not possess an unambiguous right to vote for the country's most powerful political office. The constitutions of more than a hundred nations around the world positively affirm the right of citizens to vote, but the Constitution of the United States does not. What if someone told the Taliban or China's ruling elite? What

[1] *Bush v Gore*, 121 S.Ct. 526, 529 (2000); *George W. Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board*, oral arguments, 1 December 2000, 55.

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if someone told Nebraska's farmers or New York's firemen or my Uncle Pat, all of whom think they have a right to vote?

At one level, of course, the issue is a technical one: in practice (and thanks to their state legislators), the vast majority of American citizens do possess a right to vote for their state's delegates to the electoral college; and that right is (at least obliquely) sheltered by a substantial array of constitutional amendments, statutes, and court decisions. Nonetheless, the events surrounding election 2000 inescapably bring the question of reform to the foreground. Should the federal Constitution be amended in order to affirmatively guarantee the right of American citizens to vote for president and to have those votes determine each state's vote in the electoral college?[2] My own answer to that is an unequivocal "yes." Such a step seems long overdue, and this is as good a time as any to make the move.

## Making the Constitution Match Our Values

I should say at the outset that I personally would favor an even stronger measure: abolishing the electoral college altogether, and electing the president and vice-president by means of a national popular vote. The electoral college is a flawed and archaic institution that has wrought mischief in roughly 10 percent of our national elections. It functions at all only because it has long ceased to serve the deliberative function for which it was designed; and its granting of disproportionate weight to voters who live in the small states looms as an overt contradiction of the principle of "one person, one vote" that is at the heart of modern conceptions of democracy. That said, the chances of abolishing the electoral college (thanks in good part to the opposition of those small states) seem to be roughly on a par with the chances of Fidel Castro becoming governor of Florida.

The proposition discussed here, therefore, is more modest but more pragmatic: it might have some possibility of becoming law. As framed, the proposal would leave the small-state advantage intact while presumably permitting each state to decide how to allocate its electors—that is, by district or in one bloc. The proposal would nonetheless achieve two critical goals. It would prevent state legislatures from ever acting to select members of the electoral college on their own or in any way other than through popular election. More abstractly—but perhaps more critically—it would embed the value of a right to vote for the nation's highest office in the federal Constitution.

[2] There are, of course, a number of different types of amendments that could be proposed, some of which would affect all federal elections or all elections and others of which would abolish the electoral college outright. Here I discuss what might be regarded as a minimal constitutional intervention: an amendment that would guarantee to all American citizens the right to vote in presidential elections and to have those popular votes be decisive in selecting members of the electoral college. This would leave the electoral college untouched and presumably leave to states or state legislatures decisions about how to apportion electoral votes.

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The most fundamental reason for amending the Constitution in this way is to bring a late eighteenth-century Constitution into harmony with late twentieth- or twenty-first-century ideals and values. The phrase "the right to vote" did not appear in our original Constitution, an omission that was only partially a consequence of the Founding Fathers' decision to leave most suffrage matters to the states. The phrase was absent, both from the first Constitution and, notably, from the Bill of Rights, because there was substantial uncertainty and disagreement among the Framers about whether voting was in fact a right. The more conservative among them (probably a majority) believed it to be a privilege; and even those who did call it a right were generally quick to point out that it was not by any means a universal right. As is well known, voters in nearly all states of the early republic were adult (usually white) male property owners or tax payers.

A great deal changed over the next century and three-quarters. Property and taxpaying requirements were stripped away during the first half of the nineteenth century, although they made some surreptitious returns thereafter. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments added the phrase "the right to vote" to the language of the Constitution, while giving formal (if contested and then flagrantly ignored) protection to the political rights of African Americans. The exclusion of women was prohibited in the first decades of the twentieth century. And the 1960s witnessed a stunning expansion of voting rights at the hands of both Congress and the Supreme Court, effectively ending discrimination based on race, literacy, poverty, and residential mobility. As I have recounted in detail elsewhere, these changes took a great deal of time; they were always contested; they were often rolled back in partial and incomplete ways. But the legal, political, and cultural environment did change profoundly.[3] Few Americans today would openly advocate disenfranchising blacks, Natives Americans, women, or poor people.[4]

The intellectual or ideological history of suffrage in the United States can be viewed as a prolonged process through which Americans came to view voting as a right rather than a privilege and also as a right similar to other rights, adhering to all citizens or at least all adult citizens. The two prongs of this issue infused debates about the franchise for many decades, leading, among other things, to distinctive contortions of language, argument, and rhetoric. As early as the revolutionary period, advocates of franchise expansion (to include those without property, for example) defended their position on the grounds that vot-

[3] See Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

[4] I use the word "openly" deliberately. I do not think that the embrace of genuinely democratic values is universal by any means; and I suspect that many Americans view universal suffrage as E. L. Godkin did in 1894: "it has, in spite of its imperfections and oddities, something of the majesty of doom." Quoted in Keyssar, *Right to Vote*, 126. Among other signs of something less than a full-scale embrace were the hundreds of thousands of Massachusetts and Rhode Island voters who opposed constitutional changes sanctioning the enfranchisement of paupers in the early 1970s.

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ing was a right or even a natural right. Conservatives commonly sought to rebut such claims by pointing out that if voting were a right, then all men, even African Americans, should have it—and women and children too, as John Adams famously noted. On the other hand, if suffrage could reasonably be denied to any category of persons (and few were willing to argue the contrary), then it must not be a right but a privilege. As a privilege, it could reasonably and legitimately be restricted to those who would wield it "responsibly." Such arguments led throughout the nineteenth century to often murky claims that suffrage was an "earned" right or a "conferred" right, or one that could only be exercised by people with particular capacities or qualities. A delegate to the Indiana constitutional convention of 1850 announced that he believed in "the right of universal suffrage," which he asserted belonged only to "all free white male citizens over the age of twenty-one."[5] So much for universal.

It was during the cauldron of Reconstruction that prominent political leaders first began to openly embrace the full logic of the claim that suffrage was a right: as Senator Henry Wilson put it in words eerily predictive of public debates that would occur a century later, "Let us give all citizens equal rights, and then protect everybody in the United States in the exercise of those rights." His colleague, Oliver Morton, maintained that the same ideals that led him to favor enfranchising African Americans obliged him to oppose suffrage restrictions based on property, literacy, or nativity. In the 1870s and 1880s, numerous male delegates to state constitutional conventions applied that logic to women as well. "Women's right to the ballot seems so clear," noted an Ohioan in 1874, "that it is like some of the mathematical axioms." "Whatever rights are given to one citizen ought to be given . . . to every other citizen," claimed a California delegate four years later.[6]

These were not the views of most Americans in the 1860s and 1870s. Nor did they quickly become predominant: the latter decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a stunning backlash against franchise expansion in the North as well as the South. But the spectrum of public opinion had shifted enormously since the 1780s or even the 1830s, and the view that every adult citizen ought to be enfranchised had made its way into the ideological mainstream. There it has remained, gaining ground in fits and starts, until it was eventually catapulted into a majority ideal thanks to the combustible mix of World War II, the cold war, and the transformation of southern agriculture. The notion that suffrage was a right that belonged to all adults (with the noted exception of convicted felons) undergirded the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the Twenty-fourth Amendment, as well as the Supreme Court's repeated invocation of the equal protection clause to loosen numerous restrictions on the franchise. "It is wrong—deadly wrong—to deny any of your fellow Americans the right to vote," a president from Texas told Congress in 1965.[7]

[5] Keyssar, *Right to Vote*, 1, 44, 53, 172.
[6] Ibid., 98–99, 188.
[7] Ibid., 256–281.

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It would be pollyannish to presume that everyone in the United States whole-heartedly believes that voting is a right belonging to all adult citizens. During election 2000 I found myself called a "democracy pimp" on a radio show in Dallas, and just months ago at a polling place a neighbor adamantly promoted the resuscitation of property requirements. But our nation's political, legal, and cultural embrace of democracy is unquestioned, and democracy has come to mean that all adult citizens participate in the selection of government leaders. In the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society." Amending our Constitution to bring it in line with our values, thus, hardly seems controversial. It would also follow a strong current of American history. In the 1860s, Charles Sumner acknowledged that racial bars to the franchise may have been "'republican' according to the imperfect notions of an earlier period," but that they were no longer appropriate in a changed world. His Republican colleagues in Congress argued for a broadened franchise with the lovely phrase (now gone from the language) that the Constitution should be amended according to "the lights we have before us," or "all the lights of our modern civilization."[8] In the year 2003, the lights we have before us make clear that all American citizens ought to possess a constitutionally guaranteed right to vote for president.

## States' Rights and Democracy

One likely objection to an amendment of the type proposed here is that it would represent yet another incursion of the national government into an arena traditionally controlled by the states. State legislatures would relinquish the ability to select the manner in which delegates to the electoral college are chosen; all states would be compelled to hold popular elections.

One response to such an objection might, of course, be to point out that all states hold popular elections for president now and thus relatively little would change. But the historical record suggests a more powerful answer. Put simply, the cry of "states' rights," with respect to the breadth of the franchise, has almost invariably been a rhetorical and legal shield deployed to protect discriminatory behavior and a narrowing of the franchise. For most of our history, to be sure, the loosening of suffrage requirements came at the hands of state legislatures and constitutional conventions. In one notable instance—the alien declarant voting laws of the nineteenth century—the states were out ahead of the national government. (So far ahead that they eventually crept back into line.) But whenever the states and the federal government have been in overt conflict, it has been because Washington insisted on more democratic processes.

[8] Xi Wang, *The Trial of Democracy* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 32; Keyssar, *Right to Vote*, 96–97, 284.

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This dynamic was visible early on, as political leaders first grappled with the confusing structure that the Founding Fathers had erected for choosing a president. The Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, was the work of Congress. Congress, moreover, played a key role in pressing the states to hold popular elections for president despite the latitude offered state legislatures by the Constitution. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, methods of selecting members of the electoral college varied greatly from state to state and even from election to election. Some state legislatures chose electors by themselves; six did so as late as 1824. In other states, electors were chosen in districts by popular vote; in still others, all electoral votes went to the winner of the popular vote. Practices tended to change for short-term and partisan reasons, thereby potentially undermining the legitimacy of the elections themselves. The North Carolina legislature's decision to choose electors by itself in 1812, although altogether legal, was the occasion of a "great excitement" in the state, and the last-minute decision of New Jersey's legislators to do the same for purely partisan reasons was treated as something of a scandal, even in a state which from birth seems to have been allergic to the nonpartisan enforcement of election laws. Similarly unpopular, at least in some quarters, was the congressional decision to deny Andrew Jackson the presidency in 1824 despite his having received the largest number of popular votes.[9]

This chaotic method of choosing a chief executive prompted members of Congress during the first quarter of the nineteenth century to introduce dozens of amendments calling for revamped and standardized methods of voting for president. Some called for the abolition of the electoral college, others for district voting; nearly all demanded that the people, not state legislatures, have the power to choose the president or at least presidential electors. Even after things had settled down in the early 1830s, Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri, with the support of his friend Andrew Jackson, continued to present to each Congress a proposed amendment mandating a national popular vote for president along district lines.[10]

Benton's rationale for such a proposal reflected both a growing faith in popular elections and a deepening distrust of intermediary institutions that could frustrate the popular will. On the floor of Congress, Benton insisted that his goal was "to keep the election wholly in the hands of the people, and to do this by giving them a direct vote for the man of their choice." Its underlying "principle"—not irrelevant to our own time—was "that liberty would be ruined by

[9] *Annual Report of the American Historical Association [AHA] for the Year 1896*, vol. II (entitled *Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 1789 to 1889*, a prize essay by Herman V. Ames), *House Document No. 353, part 2*, 54th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: 1897), 80–85; see also Jack N. Rakove, "The E-College in the E-Age" in Rakove, ed., *The Unfinished Election of 2000* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 201–234; Edward Stanwood, *A History of Presidential Elections*, 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1896), 60–61; Charles A. O'Neil, *The American Electoral System* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889), 106.

[10] AHA, *Annual Report*, 80–91.

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providing any kind of substitute for popular election." President Jackson himself in 1835 declared that "the experience of our country, from the formation of the government to the present day, demonstrates that the people cannot too soon adopt some stronger safeguard for their right to elect the highest officers known to the Constitution." Implicit in such claims was the notion that popular voting was a national value. Opposition to the amendments was grounded, rhetorically at least, in a rejection of their assertion of national power over states' rights. Benton's proposal, according to John Tyler, "obliterated all state boundaries and dictated a course of action as if we were a nation and not a compact of states."[11]

None of these amendments passed, although several garnered a great deal of support. Yet it was in the face of action in Washington that the states moved toward a uniform method of choosing presidential electors through popular election and with the winner-take-all system that has become so grimly familiar. By 1832, only South Carolina clung to the practice of having its legislature choose electors; and only Maryland continued to use the district system.[12]

The Reconstruction amendments also, of course, constituted a federal intervention in the name of democratic values, as did the Nineteenth Amendment ratified in 1920, which gave women the right to vote. Most importantly, the transformation of voting rights law that was centered in the 1960s—but which actually unfolded a bit more gradually from the 1940s through the early 1970s—represented the self-conscious assertion of the federal government as the guarantor of democratic rights. Recognizing that the southern states, by themselves, would not undertake democratizing reforms (to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which had been on the books for nearly a century), Congress, the president, and the Supreme Court acted to enforce the national value of democracy. They were in effect asserting that no state or region of the United States could remain outside of a national consensus; in so doing, they acted precisely "as if we were a nation"—which, in fact, we are.

## Confronting the Disenfranchisement of Felons

Tinkering with suffrage laws has throughout American history meant prying the lid open on a Pandora's box. Replacing property with taxpaying requirements meant calling into question why there should be any pecuniary qualifications for voting at all. Advocates of black suffrage after the Civil War found themselves in sharp, sometimes bitter conflict with supporters of women's suffrage. Southern suffragists in the early twentieth century encountered resistance from those who feared that any effort to change franchise requirements could break down the barriers against black voting.

[11] Ibid., 91; *Congressional Globe*, 24th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: 1836), 11; 28th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: 1844), 686.

[12] AHA, *Annual Report*, 85. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of American Presidential Elections: 1789–1968* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).

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In a far more limited way, the Pandora's box is present here as well. Any constitutional amendment that affirmatively guarantees the right of American citizens to vote in presidential elections will bump up against at least one knotty issue—the voting rights of felons and exfelons. This is so because any clearly and simply stated guarantee ("All American citizens shall have the right to vote for presidential electors in the state in which they reside") would appear to override state restrictions on voting by those convicted of crimes.[13] Circumventing this problem, on the other hand, would require wording ("All citizens not convicted of crimes" or "All citizens eligible to vote under state laws") that would thicken the barriers against the enfranchisement of felons and exfelons.

Either position will be controversial and have detractors; it is particularly easy to imagine opponents of a simply worded amendment latching onto and making much of the fact that it would enfranchise several million people who have committed crimes. (Willy Horton goes to the ballot box.) In states like Florida, Alabama, and Texas, with large numbers of excluded felons, this issue could jeopardize ratification of an amendment. On the other hand, language that sanctioned the disenfranchisement of felons would be unpopular within the black community and among many progressives who would generally be inclined to support an amendment guaranteeing the right to vote. None of which, to my mind, is a reason to back away from the issue: a national debate about the merits and demerits of felon exclusions may be well worth provoking. The same could also be said of another issue that might rear its head—the voting rights of American citizens residing in Puerto Rico. Public debates that challenge the American people to test their stated ideals against tricky concrete issues ought perhaps to be welcomed rather than avoided.

## It Just Might Matter

Just as generals sometimes fall prey to the impulse to fight the last war, political reformers frequently attempt to keep the last crisis from happening again. Much of the election reform legislation now pending before Congress seems to be of this type: it is designed to keep the spectacle of hanging chads, butterfly ballots, Katherine Harris, and confused news analysts from dominating the national television screen for a month after some future election. Such a spectacle would be unlikely to recur in any event, but numerous legislative proposals seem to spring from an understandable impulse to at least do something—or to avoid the charge of having done nothing after the train wreck of election 2000. That said, there is nothing particularly harmful and much that is constructive about the package of bills awaiting action in Congress. That they remain

[13] If felons and exfelons were enfranchised in presidential elections, it would put immense pressure on the states to enfranchise them for local elections also. Unless the states did so, they would have to maintain different voting rolls and possibly voting machines for presidential and for state elections. The situation would be analogous to what loomed on the horizon with the eighteen-year-old vote before passage of the 26th Amendment.

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pending over two years after election 2000 has less to do with the quality or significance of the reforms proposed (the package is bland at best) than with the simple fact that all election reforms have potential partisan implications and no party wants to surrender any procedural advantage.

The constitutional amendment discussed here is somewhat different and penetrates more deeply into our political structures. It is not a response to what happened or what was publicly debated or what filled the airwaves, but to what was revealed and to what almost happened. Election 2000 and *Bush v Gore* made clear that a partisan state legislature could legally hijack a presidential election. Is this likely to occur? Certainly not. But the events of November 2000 and September 2001 remind us in ways that we should not ignore that the unlikely can happen. Moreover, a legislative hijacking of an election is unlikely precisely because it would provoke a deep crisis of legitimacy in a nation whose citizens believe in popular elections. Stated somewhat differently, the largest barrier to abuse of the current legal configuration is the fact that the vast majority of the American people are unaware that this configuration exists and would regard it as incompatible with the nation's core political values. Making the Constitution congruent with those values would thus seem to be a worthy goal in and of itself. In addition, placing the right of citizens to vote for president firmly and squarely in the Constitution could well carry weight in future legal conflicts, the contours of which we cannot quite imagine at present.

The new and somewhat unfamiliar tones of uncertainty and unpredictability that mark public life in the United States in the wake of September 11, 2001 add some depth, even perhaps some urgency, to the case for shoring up our democratic institutions. In the end, election 2000 did not prove to be a full-blown crisis of political legitimacy. Although many analysts and legal scholars found the Supreme Court's actions to be shocking, public rage diminished rapidly (except within the black community), and normal rhythms of life and politics were quickly restored. To some considerable degree, this was the case because the outcome of election 2000 did not appear as though it would make much difference to many people. The most widely discussed issues of the electoral campaign after all were the relative merits of different programs for improving education and different prescription drug plans for senior citizens, not exactly issues that would send large numbers of citizens to the barricades. That President Bush has set out since his inauguration to demonstrate that there were major differences between the two candidates is a different matter. But in the decades ahead, in a world that appears less benign, in a nation less certainly prosperous, political cleavages may sharpen. Electoral contests could well become more contentious, more bitter, more substantive, more vital. In such an environment, it will be all the more essential for the rules of democracy to be clear and the rights of the people unambiguous.

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# Panel Discussion

CARALEY:* Alex, everyone has read your paper. Do you want to give a short summary?

KEYSSAR: What I was asked to do was to reflect, as an historian, on this proposition regarding a constitutional amendment to guarantee the right to vote for presidential electors. I have reflected on it. I have no difficulty offering my support for it. My own views, and I have spoken about this fairly widely in the past, favor an even broader amendment, one which would guarantee the right to vote in all elections in the United States, and in so doing would also obliterate the electoral college. This comes both out of principle and out of my longstanding impossible-ist streak, which for the purposes of the present discussion I will forego. I actually do think that abolishing the electoral college would be a good idea, and as I mention in the paper, I think that the odds of doing that are roughly equal to the odds of Fidel Castro becoming governor of Florida.

CARALEY: You mean you prefer only eliminating people as electors or eliminating the whole electoral vote system of voting?

KEYSSAR: The whole electoral system of voting, the whole deal. Let me try to go over some of the reasoning that I offered behind this, and frankly I think that there are two overwhelming reasons. The first reason for doing this is in effect to bring the Constitution into harmony with the change in political values that has occurred over the last two centuries. In some sense, it's that simple. At the outset when the Constitution was written, whether or not voting was a right was a matter of substantial dispute. I think that most of the Founding Fathers did not believe that voting was a right. Voting was thought of as a privilege. And in the debate that emerged in the late eighteenth century, there was substantial disagreement about whether voting was a right or was a privilege. If it was a right, and I talk about this in the paper, the question was: Was it a right like other rights that should belong to all citizens or was it a right that only belonged to some people, in which case that made it a peculiar kind of right. That produces wonderful locutions in the language over time. For example, in a debate in the 1870s on women's suffrage, one opponent of women's suffrage stood up and said, "voting is not a natural right, it is a conferred right." And somebody stood up to respond, "if it's a conferred right, who conferred it on us?" Those kinds of debates took place throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

One could see the intellectual history of suffrage in the United States as a lurching progression, a shift toward the notion that voting is a right and not a privilege and toward the notion that it is a right like most other rights in the sense that is adheres to all citizens. That takes a long time, and in writing

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this portion of the paper, I found myself telescoping a lot of complicated history and thus slipping into a kind of Whig version of American history that my book was written to attack. But the fact is that there was progress and change over the long run as well as a lot of backing and forthing.

The United States got universal suffrage roughly in 1970, which is rather late for the standard bearer of democracy. Even then, I think there are currents in American life and in American society that are less positive about democracy. One of my favorite examples of this is the 1972 presidential election, which some us of here remember. It was the overwhelming victory for George McGovern in Washington, DC and Massachusetts. But in the 1972 election in Massachusetts, which was the most liberal state in the country at the time, there was a rather remarkable referendum on the ballot, which was to remove from the Massachusetts state constitution the prohibition against paupers' voting. That prohibition had effectively become unconstitutional as a result of *Harper v Virginia*, but the language was in the state constitution, and so there was a referendum asking: "Should we remove this prohibition that says that paupers cannot vote?" Well, the proposition passed. But 400,000 people voted against it in Massachusetts in 1972. So I think we have to recognize that this embrace of voting even today is not universal. Still, change has occurred at some critical junctions that I have tried to outline in the paper, and the temper of political thought is quite different in the early twenty-first century society than it was in the late eighteenth century.

The second point that I tried to address, as cued by the organizers of this symposium, was the potential objection to a "right to vote" amendment that might be raised by those claiming to protect states' rights: if we had such a constitutional amendment, it would eliminate the hallowed right of state legislatures to hijack elections. This is, we all know, a very valued state right. But rather than simply poke fun at that, the reflections I give to that as a historian are really twofold. One is that in contrast to the situation at the end of the eighteenth century or the early nineteenth century, we are now fully a nation. There were numerous constitutional amendments proposed between 1810 and 1830 that would have federalized the right to vote. Thomas Hart Benton introduced one every year into Congress, and John Tyler's opposition to it was to say that such a proposition was as if or as though we were a nation and not a compact of states. Well, at this point in our history I am comfortable saying that we are a nation and not a compact of states. And I think most other people accept this as well.

The other thing that the historical background sheds light on is that throughout American history, voting issues have been the subject of more constitutional amendments than any other single subject, occasioning frequent tension between the states and the federal government. With possibly one or 1.5 exceptions, in conflicts between the states and the federal government, the federal government has always been on the side of greater democracy and expanding the right to vote, while the cry of states' rights has almost invariably been a

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demand to restrict the suffrage and to discriminate in one form or another. The one broad exception was that in part of the nineteenth century, in a very interesting development, a lot of the states got way out ahead of the federal government in granting the right to vote to people who were not citizens. But then they crept back into the fold in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as they realized that these noncitizens weren't any longer the kinds of folks they wanted to have vote in the first place. The other interesting case about this is the Supreme Court's action and the federal government's stance during and just after the 1842 Dorr War in Rhode Island, when the federal government certainly took an emphatically conservative position. In general the story about voting rights is largely about the South, but not exclusively so, as is revealed by the evolution of Native-American rights in the West. Thus states' rights has generally been a rhetorical shield behind which lay a desire to discriminate: usually to discriminate against people of color.

Let me make two more comments, again about things that are in the paper in a somewhat more coherent form. One is that any amendment of this type is bound to bump into the issue of felons. How you word the amendment will in one form or another play into the debate about whether felons and exfelons should be, are, or ought not be enfranchised. I am not sure one can find a wording that does not either enfranchise people who are currently incarcerated or in postincarceration, or that does not thicken the legal barriers against their enfranchisement by providing a federal constitutional sanction for it. I think that if there were a public debate over this constitutional amendment, the question of felons would come to the fore; Puerto Rico in some places might also emerge. And my reaction to that is to welcome it. That is not a reason to back away from it. It is an issue that needs public debating.

The last thing I would say, and I don't think this is just a rhetorical flourish, is that in the post-September 11 world there's a new measure of urgency about questions of rights and certain questions of politics. I don't think that it is an artificial attachment of one thing to another. Everyone in this room found election 2000 to be a massive crisis. But in the end it really was not much of a crisis. It did not go very deep. It was a legal crisis and a minor political crisis. But the water settled over it very quickly. I think that occurred precisely because there did not appear to be much difference between the two candidates. After all, the single most debated issue in the last weeks of the campaign was exactly which prescription drug plan to have for seniors. That is not an issue that was going to send a lot of people to the barricades when their candidate lost. The whole structure, the way the campaign was conducted really minimized any sense of difference between the candidates. We have learned since then that there was an enormous difference. Moreover, in a world where we feel a sense of threat, in an international environment that may feel substantially less warm and fuzzy, and in an economy which may have less promise of continuous growth, we may start seeing the emergence of a more contentious and conflic-

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tual politics in which making the right to vote less ambiguous becomes all the more important.

CARALEY: Yes, and post-September 11, when our government is debating whether to start a potentially large war in the Middle East, that's all the more reason to know who has a right to vote for the person who has most to do in making that kind of decision.

SMITH:* I agree completely with every point in Alex's paper. I am, therefore, glad that he kept it short, because otherwise he might have gone on to say everything that I have to say. But perhaps by making some further points, I can reach some fruitful disagreements with him or, I'm sure, with some of the rest of you.

Alex notes that he would really like to see the electoral college abolished. So would I. During the *Bush v Gore* controversy, I briefly tested the waters of cyberspace to see if there might be some rising public sentiment to do so. I found none, a point to which I will return.

But first let me give my reasons for disliking the electoral college. It is not only that the power to appoint electors actually belongs to the state legislatures, undemocratic as that is in terms of modern notions of democracy. And it's also not only that it apportions electors via a state's number of senators plus representatives and thereby reproduces the least democratic features of Congress, bad as I think that is. I also dislike building state representation into the electoral college, because that system did not simply arise from the desires of small states to balance out the power of big states. It also won support in part from the desire of slave states to balance out the power of free states, because the slave states rightly expected the free states would grow in population more rapidly. So the electoral college was designed to give the slave states disproportionate power in selecting presidents—and it worked. Apart from the two troubled one-term presidencies of the two Adamses, presidents from slave states governed the nation for the first forty-seven years of its existence—the years when slavery was allowed to spread and tighten its cancerous hold on the body politic.

So I see the electoral college as in part an ugly relic of slavery, and I hate that. But, I know that slavery is in the distant past, so that's not a reason to abolish it today. It is probably more prudent to do as Alex and Jim Caraley suggested—to leave the electoral college intact but to establish a constitutional right of citizens to vote for presidential electors. More minimal though this proposal is, it does still raise troubling and important questions that should be raised, and Alex has just identified the key ones. It would raise the question of whether we can and should disenfranchise felons; and let me add some points on this issue. No nation in the world disenfranchises felons to anything like the extent that the United States does. We are at the far extreme in this

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pattern. And the United States today disenfranchises many more felons than it used to, because over the last thirty years we've added many more criminal laws; we've added disenfranchisement as a penalty for more crimes and have made many more acts into felonies that bring disenfranchisement and incarceration instead of lesser penalties. This recent period represents the second time in our history that we've had a large surge in new criminal laws and heightened incarcerations. The first such period came in the late nineteenth century, and it resulted primarily in the imprisonment and disenfranchisement of large numbers of newly freed and newly enfranchised black men. In our time, of course, matters are very different. The surge in criminalization over the past thirty years has resulted primarily in the imprisonment and disenfranchisement of large numbers of long-freed and newly-enfranchised black men. It should be evident from that description why I think the question of whether we should be doing this is one that definitely merits deep consideration and debate today.

Alex is also right to say that the denial of the franchise in presidential elections to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico would also be called into question by this proposal; and that, too, is a good thing. The history of the debates over what to do with the Spanish American War acquisitions in 1900, the debates over the Foraker Act, which initially structured American colonial governance in Puerto Rico, the debates over the Jones Act of 1917, which gave Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship over the objections of their leadership, all show that the main reason that this kind of U.S. citizenship did not include voting rights in U.S. elections was that Puerto Ricans were considered culturally and racially unfit for the franchise. Of course, like slavery, that's well in our past. That cannot be the reason why U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico do not vote in presidential elections now. But then, what is the reason? That is a question that merits deep consideration, and if this proposal helps spur that discussion, I think that would be a good thing.

But I have to say, even though I think discussing these questions would be valuable and important, I very much fear that if these questions are raised, even this modest, minimal proposal might fail to win the supermajority support needed for a constitutional amendment. I'm afraid, even though we tell ourselves in all sincerity that governing in accordance with racial prejudices belongs to our past, we are still often reluctant to change policies and institutions that we have inherited from those days, including those I've just described, even if they perpetuate many of the old injustices in our own time, as I think they often do.

Since even this modest proposal for a constitutional right to vote in federal elections may well be defeated anyway, let me mention that I would like to see it made slightly less modest. Alex indicates that under this proposal the states would still have leeway to indicate whether the voters choose electors as a bloc in a statewide winner-take-all election or by districts. I'd like the amendment to require that electors be assigned by some system of proportional representation, with the candidate getting a plurality nationwide winning the

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White House. I realize that this is a radical addition that would probably make prospects for change even grimmer, so I will understand if no one here wants to go along with it.

But I mention it because the thing I found most discouraging about the election of 2000 and *Bush v Gore* was not that the candidate with fewer votes nationwide took office with the help of the electoral college and the U.S. Supreme Court. The thing that I found most discouraging was that after a few months, nobody much cared. They didn't care enough to want to reform the electoral college. They didn't care enough to be concerned with whether in some way we should curb the power of the Supreme Court. Now, it may have been because the election was essentially a tie, so that this was as good as flipping a coin. Some arbitrary means seemed the best possible under the circumstances. It may have been because the candidates didn't seem all that different anyway, as Alex suggests. Some would dispute that, but it's possible. It may also have been, however, because Americans have gotten used to the idea that our democratic processes are mostly just rituals anyway and that some subset of our mainstream elites ends up governing no matter what. So it's not really worth worrying too much about how they get there, we just worry whether they're doing all right for us or not. And for most Americans, Bush has been doing all right for us; that's all that matters, so we don't need to worry about the election of 2000 and how democratic or undemocratic it may have shown our institutions to be.

Maybe things have to be that way in such a vast country as ours; maybe real democracy, if we're honest, is a pipedream under modern circumstances. But I also think that people don't care too much about whether our democratic processes are really all that democratic, because those processes provide such limited avenues for real democratic participation and efficacy. Therefore, they don't nourish or encourage democratic commitments substantially. I think perhaps if we build an element of proportional representation into presidential voting, even if we keep what I see as the ill-conceived electoral college and even though in the end only one person would get elected president, that change would still encourage the growth of third-party candidacies; for it would provide more visible evidence of their strength, which can encourage them. It also might serve as an example that would help legitimate changes in other electoral systems to make them less biased in favor of the two major parties in other elections. That in turn might mean that with a more robust and diverse party system reflecting more different types of view, more people would really feel represented, would feel that they have a real chance for a voice and an impact in our political system. And more people might think it worthwhile to engage in democratic politics; and then more people might become more committed to democratic values and to the actual realization of them; and more people might get upset if the electorally-registered democratic will were thwarted on occasion and if some citizens were locked out of democratic participation altogether.

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If we can't get that kind of more radical reform to affirm and strengthen the reality of our system's professed commitments to democracy, let us at a minimum try to do so by insuring that all citizens gain a constitutional right to vote for president of the United States. What real democratic reason is there not to do so?

CARALEY: Thank you. Linda, do you want to weigh in?

GREENHOUSE:* Yes. I think Bush against Gore was certainly a wake-up call for those of us not in the scholarly community. Until Bush against Gore, I had no idea that I didn't have a direct right to vote. And it's possible, if people reflect back on it, that even short of a constitutional amendment there may be a way of addressing the problem. Remember what happened in Florida, how close the legislature came to trumping the peoples' right to vote. I don't know if it's a practical idea to have debates in state legislatures to bring the popular democracy point to the fore and achieve by legislation, state by state, the kind of guarantee that would be achieved nationwide by an amendment.

Let me make one micropoint also in focusing on the felon issue. One other kind of glaring hole in the franchise that was brought to the fore in Florida was the question of military ballots. If you remember, that was a very tricky issue because there was a lot of game-playing among the Florida electoral apparatus as to how closely to look at the time stamp on the absentee ballots that had been mailed from ships beyond the deadline. There was a debate in the Gore camp over whether to challenge ballots that were, at least facially, invalid. Then the Gore people decided at the end of the day not to do that, because they didn't want to look unfriendly to the military. But that's something that I think, if we're talking national picture, certainly has to be regularized and taken out of the hands of partisan state electoral officials.

CARALEY: But if the state legislatures do it, why can't they change their minds and undo it whenever they feel like it?

GREENHOUSE: I think Alex's point about harmonizing the Constitution with prevailing political and social values also applies there. Once the issue is joined and people are aware of what the issue is, as few were until now, I think it would be, as a political matter, impossible for legislatures to take back this sleeping giant's power.

CARALEY: But the Florida state legislature was about to do just that, was about to choose the Bush electors on its own if Gore came out ahead in the popular vote. So they were going to take back the power to choose electors from the people.

GREENHOUSE: Sure. But what I was proposing would be state-by-state legislation where there would be a state law in the exercise of the legislature's federal constitutional power to determine this. The legislature would give up its power and make it clear that there's no set of circumstances under which what was about to happen in Florida would happen.

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KEYSSAR: Where do you see the resistance to a federal constitutional amendment coming from?

GREENHOUSE: The problem I see with a constitutional amendment is that it would get very complicated and very encrusted with the wish lists of other groups. I mean, whether we get back to the term limits debate, although that moment, I guess, seems to have passed. Who knows what would come out of the woodwork once there's an amendment process on the floor? A few years ago, when there were lots of various amendments floating around, a couple of blue-ribbon panels were convened. The Century Foundation had one to warn of the dangers in this kind of climate, of quote, "tinkering with the Constitution." I can see some things getting encrusted and more complicated than we'd like to deal with.

SMITH: That would have been an argument against the Fifteenth Amendment and against enfranchising women as well, though, which were both attempted at some degree at the state level.

POMPER:* There's something about this discussion that seems to me off in space. If you take it in its bold terms that there should be a constitutional amendment or there should be language that says Americans should vote for president, or should have the right to vote directly for president, that seems like an obvious proposal. If you put it straight on the table and nothing else, nobody would disagree with it, nobody would have the nerve to disagree with it politically. But, of course, it wouldn't just be that, and Rogers Smith illustrates exactly what would happen. He said, well this is okay, but what I really want is proportional representation of the electoral votes or proportional representation of the direct popular vote; somebody else will want the district system; Arthur Schlesinger will want his particular kind of hybrid. And so, it will not be just that. An amendment that says "the right of the American people to vote for electors shall not be infringed," raises the question, "Who are the American people?" Are they under 18 years old? Are they alien permanent residents? Particularly, are they felons? It seems to me that if you want to do something serious, you ought to, and you don't need a constitutional amendment for this. You need legislation to deal with the largest disenfranchisement in the country.

There are four million Americans who could not vote in 2000 because of the exclusion of exfelons. In Florida, a couple of sociologists have done a wonderful study. In Florida, if exfelons had been enfranchised, Gore would have carried the state by 71,000 votes. We wouldn't have had this conference. You wouldn't have had the grant from Carnegie.

CARALEY: Yes, Gerry. Since I'm the convener I guess I should talk to that. Without some change, I think you could have a political crisis. If this were in the middle of a war, as the elections of 1864 and 1944 were, and

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one person seemed to be getting the popular vote plurality and there was skullduggery in the ballots in another state headed by a governor who's the brother of the opposing presidential candidate, it wouldn't be accepted as readily as it got accepted when we thought that there was really no difference between Bush and Gore.

KEYSSAR: In any case, I think the felon issue is what is the setting or context. How do you want to bring that issue up into a public debate? It would seem to me, and I'm not saying there are no other ways, that bringing it up in the context of a statement of universal rights may be a good way to do it. The second point is that in many states, you could not do it just by legislation. These things are in state constitutions. The felony exclusions are in state constitutions. You could not simply do it by legislation.

POMPER: May I ask you or Linda Greenhouse a question? There was something I dimly remember in 2000. The Florida constitution says something about "the people shall determine all offices" or something like that. And that raises the prospect that if the Florida legislature had hijacked the election, they might have been sued by somebody, which of course would have gone to the Florida Supreme Court and then ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court. But maybe this problem doesn't even exist in Florida.

KEYSSAR: Florida's constitution opens with a very strong declaration, an affirmation of the right to vote for all public offices. As I recall, that was part of what Larry Tribe was trying to use as the tie breaker in interpreting conflicting statutes: he pointed toward this strong Florida right to vote to which Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia responded, "But there is no right to vote under Article II, section I," which trumps the state constitution. I think that's the way that argument evolved.

CARALEY: What about something else? I would not prefer a straight national popular election of the president, because of psychological reasons. I voted for presidential candidates who most of the time lost elections, but they carried either New York, when I was voting in New York, or Connecticut, where I now vote. And that gives me a sense of "Okay, at least I helped carry my state." Am I the only one who gets any kind of gratification out of that? I see Bob Shapiro laughing.

SHAPIRO:* I haven't seen any public opinion data on that in particular. I think it's an interesting question. The question I had for you, Jim, was in framing this question about the amendment were you thinking in terms of broader issues of the definition of who the electorate is, who the voters are as opposed to simply dealing with problems of renegade state legislatures? Because one political solution here is just to think about this in normal incremental political terms and just focus on that as the issue and be silent on all the other kinds of things. With regard to felons, just one small footnote, as

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more elected officials and politicians go to jail, maybe they'll become more concerned about it.

RAKOVE:** I think this issue of the Florida legislature, or any legislature, being able to hijack an election really is a specious one. The Constitution is clear, and federal statutory law is clear, that electors have to be appointed within a certain time and then to vote on a certain day. Notwithstanding these guys, who I really regard as constitutional hookers, who told the Florida legislature that they could go ahead and appoint this slate of electors after 7 November, on the simple face of it that would be a blatantly unconstitutional and illegal action in terms of the text of the Constitution and the statute. So I think it's problematic to ground this proposal on the danger of the Florida scenario, which is unlikely to repeat itself, both in terms of the circumstances and in terms of the existing constitutional and legal norms.

What I think would be more interesting, Alex, and it's a point you develop in your book, is to think about the implications of stating a positive right to vote for the presidency as distinguished from all those amendments, which as you certainly argue in your book, have never been phrased in robust positive terms, but have simply involved the removal of prohibitions or restrictions. Thinking about the democratic implications of expressing a right to vote for the presidency in the most positive terms as possible may not solve the Puerto Rican problem or the problem of felons, but it would represent an interesting advance beyond the way in which these amendments have previously been drafted. This is an interesting idea fraught with all kinds of implications. I'm aware of all of the dangers that arise here. But it would be interesting to see a debate about the basis on which we disenfranchise felons, and also why Puerto Ricans are citizens but can't vote in presidential elections. I think most Americans would not realize Puerto Ricans really are citizens.

CARALEY: Well, they also don't have House members and they don't have Senate members.

PILDES:* I want to express a little skepticism about the constitutional route, because, Alex, when you say that the history of the federal government has been one of the expansion of the suffrage, we have to remember that there's a difference between the political and judicial branches of the federal government. I was reminded of this by a conversation with Linda this morning. Once you constitutionalize the issue, you're doing something other than nationalizing it; you're turning over control of that issue to the courts to a significant extent. And if you look at the history of judicial action with respect to the vote and democracy, it's a pretty mixed history. There is an expansive period of time, but it's been twenty years or so in American history, and there are lots of moments when courts have been very—and I think this is such a moment—aggressive in dampening down democratic processes through constitutional

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law. I think it's quite easy to anticipate or predict that the courts will bring a kind of ideological conservative sensibility about changes to democracy.

This is going on internationally now. For example, the German Constitutional Court was asked whether the entry into the Maastricht Agreement by Germany violated the right to vote of German citizens. The argument was that there is a constitutional right to vote in the German Constitution. This is a dilution of sovereignty, and the German Court didn't say that this is not a question that the courts ought to address at all; they said that this is a serious issue. This could become problematic. Maastricht itself is not yet the point at which the right to vote has been diluted. But the whole idea that the courts would have anything to do with a judgment about the expansion of the European Union strikes me as a very mistaken path to go down.

Even historically, it's true that when we constitutionalize things like the Fourteenth Amendment, there's a conservative tendency, like the felon issue we're talking about. It becomes embedded as an area that states can continue to address through Section II of the Fourteenth Amendment. Women's suffrage gets taken off the table, in part by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, because that's the first time the word "male" was inserted into the Constitution. Even with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, there can be countervailing, conservatizing tendencies. When you have mass political movements for change, I think it's a much better way to change political process, because it allows a lot more flexibility and accommodation over time. It keeps issues in a political context, as opposed to licensing courts to address these kinds of issues.

ISSACHAROFF:* Usually for alphabetical reasons, I get to go before Rick and I don't like coming after him. I would say two things, and it follows up on what Rick says. Alex gave one and a half of those reasons already and he was right. I was going through my head and I was thinking *California Democratic Party v Jones*, *Shaw v Reno*, a number of cases where federal law has intervened to restrict the gambit of state political activity in areas where states gave greater latitude to political accommodations of the will of the majority than the federal courts were willing to read into the Constitution. I am not quite so confident that the federalization will push necessarily in the direction which you want it to push. Beyond that, my primary reaction is that there's always the tendency to fight the last fight and to view the last fight as being the most significant. But if you think about what is missing in the American context from the rights domain with regard to the franchise, I would argue that it's basically tinkering at the margins. It is true that the felon disenfranchisement issue is a significant one. It is true that Puerto Rico has all kinds of complications and that the District of Columbia has complications. But is that really where the main inquiry should be? I think this is a point that I make in my paper—if you think about the distortions of the electoral

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college in the last election, I don't think the rights claim is particularly salient. I don't think that, for example, in given the structure of the campaign where neither candidate campaigned nor spent money in New York or Texas, two of the three largest states, that the electoral results are very meaningful in terms of who actually won and who had more popular support. It's an artifact of the rules of the game, and if the rules had been changed, they would have campaigned differently. We have no confidence about how that would have come out. What is significant is that the winner-take-all feature of the electoral college division of the electors in each state, even if we have the electoral college and everything else, radically changes the terms of political discourse in this country.

Why in the world did we have an election about prescription drugs in 2000? It is impossible even to remember what the discussion was. And it's certainly impossible to remember why that should have any salience except that everybody knew that the election was going to turn on Florida and Pennsylvania, and those are numbers one and two in terms of elders in their population. So we ran an entire national campaign on what was the narrowest form of sectional interest. Now Rogers makes the point that the electoral college grew out of the sectional interests of the slave holders; we had a repeat of that, not at the rights domain but rather a structural distortion of what should be the way in which the Americans select the president. So I would suggest that the federal route is not necessarily the panacea that it's held out to be. It may be that focusing on this as a question of the expansion of the rights domain really misses the issue of what the actual effect of the electoral college is.

CARALEY: What you spoke about the electoral college requiring winner take all, you didn't mean to say that because not every state requires winner take all.

ISSACHAROFF: No, every state but two requires winner take all.

CARALEY: Right, but that's not in the Constitution.

ISSACHAROFF: No, it's not in the Constitution.

CARALEY: If my memory is correct, it was the Virginia legislature that established winner take all first. I think it was in 1796 so that John Adams would not get a single elector from Virginia. So it was to disenfranchise the minority. But I think basically I agree with you, because the other thing you didn't bring in, except inferentially, is the high cost of television advertising. Because Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, the only states where I watched television, were certain as to how they would go, I didn't see a single ad for Gore or Bush. So we, now sitting in New York, are being ignored by presidential campaigns. The whole winner take all of the populous states was supposed to give them disportionately large influence by casting a large block of electoral votes to one candidate over the other. This kind of influence has evaporated, because the campaigns have to ration money. They don't have unlimited television money, and they ignore people in states that are deemed not to be in play but certain for one or another of the candidates.

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SMITH: I think these are very important considerations. I don't disagree with you at all about the history and the Supreme Court's rule and all that. But, two things: one is that we have come to a point in the system in which constitutionalization is viewed as empowering the courts, but that shouldn't necessarily be the case. To some degree, it's an analytically separate problem if we have overly privileged the courts as opposed to other institutions and democratic politics in saying what the Constitution means. I don't think we should just embrace that feature of the contemporary system, and I agree there are problems with a constitutional rights route. I am most struck by the general lack of any political movement on any of these fronts that we're talking about, and if debating a constitutional amendment were a way to get debates going in democratic processes, that would be a good thing.

CARALEY: Let me try to sum up the thinking of our panel. Everyone believes that every American citizen should have the constitutional right to vote for presidential electors. Some didn't even realize that the Constitution does not now give such a right and that popular voting for electors is dependent on the actions of the various state legislatures. While a few of the colleagues preferred a nationwide, straight, popular election of the president, we did not discuss this with any depth, because everyone agreed that a constitutional amendment trying to eliminate the electoral vote system completely could never be adopted. There was also broad consensus, however, that electors as persons should be taken out of the system and that electoral votes should be assigned by a state according to the popular vote without any further human, discretionary intervention.

Even for this minor change of the system, various participants thought the wording of an amendment would not be easy, because the pro-democratic changes in the Constitution for presidential voting are all worded as prohibitions from depriving the right to vote on the basis of race, gender, or age above eighteen years. There is no language for affirmatively granting the right to vote. Also there was some concern that once a constitutional amendment is being considered, the whole system might be opened up. Anti- rather than pro-democratic language might find itself into the amendment. There was also concern over the denial by states of the right to vote to the substantial numbers of persons convicted of felonies.

We all realized that the Constitution itself does not provide for the winner-take-all system of allocating electoral votes that is used in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia. What the winner-take-all system does is to deny statewide minorities any influence in the outcome of the presidential election. Ordinary state or federal legislation could change that system, but there was no consensus on what should replace it: winner take all by congressional district or proportional vote allocation of electoral votes by congressional district or statewide. . . . Only the last variation would put all states "in play" and not have any written off before the general election campaigns even begin.

Thank you everybody.

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


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


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# The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN

America today arguably has greater ability to shape the future of world politics than any other power in history. The military, economic, technological, and cultural dominance of the United States is unprecedented. The opportunity that America has before it also stems from the geopolitical opening afforded by the cold war's end. Postwar periods are moments of extraordinary prospect, usually accompanied by searching debate and institutional innovation. It is no accident that the Concert of Europe was erected after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, that the League of Nations came into being at the close of World War I, and that the founding of the United Nations followed the end of World War II.

Despite the opportunities afforded by its dominance and by the end of the cold war, America is squandering the moment. From the fall of the Berlin Wall until September 11, 2001, the United States had no grand strategy, no design to guide the ship of state. The first Bush administration did an admirable job of presiding over the end of the cold war but did little to shape what came next. The Clinton team managed reasonably well the international challenges that it faced but never articulated a conceptual foundation or overarching set of guiding principles. The early months of the George W. Bush administration were characterized primarily by inconsistency, with the ambitious unilateralism of the neoconservatives clashing head-on with the neoisolationist instincts of the president and his fellow heartland conservatives.

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Since September 11, the United States has had a grand strategy—one based on the principles of preeminence and preemption. But it is a manifestly inappropriate grand strategy. Washington's swaggering brand of global leadership and its dismissive attitude toward international institutions have succeeded in alienating much of the world and straining to the breaking point many of America's key partnerships.

Rather than rallying behind the United States, countries around the world are distancing themselves from Washington and locking arms to resist a wayward America. France, Germany, and Russia did their best to block America's rush to war against Iraq; the Western alliance is unlikely to survive the transatlantic rift that has opened. After North Korea restarted its nuclear weapons program, South Korea, China, and Japan all made clear they would not back Washington's refusal to negotiate bilaterally with Pyongyang. Anti-American sentiment has been on the rise in just about every quarter of the globe.[1] Even in countries that have for decades been close U.S. allies—such as Germany and South Korea—politicians are winning office by running on platforms calling for independence from Washington. America seems well on its way to compromising perhaps its most precious asset—its international legitimacy.

The failure of the United States to manage more successfully the post-cold war international order is a direct by-product of Washington's misperception of the world's geopolitical landscape. Backed up by repeated scholarly pronouncements about the longevity of unipolarity, successive administrations have operated under the assumption that U.S. primacy is here to stay. As William Wohlforth sums up the prevailing wisdom, "the current unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable. . . . For many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United States in any of the underlying elements of power."[2] Such confidence in the durability of U.S. preponderance bred the complacency of the 1990s. Washington believed that order would devolve naturally from hierarchy; there was no pressing need for institutional innovation. The blustery policies of the Bush administration have similarly been based on the presumption that a combination of preeminence and uncompromising leadership will induce the rest of the world to get in line.

This confidence about the longevity of the American era is not only misplaced but also dangerous. America appears to be committing the same error as most other great nations that have come before it—mistaking for a more permanent peace the temporary great-power quiescence that usually follows resolution of a major geopolitical divide. The decade that followed the cold war's end was admittedly one of bounty and peace for America. The current

[1] See Richard Morin, "World Image of U.S. Declines: Poll Says Countries Suspicious of Iraq Motives, Global Role," *Washington Post*, 5 December 2002.

[2] See William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24 (Summer 1999): 8, 10–22; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (July/August 2002); and Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest* 70 (Winter 2002/2003).

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dominance of the United States is no illusion; by any measure, America is in a class by itself. The events of September 11 certainly left the United States with a new-found vulnerability, but they also fostered confidence that the threat of terrorism would further unite the world's major players.

The international system, however, is fickle and fragile, and can come apart with remarkable speed. In 1910, Europeans were confident of the peace-causing benefits of economic interdependence and the irrationality of armed conflict. By the late summer of 1914, Europe's great powers were at war. The United States enjoyed prosperity and optimism during the second half of the 1920s. By 1933, the world was well into a painful depression, Hitler was in control of Germany, and the century was fast headed toward its darkest moments. In early 1945, the United States was busy building a postwar partnership with the Soviet Union, U.S. forces were rapidly demobilizing, and the American people were looking to the United Nations to preserve world peace. Within a few short years, the cold war was under way, and the United States and Soviet Union were threatening each other with nuclear annihilation.

The reemergence of rivalry and conflict among the world's major states is by no means foreordained. But there is no better way to ensure its return than for America to set its sights on terrorism and presume that great-power peace is here to stay. Instead, America should realize that its preponderance and the stability it breeds are already beginning to slip away. Europe is in the midst of a revolutionary process of political and economic integration that is gradually eliminating the importance of its internal borders and centralizing authority in Brussels. The European Union's collective wealth will soon rival that of the United States. As the diplomatic standoff over Iraq made clear, the continent's main powers are increasingly ready to act as a collective counterweight to U.S. power. Russia, which joined France and Germany in trying to prevent the war, will ultimately rebound and may well take its place in an integrating Europe. Asia is not far behind. China is already a regional presence, and its economy is growing apace. And Japan, the world's second-largest economy, will eventually climb out of recession and gradually expand its political and military influence.

At the same time that challengers to its dominance are on the rise, the United States is fast abandoning its embrace of a liberal brand of internationalism—one committed to multilateral action and international institutions. Instead, America is veering toward unilateralist and neoisolationist extremes, a change of course that will both alienate rising centers of power and encourage their autonomy. President George W. Bush early on made known his unilateralist proclivities. Within six months of taking office, Bush had pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, made clear his intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, stated his opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the pact establishing the International Criminal Court, backed away from establishing a body to verify the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and watered down a UN agreement aimed at controlling the proliferation of small arms. Bush also revealed his neoisolationist instincts,

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making clear that he intended to rein in the country's commitments, back away from mediating peace efforts in troubled regions, and focus on matters closer to home.

For many, the events of September 2001 arrested this trend, convincing the Bush administration and the American public of the need for wide-ranging, multilateral engagement. As Andrew Sullivan, the former editor of *The New Republic*, wrote only a few days after the attack, "We have been put on notice that every major Western city is now vulnerable. . . . For the United States itself," Sullivan continued, "this means one central thing. Isolationism is dead."[3] Others asserted that the attack would encourage Washington to rediscover multilateralism. G. John Ikenberry claimed that terrorism would push the United States "back toward a more centrist foreign policy" that "stresses alliances [and] multilateral cooperation," thereby providing "new sinews of cohesion among the great powers."[4]

It is by no means clear, however, that terrorism inoculates the United States against the allure of either isolationism or unilateralism. In the long run, America's leaders may well find the country's security better served by reducing its overseas commitments and raising protective barriers than by chasing terrorists through the mountains of Afghanistan or toppling Saddam Hussein. The United States has a strong tradition dating back to the Founding Fathers of seeking to cordon itself off from foreign troubles, an impulse that could well be reawakened by the rising costs of global engagement. America's initial response to the attacks of September 11, after all, was to close its borders with Mexico and Canada, ground the nation's air traffic, and patrol the country's coasts with warships and jet fighters. And when the United States does act, it may well do so without the support of the international community—as in Iraq—undermining both the spirit and the form of multilateral engagement.

The American era is alive and well, but the rise of alternative centers of power and a difficult and diffident U.S. internationalism will ensure that it comes undone as this new century progresses—with profound geopolitical consequences. The stability and order that devolve from American preponderance will gradually be replaced by renewed competition for primacy. The unstoppable locomotive of globalization will run off its tracks as soon as Washington is no longer behind the controls. Pax Americana is poised to give way to a much more unpredictable and dangerous global environment. And the chief threat will come not from the likes of Osama bin Laden, but from the return of traditional geopolitical rivalry.

As a matter of urgency, America needs to begin to prepare itself and the rest of the world for this more uncertain future. To wait until American preponderance is already gone would be to squander the enormous opportunity that comes with primacy. America must devise a grand strategy for the transition to a world of multiple power centers now, while it still has the luxury of doing so. This is the central challenge of this article.

[3] "Why Did It Have to be a Perfect Morning?" *The Sunday Times*, 15 September 2001.

[4] G. John Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror," *Survival* 43 (Winter 2001–2002): 19–20.

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## The Waning of Unipolarity

Most scholars of international politics trace change in the distribution of power to two sources: the secular diffusion over time and space of productive capabilities and material resources; and balancing against concentrations of power motivated by fear of exploitation. Today's great powers will become tomorrow's has-beens as nodes of innovation and efficiency move from the core to the periphery of the international system. In addition, reigning hegemons threaten secondary states, causing them to form countervailing coalitions and take other steps to offset their material disadvantage. Taken together, these dynamics drive the cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of great powers.[5]

The contemporary era departs from this historical pattern; neither the diffusion of power nor traditional military balancing against the United States will be decisive factors driving the coming transition in the international system. It will be decades before any single state can match the United States in terms of either military or economic capability. Nor is explicit balancing against American power likely to provoke a countervailing coalition. The United States is separated from both Europe and Asia by large expanses of water, making American power less threatening. Anti-American sentiment may be on the rise in many parts of the world. But it is hard to imagine that the United States would engage in behavior sufficiently aggressive to provoke an opposing alliance of industrialized countries. Europeans, South Koreans, and others may not welcome U.S. troops in their neighborhoods as they have for decades, but there are no signs that countries in Europe or Asia are contemplating balancing against the United States in military terms.

In contrast to the past, the waning of today's unipolarity will be driven by two unusual suspects: regional amalgamation in Europe and the erosion of liberal internationalism in the United States. Europe is gradually emerging as a counterweight to the United States. It will not challenge America militarily, but it will increasingly constitute an alternative center of power in economic and political terms. At the same time, America's changing internationalism will compromise the international order that the United States itself took the lead role in constructing, expediting the transition to a more divided and unruly global system. Fittingly enough, the end of American primacy may be made in America.

### *The Rise of Europe*

Europe is in the midst of a long-term process of political and economic integration that is gradually eliminating the importance of borders and is centralizing authority and resources. To be sure, the European Union (EU) is not an amal-

[5] See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17 (Spring 1993).

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gamated polity with a single center of authority. Nor does Europe have a military capability commensurate with its economic resources. But trend lines do indicate that Europe is heading in the direction of becoming a new center of power. Now that its single market has been accompanied by a single currency, Europe has a collective weight on matters of trade and finance rivaling that of the United States. The aggregate wealth of the EU's fifteen members is already approaching that of America, and the coming entry of a host of new members will strengthen Europe's hand.

In addition, Europe has recently embarked on efforts to forge a common defense policy and to acquire the military wherewithal to operate independently of U.S. forces.[6] The EU has appointed a high representative for foreign and security policy, created the bodies necessary to provide political oversight, and started to revamp its forces. After parting company with the United States over the war against Iraq, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg announced that they were taking further steps to deepen defense cooperation. And Germany moved closer to ending military conscription in favor of a more capable professional force.[7] Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, the EU's military capability will certainly remain quite limited compared to that of the United States. And it will be decades, if ever, before the EU becomes a unitary state, especially in light of its impending enlargement to the east. But as its resources grow and its decision making becomes more centralized, power and influence will become more equally distributed between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Skeptics counter that the EU is unlikely to cohere as an effective actor in the global arena; the national states remain too strong and the union too decentralized and divided by cultural and linguistic boundaries. But Europe has repeatedly defied the skeptics as it has successfully moved from a free trade area to a single market and to a single currency. Eastward enlargement does risk the dilution of the union, threatening to make its decision-making bodies more unwieldy. But precisely because of this risk, it is also likely to trigger institutional reform, inducing a core group of states to pursue deeper integration. Important in both practical and symbolic terms, EU member states are now considering the drafting and ratification of a constitution, the appointment of a single foreign minister, and the establishment of a directly-elected chief executive.

A changing political discourse within Europe is also fueling the EU's geopolitical ambition. For most of its history, national leaders have justified European integration to their electorates by arguing that it is needed to help Europe escape its past. Union was the only way out of great-power rivalry. But World War II has by now receded sufficiently far into history that escaping the past no longer resonates as a pressing cause for many Europeans. The younger gen-

[6] The EU has set a goal of being able by 2003 to deploy a force of roughly 60,000 troops within 60 days of notification and to sustain the deployment for one year.

[7] Tony Paterson, "Schroder to End Conscription in Push for EU Rapid Reaction Force," *Daily Telegraph*, 13 April 2003.

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erations who lived through neither the war nor Europe's rebuilding have no past from which they seek escape. The dominant political discourse that has for decades given the EU its meaning and momentum is rapidly losing its salience.

In its place is emerging a new discourse, which emphasizes Europe's future rather than its past. Instead of justifying integration as a way to check the power and geopolitical ambition of the national state, it portrays integration as a way to acquire power and project geopolitical ambition for Europe as a whole. French President Jacques Chirac, in a speech delivered in Paris in November 1999, could hardly have been clearer: "The European Union itself [must] become a major pole of international equilibrium, endowing itself with the instruments of a true power."[8] Even the British, who for decades kept their distance from the EU, have changed their minds. In the words of Prime Minister Tony Blair, "Europe's citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power in the world. Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about projecting collective power."[9]

Such sentiments only intensified after the election of George W. Bush because of the unilateralist substance and tone of his foreign policy. In the wake of Bush's call to widen the war against terrorism to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, French Foreign Minster Hubert Vedrine called for Europe to speak out against a United States that acted "unilaterally, without consulting others, making decisions based on its own view of the world and its own interests." When asked about how to deal with American preponderance, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder replied that "the answer or remedy is easy: a more integrated and enlarged Europe" that has "more clout." Valery Giscard d'Estaing opened the EU's constitutional convention in March 2002 by noting that successful reform of the union's institutions would ensure that "Europe will have changed its role in the world. . . . It will be respected and listened to," he continued, "not only as the economic power it already is, but as a political power that will speak as an equal with the largest existing and future powers on the planet." Romano Prodi, president of the commission, agreed that one of the EU's chief goals is to create "a superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the United States."[10]

Integration is thus being relegitimated among European electorates, but paradoxically through a new brand of pan-European nationalism. Europe's states may have rid themselves for good of their individual claims to great-

[8] Speech on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Institute Francais des Relations Internationales, Elysee Palace, 4 November 1999. Text distributed by the French Embassy in Washington, DC.

[9] Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange, 6 October 2000, available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=1341&SectionId=32.

[10] Suzanne Daley, "French Minister Calls U.S. Policy 'Simplistic,'" *New York Times*, 7 February 2002; Alan Friedman, "Schroeder Assails EU Deficit Critics," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 February 2002; Steven Erlanger, "Europe Opens Convention to Set Future of Its Union," *New York Times*, 1 March 2002; T. R. Reid, "EU Summit Ends with a Bang and a Whimper," *Washington Post*, 17 March 2002.

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power status, but such aspirations are returning at the level of a collective Europe. As these new political currents gather momentum, so will Europe's geopolitical ambition. Europe need not emerge as a superpower with a global range of interests and commitments, if its rise is to alter the effective polarity of the international system. As Europe's wealth, military capacity, and collective character increase, so will its appetite for greater international influence. Just as America's will to extend its primacy stems not just from self-interest, but also from an emotional satisfaction derived from its leadership position—call it nationalism—so will Europe's rise provoke a yearning for greater status. As the United States currently sits atop the international pecking order, the EU's search for greater autonomy will, at least initially, take the form of resisting U.S. influence and ending its decades of deference to Washington.

An EU that becomes less dependent on the United States for its security and more often stands its ground on the major issues of the day will be sufficient to alter the structural dynamics of the transatlantic relationship. Increasing rivalry between the United States and Europe promises to deal a serious blow to the effectiveness of international organizations. Most multilateral institutions have relied on a combination of U.S. leadership and European back-stopping to produce consensus and joint action. The United States and Europe have often voted as a bloc, leading to a winning coalition in the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and many other bodies. When Europe resists rather than backs up American leadership in multilateral institutions, those institutions are likely to become far less effective instruments.

Early signs of such resistance have already been quite visible. In May 2001, EU member states took the lead in voting the United States off the UN Commission on Human Rights, the first time Washington had been absent from the body since its formation in 1947. The apparent rationale was to deliver a payback for America's increasing unilateralism and to express disapproval of America's death penalty. The same day, in a separate vote of the UN's Economic and Social Council, the United States lost its seat on the International Narcotics Control Board. Early in 2003, America again found itself outflanked at the UN, with France and Germany taking the lead in denying Washington the Security Council's approval of war against Iraq.

The United States and Europe are also likely to engage in more intense competition over trade and finance. America and Europe today enjoy a remarkably healthy economic relationship, with both parties benefiting from strong flows of trade and investment. A more assertive Europe and a less competitive American economy do, however, increase the likelihood that trade disputes will become more politicized. When the Bush administration announced new tariffs on imported steel in March 2002, the EU vowed to contest the move at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Pascal Lamy, the EU's top trade official, commented that "the U.S. decision to go down the route of protectionism

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is a major setback for the world trading system."[11] In May 2003, the EU announced that it intended to impose duties on imports of U.S. goods unless Washington repealed a law giving tax breaks to U.S. exporters.

Europe's restriction on imports of genetically modified foods, a ban that could cost U.S. companies billions of dollars, has particular potential to trigger a major dispute and polarize global trade talks. The emergence of the euro as an alternative reserve currency also creates the potential for diverging views about management of the international financial system. The competitive devaluations and monetary instability of the interwar period made amply clear that the absence of a dominant economic power can provoke considerable financial turmoil and go-it-alone foreign policies—even among like-minded allies.

Looking beyond the coming decade, economic growth in East Asia will further the onset of a new distribution of global power. Japan already has a world-class economy and will eventually climb out of recession. During the last decade, China enjoyed an economic growth rate of about 10 percent per year. The World Bank estimates that by 2020, "China could be the world's second largest exporter and importer. Its consumers may have purchasing power larger than all of Europe's. China's involvement with world financial markets, as a user and supplier of capital, will rival that of most industrialized countries."[12] The rise of Japan and China will ultimately contribute to the return of a multipolar global landscape.

### *America's Reluctant and Unilateralist Internationalism*

The second trend that will bring the unipolar moment to an end sooner rather than later is the changing character of internationalism in the United States. Unipolarity rests on the existence of a polity that not only enjoys preponderance but also is prepared to underwrite order in a manner that affirms its international legitimacy and benign character. If the United States were to tire of being the global protector of last resort or behave in a way that induced other nations to rally against rather than with U.S. power, unipolarity would still come undone even if American resources were to remain supreme. This hypothetical is in the midst of turning into reality.

America's diminishing appetite for liberal internationalism is a direct product of the changing international environment. America refused to embrace liberal internationalism until World War II, when the prospect of Germany and Japan becoming aggressors with global reach necessitated its multilateral involvement in shaping the balance of power in both Europe and East Asia. The Soviet threat then ensured that the United States would maintain extensive overseas commitments and institutional entanglements for the rest of the twentieth century.

[11] Edmund Andrews, "Angry Europeans to Challenge U.S. Steel Tariffs at WTO," *New York Times*, 6 March 2002.

[12] World Bank, *China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), 103.

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The cold war is now over and the fault line between two hostile blocs gone. America faces the threat of terrorism, but this is an elusive and sporadic threat, one that appears more likely to push the United States to the extremes of unilateralism and neoisolationism than to a centrist internationalism. In this new strategic environment, many of the same considerations that constrained the country's appetite for multilateral engagement from its founding in the eighteenth century until the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 are again coming to the fore.

America has from its early days been remarkably ambivalent about taking on international responsibilities. The Founding Fathers were quite explicit in their conviction that the security of the United States would be best served by reining in its external ambition and avoiding entangling alliances. They felt that the United States could fulfill the need for expanding commerce without getting embroiled in distant lands. As a rising power during the nineteenth century, the United States waited decades before translating its world-class economic power into military strength and external ambition. And even then, it attempted to avoid major strategic commitments abroad until World War II and the cold war left it with little choice.[13]

This potent strain of isolationism is the product of two factors. First, the United States is blessed with wide oceans to its east and west and nonthreatening countries to its north and south. Because of its enviable geopolitical location, America is justified in calculating that its security is at certain times and under certain circumstances best served by less, rather than more, engagement abroad. International terrorism, the ballistic missile, and fiber optics no doubt diminish the extent to which America can afford to cordon itself off from threats in distant quarters. But proximity still matters, and the distance of the United States from other areas continues to afford it a natural security and sense of isolation.

Second, the political culture and constitutional structure of the United States have checked the scope of the country's external ambition. During the early years of the republic, the individual states were loath to give up their rights to maintain independent militias and armed forces. They were also fearful of giving too much coercive capacity to the federal government, creating a network of constitutional checks and balances to decentralize power.[14] Times have obviously changed, but such internal checking mechanisms continue to constrain the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The Senate's rejection of U.S. participation in the League of Nations, the War Powers Act, and the more recent efforts of Congress to mandate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Balkans are all manifestations of the continuing institutional constraints on American internationalism.

[13] On the rise of the United States as a great power, see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[14] See Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, circa 1787–1861," *International Organization* 49 (Spring 1995): 191–228.

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The domestic politics of foreign policy also promises to grow more complicated in the coming years. Diplomacy is no longer the preserve of an internationalist Ivy League elite that shuttles between Foggy Bottom, Wall Street, and foreign capitals. What happens inside the beltway still matters, but, more than ever before, so do decisions and attitudes in Atlanta, Dallas, Seattle, Silicon Valley, and Los Angeles, each of which has its unique interests and brand of internationalism. Regional divides hardly evoke the passions that they did during America's early decades. But political, economic, and cultural differences that fall along regional lines are again coming to play an important role in shaping the country's foreign relations.

Consider the demographic makeup of the American population. An electorate with ancestral allegiances primarily to Europe is being transformed by the ongoing influx of immigrants from Latin America and by higher birthrates within the Latino community. By the second half of this century, Caucasians of European background will represent less than 50 percent of the U.S. population, with Latino Americans representing between one-fourth and one-third of the country. Latinos tend to concentrate in the Southwest, opening up the prospect of increasing regional differences.[15] This growing diversity could make it more difficult for America to generate a common internationalism and could lead to a country much more focused on the Western Hemishere.

America's unilateralist bent also has deep roots in the country's politics and culture. Since the republic's early days, Americans have viewed international institutions with suspicion, fearful that they will encroach upon the nation's sovereignty and room for maneuver. Avoiding entangling alliances and restricting the power of the federal government are enterprises that hit a populist chord and run deep within the American creed. After World War II, Americans of necessity shed some of their aversion to multilateral engagement; building a cohesive community of liberal democracies and managing the Western world required an elaborate network of institutions. But even during the cold war, unilateral urges often prevailed. On issues ranging from the tenor of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, to the Arab-Israeli conflict, to arms control, to international trade, the Western allies frequently complained of a wayward America all too often acting alone.

Absent the constraints of the cold war, America's unilateralist impulse has strengthened considerably. The vulnerability associated with the threat of terrorism has also played a role, as has electoral politics. A populist unilateralism runs strongest in the South and Mountain West, the fastest growing regions in the country, which are George W. Bush's main constituency.[16] America has also gravitated toward unilateralism out of frustration with its inability to get its way as often as in the past. Accustomed to calling the shots, the United States is

[15] U.S. Census Bureau, Census 1990. Available at: http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary.

[16] Walter Russell Meade, "The Jacksonian Tradition," *The National Interest* 58 (Winter 1999/2000): 5–29.

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likely to go off on its own when others refuse to follow Washington's lead, which the Europeans have been doing with greater frequency as their strength and self-confidence grow.

It is admittedly puzzling that isolationism and unilateralism are making a comeback at the same time. At least on the surface, they represent contradictory impulses, with isolationists calling for disengagement and unilateralists favoring unfettered global leadership. But they are in reality opposite sides of the same coin. They share common ideological origins in America's fear of entanglements that may compromise its liberty and sovereignty. The country should do its best to shun international engagement, but if it does engage, it should do so in a way that preserves national autonomy. They also share origins in the notion of U.S. exceptionalism, providing the nation an impetus to cordon itself off from the international system, but also to remake that system as America sees fit. It is precisely because isolationism and unilateralism are so deeply embedded in the country's political culture that they pose a dual threat to liberal internationalism, inducing the United States to retreat from the global stage even as it seeks to recreate the world in its image.[17]

The erosion of liberal internationalism in the United States is not a passing idiosyncrasy of the Bush administration. On the contrary, it is the product of secular changes in the geopolitical and political environment. The combination of unilateralism and isolationism toward which the United States is headed promises to be a dangerous mix. One day, America may well be alienating partners through its stiff-necked, go-it-alone ways, inducing the EU to emerge not just as a counterweight, but an angry one at that. The next, it may be leaving allies in the lurch as it backs away from an international system that it finds difficult to control. At the very moment that the United States will need the help of others to address mounting challenges, it may well find the world a lonely place.

Incorporating the trajectory of U.S. internationalism into analysis of the forces driving systemic change thus has profound implications for forecasting how and when America's unipolar moment is likely to end. In purely material terms, no single country is likely to catch the United States for decades, as Wohlforth has persuasively argued. But Wohlforth, like many other scholars, makes a critical analytic error in assuming that polarity emerges solely from the distribution of power. The willingness of states to deploy their resources, the manner in which they deploy them, and the ends to which they do so also play a role in shaping polarity. The emergence of a more reluctant and prickly American internationalism, even if U.S. preponderance remains uncontested, is a powerful engine of change in the global landscape.

## *The Evidence*

I have thus far built what is primarily a deductive case for the proposition that liberal internationalism is in retreat in the United States. I now provide sup-

[17] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986).

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porting empirical evidence, examining briefly public opinion, congressional behavior, and the early foreign policy of George W. Bush. I then take up the likely impact of terrorism on the trajectory of U.S. internationalism.

Numerous indicators suggest that U.S. internationalism is changing in step with the world's shifting geopolitics. Consider the picture that unfolded over the course of the last decade. America's diplomatic corps, once a magnet for the country's most talented, lost much of its professional allure. The few top candidates that the State Department did succeed in attracting often left in frustration after only a few years. According to a front-page story in the *New York Times*, "The State Department, the institution responsible for American diplomacy around the world, is finding it hard to adjust to an era in which financial markets pack more punch than a Washington-Moscow summit meeting. It is losing recruits to investment banks, dot-com companies and the Treasury and Commerce Departments, which have magnified their foreign policy roles."[18]

Public opinion surveys paint a similar picture. Regular surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and other bodies indicate that Americans remained generally internationalist throughout the 1990s.[19] However, the public's interest in foreign affairs did decline sharply. During the cold war, some pressing geopolitical issue of the day usually ranked near the top of the public's concerns. By the end of the 1990s, only 2 to 3 percent of Americans viewed foreign policy as a primary concern. When Americans were asked to name the "two or three biggest foreign-policy problems facing the United States today," the most popular response was "don't know." A solid majority of Americans indicated that events in other parts of the world have "very little" impact on the United States. As James Lindsay of the Brookings Institution summed up the situation in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, "Americans endorse internationalism in theory but seldom do anything about it in practice."[20] At the opening of the twenty-first century, Americans thus did not oppose their country's engagement in the world. They had just become profoundly apathetic about it.

It is precisely because of this attention deficit that newspapers, magazines, and the television networks dramatically cut back foreign coverage. In a com-

[18] Jane Perlez, "As Diplomacy Loses Luster, Young Stars Flee State Dept.," *New York Times*, 5 September 2000. In 2001, the State Department launched a publicity campaign to reverse its recruiting woes. The campaign was an apparent success, with the number of applicants for the 2001 Foreign Service entrance exam substantially larger than for the 2000 exam. See David Stout, "Sign-Ups for Foreign Service Test Nearly Double After 10-Year Ebb," *New York Times*, 31 August 2001.

[19] The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations carries out a public opinion survey every four years. The 1998 survey indicated that 96 percent of U.S. leaders and 61 percent of the public "favor an active part for the US in world affairs." The figures for 1994 were 98 percent and 65 percent respectively, indicating only a slight drop. In general, public opinion surveys show only a minor decrease in internationalism since the end of the cold war. See John E. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), available at: http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/AmPuOp99.pdf.

[20] James Lindsay, "The New Apathy," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (September/October 2000): 2–8. The public opinion data in this paragraph are also from the Lindsay article.

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petitive industry driven by market-share and advertisement fees per second, the media gave America what it wanted. Coverage of foreign affairs on television and in newspapers and magazines dropped precipitously. The time allocated to international news by the main television networks fell by almost 50 percent between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.[21] Between 1985 and 1995, the space devoted to international stories declined from 24 to 14 percent in *Time* and from 22 to 12 percent in *Newsweek*.[22]

The spillover into the political arena was all too apparent. With foreign policy getting so little traction among the public, it had all but fallen off the political radar screen. Virtually every foreign matter that came before Congress, including questions of war and peace, turned into a partisan sparring match. Peter Trubowitz has documented that partisan conflict over foreign policy increased dramatically in the recent past.[23] Bill Clinton's scandals and his repeated standoffs with an alienated Republican leadership no doubt played a role in pushing relations between the two parties to the boiling point. But the fact that foreign policy was held hostage made clear that America's politics and priorities had entered a new era.

Partisan politics with worrisome regularity trumped the demands of international leadership. Important ambassadorial posts remained empty throughout the Clinton years because Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, purely out of spite, refused to confirm the president's nominees. In August 2000, Peter Burleigh resigned from the State Department after waiting nine months for the Senate to confirm his appointment as ambassador to the Philippines.[24] Burleigh was widely recognized as one of America's most accomplished diplomats. America's dues to the United Nations went unpaid for most of the decade to keep happy the antiabortion wing of the Republican party, which thought the UN's approach to family planning too aggressive. The Senate in 1999 rejected the treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons despite the administration's willingness to shelve it. Better to embarrass Clinton than to behave responsibly on matters of war and peace. Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska, even admitted as much on the record. Reflecting on the apparent Republican assault on internationalism, Hagel commented that "what this is about on the Republican side is a deep dislike and distrust for President Clinton."[25] It is hard to imagine a more potent indicator of the direction of American internationalism than the defeat of a major treaty because of political animosities on the Senate floor.

[21] Andrew Tyndall, "Decline of International Network News Coverage since the End of the Cold War (in Minutes)," The Tyndall Report, cited in Media Studies Center, "The Decline of International News Coverage," available at http://www.mediastudies.org/international/international.html.

[22] Hall's Magazine Editorial Reports cited in James F. Hoge, Jr., "Foreign News: Who Gives a Damn?" *Columbia Journalism Review* 36 (November/December 1997): 48–52.

[23] Peter Trubowitz, University of Texas at Austin (draft paper presented at the Autonomous National University of Mexico, Mexico City, 20 August 2000).

[24] "Stymied by Senate, Would-Be Envoy Quits," *New York Times*, 1 September 2000.

[25] Alison Mitchell, "Bush and the G.O.P. Congress: Do the Candidate's Internationalist Leanings Mean Trouble?" *New York Times*, 19 May 2000.

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*Kosovo*

The battle for Kosovo provides perhaps the best window into these new attitudes, largely because it entailed putting U.S. forces into combat. On the surface, NATO's battle for Kosovo appeared to confirm that American leadership was alive and well. The United States led NATO into battle, Washington effectively ran the air campaign, and Clinton held course until Slobodan Milosevic capitulated and withdrew his forces from Kosovo. Upon a closer reading, however, the war was anything but a resounding confirmation of U.S. internationalism.

America's effort in the Balkans was at best half-hearted and enjoyed only razor-thin political support. From the outset, President Clinton pledged to avoid the use of ground forces, severely constraining the military operation and weakening NATO's hand in coercive diplomacy. The Clinton team expected Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to capitulate after a few days of air strikes; when he did not, the administration was shell-shocked and in a state of virtual paralysis.[26] Even after weeks of an air war that only exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, NATO was supposed to resolve and increase the probability of a southward spread of the war to Macedonia and Albania, President Clinton maintained his veto on ground troops. Moreover, he insisted that allied aircraft bomb from no lower than 15,000 feet to avoid being shot down.

Congressional opposition to the conflict only made matters worse. A month into a war that had not produced a single U.S. casualty, the House nevertheless expressed grave misgivings and voted 249–180 to refuse funding for sending U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia without congressional approval. The House was not even willing to pass a resolution endorsing the bombing campaign (the vote was 213–213). Congress's behavior hardly represented a strong reaffirmation of America's commitment to stability in Europe.

American behavior after the end of the conflict over Kosovo gave further indication of Washington's clear intent to limit the scope of U.S. commitments in the Balkans. European forces picked up the bulk of peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo, and the EU took the lead on economic reconstruction. Even before the end of the fighting, President Clinton promised Americans in his Memorial Day address that "when the peacekeeping force goes in there [Kosovo], the overwhelming majority of people will be European; and that when the reconstruction begins, the overwhelming amount of investment will be Eu-

[26] Brookings Institution scholars Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon offer a damning critique of the alliance's strategy: "The allies viewed force simply as a tool of diplomacy, intended to push negotiations one way or another. They were unprepared for the possibility that they might need to directly achieve a battlefield result. . . . NATO's war against Serbia was a vivid reminder that when using military power, one must be prepared for things to go wrong and to escalate." Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 105.

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ropean."[27] When the peacekeepers were deployed, American troops (which represented less than 15 percent of the total force) were sent to the east of Kosovo, where the likelihood of violence was presumed to be lower. In February 2000, a small contingent of U.S. troops was dispatched to the northern city of Mitrovica to help quell ethnic violence. When the troops were stoned by angry Serbs, the Pentagon responded by ordering U.S. forces back to their sector, making clear that Washington was prepared to undercut the peacekeepers' commander on the ground and put U.S. forces under special restrictions.[28]

Despite the unusual protections afforded U.S. troops, American lawmakers continued to complain about the need for Europe to do more. Republican Senator John Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in March 2000 pledged to seek to withhold half of the two billion dollar appropriation for American troops in Kosovo unless European nations increased their financial contributions to the UN efforts there.[29] Democratic Senator Robert Byrd proposed that the United States should turn over to the EU the peacekeeping and reconstruction effort in Kosovo and withdraw U.S. troops from the region in a timely fashion.[30]

Despite the facade of unity within NATO, America's deep ambivalence about the war and its aversion to casualties did not go unnoticed in Europe. It is no coincidence that in the aftermath of Kosovo, the European Union redoubled its efforts to forge a collective defense policy and a military force capable of operating independently of the United States. Europeans were acting on the recognition that they might well be on their own when the next military crisis emerged on the continent. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserted in justifying the initiative, "We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard."[31] As Europeans clearly noticed, the war over Kosovo made plain America's dissipating willingness to be Europe's chief peacemaker and its protector of last resort.

## *The New Unilateralism*

These neoisolationist proclivities were accompanied by intensifying unilateralist instincts. According to its rhetoric, the Clinton administration was deeply committed to liberal internationalism, insisting that it would lead through multilateral institutions and shape international order through consensus, not fiat. The United States was "the indispensable nation" because of its ability to build coalitions of the willing and organize joint action.

[27] Remarks by the president at Memorial Day Service, 31 May 1999, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

[28] Carlotta Gall, "Serbs Stone U.S. Troops in Divided Kosovo Town," *New York Times*, 21 February 2000.

[29] Jane Perlez, "Kosovo's Unquenched Violence Dividing U.S. and NATO Allies," *New York Times*, 12 March 2000.

[30] Robert Byrd, "Europe's Turn to Keep the Peace," *New York Times*, 20 March 2000.

[31] Speech at the Royal United Services Institute, 8 March 1999.

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But the record belies the rhetoric. On a regular basis, the United States opted out of multilateral efforts. In Kyoto in 1997, the international community reached agreement on new measures to protect the environment. Washington was a party to the negotiations, but then dragged its feet on implementation. A broadly successful effort to ban landmines won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for Jody Williams and the organization she headed, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The United States did not sign on; Washington preferred to play by its own rules. Clinton also withheld support for the International Criminal Court for years, changing his mind only at the end of his second term.

Signs of a diminishing appetite for liberal internationalism only intensified after George W. Bush succeeded Clinton. As a candidate, Bush promised to pursue a more "humble" foreign policy, scale back America's international commitments, be more selective in picking the country's fights, and focus more attention on its own hemisphere. After taking the helm, Bush generally adhered to these promises. During his first months in office, he drew down U.S. troop levels in Bosnia and kept U.S. troops in Kosovo on a tight leash despite the spread of fighting to Macedonia. He reduced America's role as a mediator in many different regional conflicts. Secretary of State Colin Powell followed suit by dropping from the State Department's roster more than one-third of the fifty-five special envoys that the Clinton administration had appointed to deal with trouble spots around the world. The *Washington Post* summed up the thrust of these moves in its headline, "Bush Retreats from U.S. Role as Peace Broker."[32]

In similar fashion, Bush made good on his promise to focus U.S. foreign policy on the Americas. President Bush's first two meetings with foreign leaders were with Canadian Prime Minster Jean Chrètien and Mexican President Vicente Fox. His first foreign trip was to Mexico. His first major international meeting was a Summit of the Americas in Quebec, at which he announced that he would host his first state dinner later in the year for Vicente Fox.

The Bush administration also stepped away from a host of multilateral commitments, preferring the autonomy that comes with unilateral initiative. Consider the fate of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). During his first few months in office, George W. Bush, without first consulting with affected parties, announced that the United States would be withdrawing from both pacts. As to the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, Bush did not even try to hide his go-it-alone rationale: "We will not do anything that harms our economy, because first things first are the people who live in America."[33] As to the fate of the ABM Treaty, the administration did undertake consultations with numerous countries after making known its intention

[32] Alan Sipress, "Bush Retreats from U.S. Role as Peace Broker," *Washington Post*, 17 March 2001.

[33] Cited in Edmund Andrews, "Bush Angers Europe by Eroding Pact on Warming," *New York Times*, 1 April 2001.

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to scrap the arms control pact. But Bush then proceeded to inform the world in August 2001 that, "We will withdraw from the ABM treaty on our timetable and at a time convenient to America."[34] In December, Bush made good on his promise.

The terror attacks of September 2001 were widely interpreted as an antidote to these unilateralist and isolationist trends. And they were, at least in the short run. Far from acting unilaterally, the Bush administration went out of its way to build a broad coalition against terrorism, enlisting the support of not just NATO allies, but also Russia, China, and moderate Arab regimes. Far from reining in America's commitments, Bush declared a war on terrorism and in 2002 destroyed the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. The following year, he dispatched several hundred thousand troops to Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. And Congress and the American people were fully engaged, with the Senate, the House, and the public strongly behind Bush's decision to use military force in both Afghanistan and Iraq.[35]

In the long run, however, the struggle against terror is unlikely to serve as a solid basis for ensuring either multilateral engagement or a robust brand of American internationalism. Despite the statements of support from abroad, U.S. forces were accompanied only by the British when the bombing campaign against Afghanistan began. A host of other countries offered logistical and intelligence support, but Americans did almost all the fighting. Only after the main battles were over did forces from Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand arrive in significant numbers to serve as peacekeepers and help eliminate remaining pockets of resistance in the mountains.

America's unilateralist proclivities were even more pronounced in the war against Iraq. Bush made it amply clear amid the UN debate about whether to wage war against Iraq that the United States would act as it saw fit, asserting in his 2003 State of the Union Address that "this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."[36] He followed through on his pledge, launching an attack against Iraq despite Washington's failure to win the approval of the Security Council and despite the fact that France, Germany, Russia, China, and much of the world's population were strongly against the war. Terrorism is unlikely to make of America an avowed multilateralist.

[34] David Sanger, "Bush Flatly States U.S. Will Pull Out of Missile Treaty," *New York Times*, 24 August 2001.

[35] On 14 September 2001, both the Senate and the House voted on a resolution authorizing the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force" to respond to the attacks. The resolution passed 98–0 in the Senate and 420–1 in the House. In a poll conducted between 20 and 23 September 2001, 92 percent of the public supported military action against whoever was responsible for the attacks. See "Poll Finds Support for War and Fear on Economy," *New York Times*, 25 September 2001. In the lead-up to the war on Iraq, the House voted 296–133 to grant President Bush the authority to use military force against Iraq. The vote in the Senate was 77–23. These votes took place on 10 and 11 October 2002, respectively. As the campaign against Iraq began, 74 percent of the U.S. public approved of the decision to go to war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Adam Nagourney and Janet Elder, "A Nation at War: The Poll; Support for Bush Surges at Home, but Split Remains," *New York Times*, 22 March 2003.

[36] Address on 28 January 2003.

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It is also by no means clear that terrorism will eradicate, rather than fuel, isolationist strains within American society. The United States responded with alacrity and resolve to the attacks on New York and Washington. But the call for increased engagement in the global battle against terror was accompanied by an alternative logic, one that gained currency over time. A basic dictum of the country's Founding Fathers was that America should stay out of the affairs of other countries so that they stay out of America's affairs. The United States is a formidable adversary and is unlikely to let any attack on its own go unpunished. But should the price of hegemony mount and Americans come to believe that their commitments abroad are compromising their security at home, they will legitimately question whether the benefits of global engagement are worth the costs.

The potential allure of the Founding Fathers' admonition against foreign entanglement explains why, as one scholar put it, the attacks made "Israelis worry that Americans may now think that supporting Israel is too costly."[37] This logic similarly explains why François Heisbourg, one of France's leading analysts, commented in *Le Monde* the day after the attacks that, "It is to be feared that the same temptation [that led America to withdraw from the world after World War I] could again shape the conduct of the United States once the barbarians of September 11 have been punished. In this respect, the Pearl Harbor of 2001 could come to close the era opened by the Pearl Harbor of 1941."[38] So does this logic explain, at least in part, why Americans have begun debating whether to reduce the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia.[39] It is worth keeping in mind that amid the anti-American protests that broke out in South Korea late in 2002, even conservative U.S. voices urged Washington to consider withdrawing American troops from the Korean peninsula.[40]

It is also quite plausible that within the Bush administration forces that encourage retrenchment may well strengthen over time. Toppling Saddam Hussein enjoyed widespread support among Bush's top advisers. But only the neoconservative faction embraces an ambitious vision of political change in the Middle East and intends to use America's foothold in Iraq to pursue that vision. More traditional conservatives, especially those hailing from the heartland, are likely to show little enthusiasm for America's long-term occupation of Iraq or follow-on efforts to bring democracy to the Arab world.

The long-term consequences of the events of September 2001 could thus be an America that devotes much more attention and energy to the security of its homeland and much less attention to resolving problems far from its borders. The more time U.S. forces spend defending American territory, the less

[37] Shibley Telhami, "The Mideast Is Also Changed," *New York Times*, 19 September 2001.

[38] "De l'après guerre froide á l'hyperterrorisme," *Le Monde*, 12 September 2001.

[39] See Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Rethinks Its Role in Saudi Arabia," *New York Times*, 10 March 2002; and Shibley Telhami, "Shrinking Our Presence in Saudi Arabia," *New York Times*, 29 January 2002.

[40] See, for example, Richard Allen, "Seoul's Choice: The U.S. or the North," *New York Times*, 16 January 2003.

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time they will spend defending the territory of others. The Bush administration admittedly showed no lack of enthusiasm for waging a comprehensive and resolute war against terrorism. Future attacks on U.S. territory would likely provoke a similarly sharp response. But prior to the events of September 2001, the initial instincts of Bush and his advisers were to scale back, not to deepen, America's involvement in distant disputes. In combination with the new focus on homeland defense and the political appeal of seeking to cordon off the country from foreign dangers, these instincts are a better indication of long-term trends than are actions taken amid shock and anger.

It is equally doubtful that the threat of terror will over the long run ensure a more responsible Congress and a more engaged and attentive public. Bipartisan rancor did disappear instantly on September 11, 2001, and the U.S. public stood firmly behind military retaliation. But these were temporary phenomena arising from the grief of the moment; after a few months, partisan wrangling returned to Capitol Hill, and the public mind again began to wander. As one reporter commented on 2 December 2002, "The post-Sept. 11 Congress has now almost fully abandoned its briefly adopted pose of high-minded bipartisanship."[41] Bipartisanship returned amid the preparations for war against Iraq, but it again dissipated as soon as the fighting was over.

The relatively rapid return to business as usual stems from the fact that the United States has embarked on a long march, not a prolonged war. After Pearl Harbor, American leaders had in Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany formidable and identifiable enemies against which to mobilize the nation and evoke continued sacrifice. The threat posed by the Soviet Union then kept America focused and determined during the long decades of the cold war. In Iraq, the United States similarly faced a tangible adversary with army divisions and clearly identified leadership targets. But much of the war against terrorism is against a far more elusive enemy. America confronts an enemy schooled in guerrilla tactics—a type of warfare that, as the Vietnam War demonstrated, plays to the strengths of neither America's armed forces nor its citizens. The United States handily defeated its foes in Afghanistan, but many supporters of al Qaeda escaped, melding into village life or fleeing to the tribal lands of Pakistan. In this battle, patience and tact are more useful weapons than military force.

With much of the struggle against terrorism occurring quietly beyond the public eye through intelligence, surveillance, and covert operations, this new challenge will not be accompanied by the evocative images that help rally the country around the flag. Rather than induce Americans to join the army or the production line to contribute to the war effort, terrorism's main impact on the average citizen is to induce him to stay at home. In the wake of the attacks on New York and Washington and the anthrax scare that followed, President Bush asked of Americans not that they make a special sacrifice but that they return to normal life by shopping in malls and traveling by air. Even as American

[41] Adam Clymer, "A House Divided. Senate, Too," *New York Times*, 2 December 2001.

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soldiers were fighting and dying in Afghanistan, ABC was trying to woo David Letterman to its late-night slot to replace *Nightline*—one of the few network programs providing in-depth analysis of foreign news. As before September 2001, keeping the U.S. public engaged in international affairs promises to be an uphill battle.

## Managing the Return to Multipolarity

Combine the rise of Europe and Asia with the decline of liberal internationalism in the United States and it becomes clear that America's unipolar moment is not long for this world. At the same time that alternative centers of power are taking shape, the United States is drawing away from multilateral institutions in favor of a unilateralism that risks estranging those power centers, raising the chances that their ascent will lead to a new era of geopolitical rivalry. As unipolarity gives way to multipolarity, the strategic competition now held in abeyance by U.S. primacy will return—and with a vengeance if America's unilateralist impulse prevails. No longer steadied by U.S. hegemony, processes of globalization and democratization are likely to falter, as are the international institutions currently dependent upon Washington's leadership to function effectively. Geopolitical fault lines will reemerge among centers of power in North America, Europe, and East Asia. The central challenge for U.S. grand strategy will be managing and taming the dangers arising from these new fault lines.

The United States cannot and should not resist the end of unipolarity and the return of a world of multiple centers of power. To do so would only risk alienating and risking conflict with a rising Europe and an ascendant Asia. And it would likely stoke an isolationist backlash in the United States by pursuing a level of foreign ambition for which there would be insufficient political support. Asking that the United States prepare for and manage its exit from global primacy, however, is a tall order. Great powers have considerable difficulty accepting their mortality; few in history have willfully made room for rising challengers and adjusted their grand strategies accordingly.

In managing the return of multipolarity, America should be guided by the principles of strategic restraint and institutional binding. Strategic restraint means making room for rising centers of power so that they array their rising strength with rather than against the United States. Institutional binding entails the use of international institutions to bind major powers to each other and to bound their behavior through adherence to common norms. Institutions also promise to fulfill another important function—that of guiding America down a multilateral path that offers a middle ground between unilateralism and isolationism.

### *Transatlantic Troubles—Managing the End of Alliance*

Confronted with the rise of Europe and America's changing internationalism, the Atlantic alliance appears poised for demise. Its founder and primary pa-

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tron, the United States, is losing interest in the alliance, resulting in a military pact that is hollowing out and of diminishing geopolitical relevance. Prior to the round of NATO enlargement that extended membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Washington was abuzz with debate. In the weeks leading up to the 2002 Prague summit, which approved another round of enlargement, there was only a deafening silence; no one in the United States seemed to care. With the war against terrorism not just topping, but defining, America's strategic agenda, Europe is moving to the periphery of American grand strategy. The alliance is also of declining relevance to Europe. With the continent at peace and the European Union soon to take in the region's new democracies, Europe no longer needs its American pacifier—one of the main reasons France and Germany were prepared to stand their ground against the United States over Iraq.

Europe's security order is thus in the process of becoming much more European and much less Atlantic. As the United States prepares to decamp from the continent, the two sides of the Atlantic are heading toward a new division of labor. Europe will increasingly assume responsibility for its own security, while America focuses its attention and resources on other parts of the world—principally the Middle East and East Asia. Impressive levels of trade and investment promise to continue flowing across the Atlantic. But commercial ties will be unable to offset the forces of separation in the geopolitical arena. The traditional trans-Atlantic link, predicated upon the notion of the indivisibility of American and European security, will be no more.

To prepare the way for this new division of labor, Europe must redouble efforts to build a union capable of acting collectively on the international stage. The EU is currently in a no-man's-land. It is too strong to be Washington's lackey, but too weak and divided to be either an effective partner or a formidable counterweight. The result has been to invite Washington's disdain.

Although the debate over whether to wage war against Iraq unquestionably weakened European unity, that crisis may prove to be a turning point. Preserving the Atlantic link was one of the key motivations inducing Britain, Spain, Italy, and most Central European countries to side with the Bush administration. But now that the Atlantic alliance appears to be irreversibly headed toward demise, an Atlanticist Europe is no longer an option.

France and Germany have realized as much, one of the main reasons they are intensifying efforts to deepen defense cooperation. Poland and its neighbors have yet to give up hope of a strong NATO, but they can ignore reality for only so long; Warsaw and other like-minded capitals will soon realize they have no choice but to settle for a strong EU. The sooner current and prospective EU members face up to the fact that America is in the midst of leaving Europe for good, the sooner they will begin throwing their weight behind a more effective and collective union.

Several measures should be top priorities. The EU must complete the institutional adaptations already underway and work to establish efficient and ef-

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fective mechanisms for the formulation and implementation of a common security policy. It must oversee the coordination and integration of national defense programs, seeking to map out on a collective basis the new force structures and procurement programs required to give Europe the more capable forces that it needs.[42] Europe must also build public support for the implementation of its new defense programs. Professionalizing and upgrading forces, merging the planning and procurement processes of individual states, increasing defense expenditure—these are tasks that will require public understanding and a new level of collective will. European leaders need to begin laying the necessary political foundation.

As a more capable Europe separates from the American imperium, Atlantic relations will likely get considerably worse before they get better. But an EU able to hold its own ultimately provides the only hope for building a new foundation for the Atlantic community. The United States will at least have the option of striking a more balanced and mature partnership with Europe. The EU, whether or not America has the good sense to rekindle multilateralism, will at least be prepared for the unforeseen dangers that will arise as America ends its days as Europe's protector.

On the American side, Washington would be wise to resist its unilateralist impulses and dismissive attitude toward Europe. Several steps are in order. The United States should stop its quiet but steady effort to block Europe's growing geopolitical ambition.[43] American officials have essentially been telling the Europeans that they welcome more European defense capability and a more equitable sharing of burdens, but that they are not interested in sharing power with the EU; Washington enjoys calling the shots. Instead, they should make clear to Europe that as its new capability becomes available, the United States will accord the EU greater voice. Warnings about decoupling should give way to a single, clear message: capabilities for influence. As Europe's defense capacities evolve, the United States should look for ways to forge a more mature and constructive relationship with the EU. This means more diplomatic contact with the EU as a collective entity rather than working primarily through national capitals. And it means consulting fully with the EU before pursuing important policy initiatives rather than briefing Europe after the fact.

Washington also needs to engage in a public education campaign if America and Europe are to pull off an amicable separation rather than a nasty divorce. In light of the isolationist and unilateralist instincts that have played such a central role in American history, today's leaders need to fashion a new political equilibrium and a new, even if reduced, level of American engagement in the world that enjoys the support of the public. Doing so entails rebuilding a liberal internationalism that guides America toward not just engagement but

[42] See Michael O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces," *Survival* 39 (Autumn 1997): 5–15.

[43] For a summary of U.S. concerns and why they are misguided, see Charles Kupchan, "In Defense of European Defense," *Survival* 42 (Summer 2000).

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multilateral engagement through international institutions. Predicated upon the notion of sharing the rights and responsibilities of managing the international system with others, liberal internationalism offers a stable middle ground between isolationist and unilateralist extremes, providing the political foundations for an America that at once resists the urge to retreat and works with, rather than against, emerging centers of power. Before a backing away from the world becomes likely and go-it-alone impulses alienate potential partners, America needs to find this new internationalism.

### *East Asia: Sino-Japanese Rapprochement or Multipolar Balancing?*

The implications of America's changing internationalism are less immediate for East Asia than for Europe. Unlike in Europe, the end of the cold war has not resolved the region's main geopolitical cleavages. As a result, the United States is likely to continue its role as East Asia's extraregional balancer. From this perspective, the United States will effectively gravitate to an Asia-first posture in the years ahead.

Nonetheless, it is still important for East Asian countries to work toward a regional security structure that is less dependent upon American power. If the United States does practice a more discriminating internationalism in the coming years, East Asia is likely to feel at least some of the consequences. The ongoing crisis on the Korean peninsula could affect the scope and tenor of America's strategic commitment in the region, with both Washington and Seoul in the midst of reevaluating the U.S. presence in Korea. Defending South Korea, at least in terms of public diplomacy, remains one of the main missions justifying America's forward presence in East Asia. If that mission disappears, it may be hard to make the case—in the United States as well as in America's regional allies such as Japan—that America's forward strategic posture should continue in its current form. At a minimum, the United States and East Asia's regional powers should begin a dialogue on how to move toward a more self-sustaining and stable regional order.

Preparing East Asia for less reliance on American power is far more complicated and dangerous than the parallel task in Europe. The key difference is that states in Europe took advantage of America's protective umbrella to deal with the past and pursue an ambitious agenda of regional cooperation and integration. Europeans have accordingly succeeded in fashioning a regional order that is likely to withstand the retraction of American power. In contrast, states in East Asia have hidden behind America's presence, pursuing neither reconciliation nor regional integration. East Asia's major powers remain estranged.

The United States, therefore, faces a severe trade-off in East Asia between the dependence upon American power arising from its predominant role in the region and the intraregional balancing that would ensue in the wake of an American retrenchment. America's sizable military presence keeps the peace and checks regional rivalries. But it also alienates China and holds in place a polar-

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ized political landscape. As China's economy and military capability grow, its efforts to balance against the United States could grow more pronounced. Were the United States to reduce its role as regional arbiter and protector, relations with China would likely improve, but at the expense of regional stability. Japan and Korea would no doubt increase their own military capabilities, risking a region-wide arms race and spiraling tensions.

If the United States is to escape the horns of this dilemma, it must help repair the region's main line of cleavage and facilitate rapprochement between East Asia's two major powers—Japan and China. Just as reconciliation between France and Germany was the critical ingredient in building a stable zone of peace in Europe, so too is Sino-Japanese rapprochement the sine qua non of a self-sustaining regional order in East Asia.

Primary responsibility for improving Sino-Japanese ties lies with Japan. With an economy and political system much more developed than China's, Japan has far more latitude in pushing their relationship forward. As in Europe, economic ties should serve as the vehicle for promoting closer political ties. Japan can also make a major step forward by finally acknowledging and formally apologizing for its behavior during World War II. The United States can further this process by welcoming and helping to facilitate overtures between Tokyo and Beijing. Washington should also help dislodge the inertia that pervades politics in Tokyo by making clear to the Japanese that they cannot indefinitely rely on American guarantees to ensure their security. Japan needs to take advantage of America's protective umbrella while it lasts, pursuing the policies of reconciliation and integration essential to constructing a regional security order resting on cooperation rather than deterrence.

China has its own work to do if its relationship with Japan is to move beyond cold peace. Beijing should respond with unequivocal enthusiasm should Japan address its past more openly. It would be particularly important for Beijing to take advantage of a resolute accounting and apology to shape public opinion and moderate the resentment toward Japan that still runs deep in Chinese society. According to a public opinion survey carried out in 1997, over 40 percent of Chinese has a "bad" impression of Japan, while 44 percent has an "average" impression, and only 14 percent has a "good" impression. Over 80 percent of respondents indicated that Japan's invasion of China during World War II remains their main association with Japan.[44] Loosening the domestic constraints stemming from these public attitudes is a necessity if rapprochement is to have any chance of getting off the ground.

If ties between China and Japan do markedly improve, the United States would be able to play a less prominent role in the region, making possible an improvement in its own relations with China. Washington should avoid rhetoric

[44] *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (China Youth Daily), 15 February 1997, cited in Kokubun Ryosei, "Japan-China Relations After the Cold War: Switching from the '1972 Framework,'" *Japan Echo* 28 (April 2001): 9.

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and policies that might induce China to intensify its efforts to balance against Japan and the United States, instead buying time for Sino-Japanese rapprochement to get off the ground. In the great debate over China's future that is now taking place on America's op-ed pages and in its academic journals, both the optimists and the pessimists are way off the mark.[45] It is simply too early to pronounce China either a strategic partner or an implacable adversary. Talk of an impending Chinese military threat is both counterproductive and misguided; neither the Chinese military nor its economy is world-class.[46] The United States can, therefore, afford to adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward China while avoiding provocative moves, such as supporting a Taiwanese policy of moving toward formal independence. China can do its part to strengthen its relationship with the United States by containing saber-rattling over Taiwan, halting the export of weapons to rogue states, and avoiding actions and rhetoric that could inflame territorial disputes in the region.

The prospect of a meaningful rapprochement between China and Japan is obviously far off. Neither China nor Japan appears ready to embark down the path of reconciliation. Nor is the United States about to take steps to reduce its influence in the region; Washington enjoys being Asia's security hub. At the same time, no one imagined in 1945 that Germany and France would put their historical animosities aside and become the collective core of an integrated Europe. If China and Japan are to have a chance of heading in the same direction, they need to take the small steps now that will lead to lasting change down the road.

## *A Global Concert of Regional Powers*

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among

[45] For optimistic views of China's future, see Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (March/April 1997): 33–44; and Nicholas Berry, "China is Not an Imperialist Power," *Strategic Review* 24 (Winter 2001): 4–10. For pessimistic views, see Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with China," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (March/April 1997): 18–32; and Constantine Menges, "China: Myths and Reality," *Washington Times*, 12 April 2001.

[46] China's GDP in 1999 was $732 billion, while America's was $9.2 *trillion*—over twelve times larger. China's annual defense budget is roughly 5 percent of that of the United States. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001–2002* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000): 25, 194. See also Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," *The National Interest* 56 (Summer 1999).

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their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations.

Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one.

But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.*

* This article draws on material presented in my book, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), and on my article, "Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity?" in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

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

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JOSEPH P. VITERITTI

The show opens with words from Meryl Streep. The celebrated actress recounts how important teachers are in our lives, how each of us remembers a very special one like Claire Callahan, her music teacher in high school. She fondly recalls her first stage appearance in a school play portraying Marian the Librarian in *The Music Man*—another testimony to the greatness of American education. Millions of viewers watched the PBS special televised in fall 2001 on "School: The Story of American Public Education." This was television at its best, a documentary history accompanied by the publication of a well-received companion book outlining how the dreams of Thomas Jefferson and educator Horace Mann were translated into a modern reality.[1]

The show and the book draw from some of the most respected scholarship the academy has to offer. That is their strength; that also is their most glaring shortcoming. This homage to the common or public school is an accurate reflection of the written canon in education research, which is not especially reluctant to admit the missteps of the past but is unwilling to seriously entertain ideas that would alter the common school model that has been the norm for more than a century. The common school is part of the American civic religion. As such, even the most respected scholars accept its basic premises as an act of faith, perpetuating its myths and assumptions; they are unshaken by evidence suggesting that public education has failed a large segment of the population

[1] Sarah Mondale and Sarah B. Patton, eds., *School: The Story of American Public Education* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).

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and is in need of fundamental change. As a result, the professional literature on school reform proceeds as a series of detours around the real issues and often dismisses demands for meaningful change as mischievous and ill conceived. The PBS program and book were essentially a history project, but the same pattern is evident in political science and economics. This article is a critical analysis of the research on school reform in all three fields. While it does not purport to be exhaustive, the material examined is representative of mainstream scholarship. It reveals a paradoxical tendency among researchers—some more passionate than others—to resist parental choice in education, all the while seeming to espouse democratic ideals.

The tone of the PBS project is set in the volume's "Introduction," written by the esteemed Stanford University historian, David Tyack. Tyack explains how Thomas Jefferson envisioned locally-controlled public schools as essential democratic institutions, how Horace Mann believed that public schools could help cultivate good character, how Progressive era reformers sought to save education from politics through governance by experts, and how recent social movements have led to better treatment of marginalized groups. But the article ends on a sour note, warning that "some critics—especially various advocates of vouchers and choice—have put a new spin on the concept of democracy." These instigators, we are told, pose a "more fundamental challenge" to our schools than the progressive era reformers who turned education over to professional administrators. They seek to replace politics with markets. This supposedly is an unfortunate development because, as Tyack understands it, "Democracy is about making wise collective choices, not individual consumer choices."[2]

The message is quite clear: Those who run the public schools—professional administrators—are inclined to make decisions that benefit everyone; education consumers—parents with children in the schools—are more inclined to act out of selfish motives. What an amazing assertion, coming from one of America's most highly regarded education historians. Don't educators and school boards have interests? Don't citizens act out of self-interest when they elect school boards? Is democracy an antidote to self-interest? For centuries political theorists have viewed democracy as an institutional mechanism through which individuals and groups pursue their public wants and needs. The hope of American democracy is a Madisonian presumption that the play of interests and counterinterests in politics will result in outcomes compatible with the common good.[3] The American experiment, however, is also an elaborate case study illustrating how the disproportionate distribution of political resources in a democracy can result in disparate outcomes.

[2] David Tyack, "Introduction" in Mondale and Patton, *School*, 8.

[3] James Madison, *The Federalist*, No. 10 in Clinton Rossiter, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 77–84. See also David F. Epstein, *The Political Theory of the Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 59–110.

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## Defining the Problem

What is it about markets that is undemocratic? Very much the way the political system is responsive to those who have political resources, markets respond to those with economic resources. And the same folks seem to have both. In this sense both politics and markets have an inherent capacity to be inequitable.[4] Nowhere is this characteristic more evident than in education. Education scholars can quarrel about the overall performance of public schools, but one essential fact is irrefutable: there has been a long-standing gap in achievement defined by race. National test scores indicate that the average black twelfth grader reads at the same level of proficiency as the average white eighth grader.[5] This four-year learning gap holds for all academic subjects. The performance data for Hispanic students are no better. Since racial minorities tend to congregate in urban centers, the failure of the common school is most profoundly evident in big-city school systems.[6] Despite years of political advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged minorities, the political system has failed to produce the kinds of structural and policy changes that are needed to make urban schools responsive to the needs of most students who attend them. This is somewhat perplexing since African Americans and Hispanics have gained a greater share of political power in cities over the past three decades.

The failure of markets to respond to the crisis in urban education is not so difficult to understand. Poor people do not have the resources to prod the market. They cannot afford the tuition to send their children to nonpublic schools. While there is some encouraging evidence that African-American students who attend Catholic high schools exhibit higher graduation and college attendance rates than their public school peers, their numbers are too small to reverse the overall pattern of academic failure in urban education.[7] Because disadvantaged families do not have educational alternatives, new forms of school choice can improve their options in one of two ways: Public charter schools can increase the number of small innovative institutions to which they have access; and vouchers can improve their access to nonpublic schools where tuition rates are ordinarily prohibitive.

This is not to say that choice alone will close the achievement gap. The evidence on the effects of charters, vouchers, and other forms of public school choice remains inconclusive. In order to be effective, choice would have to stim-

[4] See Joseph P. Viteritti, "Defining Equity: Politics, Markets and Public Policy" in Alan Wolfe, ed., *School Choice: The Moral Debate* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

[5] National Center for Education Statistics, *NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress) Summary Data Tables* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2001). See David Grissmer and Ann Flanagan, "Tracking the Improvement of State Achievement Using NAEP Data" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Report, March 2002).

[6] "Quality Counts '98: The Urban Challenge," *Education Week*, 8 January 1998.

[7] Jeffrey Grogger and Derek Neal, "Further Evidence on the Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling" in William G. Gale and Janet Rothberg Pack, eds., *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs*, 2000.

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ulate meaningful change in regular public schools where the majority of children are likely to be educated in the foreseeable future. Targeted choice designed to free poor children from failing public schools, however, could help level the playing field by offering poor children opportunities more akin to those enjoyed by the middle class. Middle-class families exercise educational choice routinely. They have either the economic means to afford tuition at private schools or the residential mobility to move to communities with decent public schools. Therefore, the central policy question is not whether to have choice in American education, but whether to provide it to our least fortunate citizens. In this sense, the choice debate has a moral dimension involving considerations of social equity.[8]

Notwithstanding all the talk about market forces and their probable effect on education, the voucher programs operable today are limited initiatives designed to benefit either low-income students (as in Milwaukee and Cleveland) or children in chronically failing schools (as in Florida). This is not like the universal voucher scheme envisioned by Milton Friedman fifty years ago that would replace public schools with private schools.[9] Most students who benefit from ongoing choice initiatives—more than 500,000—attend public charter schools. Although charters don't incite the same intense resistance within the academy as vouchers, they are generally greeted with similar suspicion from those who warn against the perils of the market.[10] Charter schools, after all, are not only schools of choice; they function outside the legal jurisdiction of local school boards and therefore compromise the common school model on two counts. Despite their deep devotion to the common school and their instinctive dismissal of alternatives, defenders of the century-old model come up short on ideas about how it might be retooled to resolve the racial gap in achievement. The "inside the box" talk about school reform is empty, with more conversation about what defenders of the status quo oppose—namely markets and choice—than what they would do to improve the system. This proclivity carries across the disciplines.

## History as Apology

In some ways the PBS project was a warts-and-all history of American education. Each section of the volume is introduced by a distinguished education his-

[8] See generally, Joseph P. Viteritti, *Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution and Civil Society* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

[9] Milton Friedman, "The Role of Government in Education" in Robert A. Solo, ed., *Economics and the Public Interest* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1955). The exceptions are the hundred-year-old programs in Maine and Vermont designed to accommodate students in towns without public high schools.

[10] See Bruce Fuller, ed., *Inside Charter Schools* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Seymour B. Sarason, *Charter Schools: Another Flawed Educational Reform* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1998).

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torian. Carl Kaestle describes how between 1770 and 1790 schooling was converted from a private matter controlled by families, churches, and community groups to a public function supported by local taxes. While generally pleased with the transition, he concedes that it was a "highly contested" and "imperfect development" at the time.[11] In the nineteenth century, the sectarian flavor of local curricula gave way to a generalized Protestant version of cultural conformism, which, we later learn, was oppressive for Catholics, Jews, and nonbelievers. While public funding through local property taxes led to greater access and richer programs in the twentieth century, it was the basis for financial inequities among districts; and it allowed cultural, racial, and gender biases to perpetuate. Thus Kaestle concludes that we should view public education as a work in progress and attempt to fashion ways to make it more equitable, inclusive, and effective.

Writing on the period 1900–1950, Diane Ravitch boasts that one of the great glories of the public school is its functioning as a "portal of opportunity" through which generations of immigrants acquired basic skills and also learned to be Americans.[12] She goes on to explain, however, that IQ tests were used in the 1930s and 1940s to steer certain racial and ethnic groups out of academic tracks into vocational programs, sowing the seeds of educational inequality within the curriculum itself. Thus, although Ravitch celebrates the achievement of universal schooling, she also notes how advances in educational technology legitimized a stratified system of teaching and how intense localism maintained racial segregation and a barrier for meaningful academic standards. James Anderson picks up on the inequality theme with an account of the struggle to desegregate schools that culminated in 1954 with the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v Board of Education.*[13] He goes on to describe grassroots political efforts launched in the 1970s and 1980s to reform urban schools and the enactment of federal legislation on behalf of language minorities, women, and children with disabilities.

What is most remarkable about Anderson's chapter, which takes us to 1980, is that its central theme, "Separate and Unequal," is as true today as it was then. If there is a single theme that runs through the entire history of American education it is the theme of inequality. This is a potentially fatal flaw in an educational system that was ostensibly designed to help forge one of the great experiments in democratic government.[14] It is especially problematic in an age when a sound education is so essential to having a productive personal, political, and professional life.

The last section of Mondale and Patton's book is called "A Nation at Risk?" Except for the added question mark, the title is taken from a controver-

[11] Carl F. Kaestle, "Part One: 1770–1900, The Common School" in Mondale and Patton, *School*, 16.

[12] Diane Ravitch, "Part Two: 1900–1950, As American as Public School" in ibid., 63.

[13] James D. Anderson, "Part Three: 1950–1980, Separate and Unequal" in ibid., 123–130.

[14] See Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti, eds., *Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

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sial report released by the U.S. Department of Education in 1983, which asserted that the poor quality of America's public schools represented a threat to the security of the country. The inclusion of the question mark indicates that the editors of the volume remain unpersuaded that the crisis was and is real. David Tyack is quoted as saying that the report "fit the mood of the Reagan years," and he describes its language as hyperbolic.[15] This last section is introduced by Tyack's Stanford University colleague Larry Cuban. After commenting on the role that business leaders have played in American education since the late nineteenth century, Cuban returns to the cautionary theme presented by Tyack at the beginning of the book. Bemoaning the influence of the corporate model's focus on market competition, choice, and accountability, he asserts, "Missing from this inventory of business influences is teaching and learning."[16] One wonders how profit-driven entrepreneurs could possibly expect to succeed in education without a focus on teaching and learning, but Cuban is unwilling to concede that point even as a matter of business practicality. His message is that corporate types who enter the education marketplace don't care about teaching and learning.

The remainder of the section is filled with commentary, mostly negative, on the impact that choice experiments will have on schooling. Among those who weigh in on the subject is Jonathan Kozol, criticizing politicians and educators who adopt a "lifeboat mentality" that will save some kids and neglect the rest.[17] This is a rather simplistic and inaccurate definition of the choice idea, as conceived today; but even if it were valid, saving some children from the effects of an inadequate education is arguably preferable to saving none. One imagines a luxury liner filled with academic pundits watching the ship of urban education descend to the bottom of the sea. Rather than save anyone, they urge the passengers to stay on board, as they sit back admiring the ship's original blueprints and tell stories of a more lustrous past when the vessel served so many voyagers so well.

The movement from a critical to a defensive posture in the writing of educational history is a relatively recent phenomenon, precipitated somewhat abruptly by widening demands for choice over the last two decades. David Tyack had exerted a profound influence on educational scholarship in 1974 by writing a seminal history of the urban school system. The book was a conscious departure from the existing historiography, which he critically described as an insider's "tale of progress, marred here and there by 'politics' and meddling by special interest groups or backwards looking teachers or laymen."[18] According to Tyack, the prior literature was designed to boost the esprit and identity of professional educators. Tyack's book—written at a time when frustrated black

[15] Mondale and Patton, *School*, 185.

[16] Larry Cuban, "Part Four: 1980–2000, The Bottom Line" in ibid., 179.

[17] Ibid., 192.

[18] David Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 9.

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parents were demanding "community control" of their schools—replaced inspirational narrative with a more realistic chronicle. Tyack traced the origins of the centralized governance model to a reform agenda, controlled by "an interlocking directorate of urban elites—largely business and professional men, university presidents and professors, and some 'progressive' superintendents."[19] Although he refrained from painting the common school as a patent failure, Tyack agreed that the "one best system" of public schooling "has ill-served the pluralistic character of American society."[20] The institutional portrait that he painted was overwhelmingly negative:

> Increasing bureaucratization of urban schools has often resulted in the displacement of goals and has often perpetuated positions and outworn practices rather than serving the clients, the children to be taught.
>
> Despite frequent good intentions and abundant rhetoric about "equal educational opportunity," schools have rarely taught the children of the poor effectively—and the failure has been systematic, not idiosyncratic.
>
> Talk about "keeping the schools out of politics" has often served to obscure actual alignments of power and patterns of privilege.[21]

In a later book written with Elizabeth Hansot, Tyack further developed the story of how an "educational trust" set up a bureaucratic system of schooling dominated by self-appointed experts.[22] In 1995, Tyack collaborated with Larry Cuban to write *Tinkering Towards Utopia*.[23] This brief popular history of school reform is a defense of incrementalism, explaining how utopian dreams get quashed by resistant teachers and principals and why this is better than radical change implemented without an appreciation for the distinct institutional character of schools. Here the "one best system" is seen as an admirable triumph. Tyack and Cuban conclude, "The public schools, with all their faults, remain one of our most stable and effective public institutions."[24] Along the way the authors take a swipe at "reinventing" schemes designed to turn schools into businesses and draw a false dichotomy between two competing ideological elements—one of capitalistic markets in pursuit of individual liberty, another of democratic politics designed to promote equality. The book ends with halting advice stating, "Rather than starting from scratch in reinventing schools, it makes more sense for us to graft on to what is healthy in the present system."[25] What is it that is healthy about the current system of urban schools?

[19] Ibid., 7.

[20] Ibid., 11.

[21] Ibid.

[22] David Tyack and Elizabeth Hansot, *Managers of Virtue: Public School Leadership in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

[23] David Tyack and Larry Cuban, *Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Compare with Diane Ravitch, *Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

[24] Tyack and Cuban, *Tinkering Toward Utopia*, 38.

[25] Ibid., 133.

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In 2000, Cuban coedited a *festschrift* honoring Tyack, where some of the latter's former students and colleagues further explicated the conventional wisdom that was solidifying among historians and other education scholars. This volume begins with a discouraging admonition about the prospects of far-reaching reform, observing that, "Highly touted reforms have repeatedly washed over public schools, leaving in their wake the debris of once-heralded programs and public disappointment."[26] After delivering this sweeping lower-your-sights lesson to would-be reformers, the editors proceed with a more pointed discussion about what really bothers them. They believe that since the 1980s a new generation of school reformers has emerged that is preoccupied with solving the nation's economic problems. These reformers are so obsessed with making the nation more competitive in a global economy and producing young people with marketable skills for work, that they have lost sight of the fundamental purposes of public schooling—making good citizens, nourishing moral and social development, and building a diverse people into one nation. (It is debatable whether urban schools achieve any of these broader purposes as they should, but I will leave that aside for the moment.) The alleged goals of these contemporary reformers are portrayed as private rather than public, focused on selfish interests instead of the common welfare. These reformers are, of course, people who advocate individual choice, vouchers, independent charter schools, and the contracting out of educational services to private entrepreneurs.

There are so many unwarranted presumptions built into the underlying argument of this book that they are impossible to address in an article of this size. Given the role that business elites historically have played in shaping American education, including the creation of the common school, it should not be surprising to students and colleagues of Tyack that these leaders continue to play a role in school reform. And yes, the economic viability of the nation and its citizens has long been a part of the public rationale for a tax-supported school system. Even Horace Mann, a great believer in schooling as an economic equalizer, made that argument. There is no basis, however, for claiming that economics is the only motivation behind the choice movement or that its constituency is singularly dominated by business interests. Many of the school-acquired skills that make young people into productive wage earners also help develop them into good citizens and active community members. The choice debate has generated a substantial body of empirical research, conducted by proponents and opponents, designed to assess the broader societal effects of vouchers, charters, and entrepreneurship.[27]

[26] Larry Cuban and Dorothy Shipps, eds., *Reconstructing the Common Good in Education: Coping With Intractable American Dilemmas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 1.

[27] See Mark Schneider, et al., "Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice," *American Political Science Review* 91 (March 1997); Wolfe, *School Choice;* Ravitch and Viteritti, *Making Good Citizens*, especially the chapters by Nathan Glazer, Mark Holmes, Rosemary Salomone, and Joseph Viteritti.

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Today the largest constituency for school choice in the United States consists of black and Hispanic parents who want alternatives beyond the failing schools to which their children are routinely assigned.[28] If their desire to attain a decent education for their children can be deemed an act of self-interest, it is the kind of self-interest our democratic system was designed to channel into worthy public ends. It is difficult to fault disadvantaged parents for wanting to give their children the same opportunities that other parents take for granted or for wanting their children to have the skills to make a good living.

In order to have an intelligent dialogue about choice, it is essential to recognize the distinction between universal voucher schemes designed to maximize competition and targeted plans designed to offer a wider range of opportunity to underserved populations. The market has become a straw man for choice opponents who do not want to deal with the moral dimensions of the discussion. They cry out for democratic governance but ignore pleas by less fortunate citizens who want more control over the education of their children. Several generations of political science research has demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that education is an essential ingredient for full participation in democratic government.[29] So long as the learning gap between the races persists, the broader purposes of education envisioned by Cuban and his associates will not be realized.

The most disheartening aspect of the Tyack *festschrift* is its sense of resignation regarding the status quo and the naïve notion that the authors' broader societal goals can be realized while the present arrangement persists. This cynicism is most evident in the "Afterword," where the editors write, "If public schooling functions to reproduce stratified social and economic relationships, it also provides a near ubiquitous opportunity to develop common values and a civic identity."[30] The assumption of commonality is overstated and obviously does not include parents who desire opportunities beyond the common school formula.[31] Worse, this stratified picture of a good society is indefensible. It is a "save the system at all costs" plea that is at odds with the ideals its authors claim to hold. In one of the volume's better essays, John Meyer attempts to reconcile its central paradox by describing public education as a secular religion embodying a "sacred canopy" of doctrines that transcend mundane experience and functioning.[32] The editors agree. Perhaps this explains why these devout believ-

[28] Terry Moe, *Schools, Vouchers and the American Public* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 193–255.

[29] Norman Nie and D. Sunshine Hillygus, "Education and Democratic Citizenship" in Ravitch and Viteritti, *Making Good Citizens.*

[30] Cuban and Shipps, *Reconstructing the Common Good*, 225.

[31] See Rosemary C. Salomone, *Visions of Schooling: Conscience, Community and Common Education* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); and the essays by Nathan Glazer, Mark Holmes, and Rosemary Salomone in Ravitch and Viteritti, *Making Good Citizens.*

[32] John Meyer, "Reflections on Education as Transcendence" in Cuban and Shipps, *Reconstructing the Common Good*, 209.

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ers feel no compulsion to face the reality of widespread failure or furnish recommendations that might help reverse the underlying injustice inherent in the project they defend.

## Politics without Vision

Over the past five years, the school reform literature in political science has been dominated by the Civic Capacity and Urban Education Project led by Clarence Stone and Jeffrey Henig. Supported by a generous grant from the National Science Foundation, the project has thus far been associated with five books (with another in preparation) examining the politics of school reform in eleven cities. Stone was the author of a landmark study of Atlanta that helped establish "regime theory" within the discipline.[33] Henig wrote a well-received critique of the market approach in education highlighting the pitfalls not only of private school vouchers, but also of magnet schools and other forms of public school choice.[34] The two previous works by Stone and Henig set the parameters of the larger project on urban school reform, defining both its conceptual framework and underlying limitation.

Regime theory views local governance as a collaborative arrangement between the public and private sectors. Civic capacity measures the ability of various actors to cooperate in solving a problem.[35] This approach rejects pluralist assumptions that government alone is adequate to carry out public objectives and elite assumptions that business interests dominate local politics. Both sectors are deemed essential in order to establish a legitimate and effective system of governance. Governing regimes control resources and establish patterns of interaction. While informal, they are relatively stable structures that move policy along in an incremental manner.

Impressed by the "proeducation" alliance once formed in Atlanta between business leaders and black integrationists, Stone sought to understand better how diverse stakeholders could be brought together in other localities to promote school improvement.[36] Therefore, the goal of the Civic Capacity project was to determine how sustainable coalitions bent on school reform could be forged in an urban environment. This was a noble objective. However, it was undermined by two problems indigenous to the adopted framework. With few exceptions, even the development of something resembling a broad-based civic

[33] Clarence N. Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989).

[34] Jeffrey R. Henig, *Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[35] See also Steven L. Elkin, *City and Regime in the American Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Clarence N. Stone, "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 15 (1993).

[36] Clarence N. Stone, ed., *Changing Urban Education* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 10–16.

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capacity in some locations did not lead to a significant improvement in school performance or a reduction of the learning gap that existed between urban students and their peers. Moreover, Stone, Henig and their colleagues did not identify a specific agenda that might lead to accomplishing these ends.

The civic capacity construct bears a striking resemblance to the participatory model of reform that swept through urban education and municipal government during the 1960s. Both portray politics as a useful mechanism for fixing systems that are not responsive to the needs of citizens and clients.[37] The "ideology of participation" was based on a pluralist understanding of urban politics. Robert Dahl's classic study of New Haven was a refutation of the notion that local governance is a closed system controlled by small economic elites. His historical analysis of New Haven demonstrated that local control was passed on from old line patricians to a more populous generation of working class people; his analysis of local decision making indicated that power was parceled out among specialized groups in discrete policy arenas, including education.[38] If local government were as open as the pluralists thought it to be, then all one had to do was create other arenas for access to engage clients who were underrepresented in the decision-making process. Urged on by black-power advocates in the neighborhoods and the Community Action Program launched in Washington, it was assumed that the politicization of the poor would force local bureaucracies to become more responsive. Pluralist scholars had underestimated the resistance that would be garnered by old ethnic machines unwilling to concede power, and black activists did not understand that institutional restructuring does not produce the social requisites needed for meaningful participation in the political process.[39]

Eventually demographic changes would allow blacks and Hispanics to assume majority or near-majority status in cities and replace the withering machines. But as Stone and his team were to learn, racial succession did not easily translate into better services, especially in education. In Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, and Washington the rising black political establishment, much like its white ethnic predecessor, became more preoccupied with preserving jobs in the school system than raising the academic performance of children.[40] While rec-

[37] See Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," *Public Interest* 16 (Summer 1969): 149; Alan Altshuler, *Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1970); Diane Ravitch, *The Great School Wars: A History of the New York City Public Schools* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, rev. ed.), 251–387.

[38] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

[39] Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* (New York: Free Press, 1969); Joseph P. Viteritti, *Bureaucracy and Social Justice* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1979).

[40] Clarence N. Stone, et al., *Building Civic Capacity: The Politics of Reforming Urban Schools* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 21–22; Jeffrey R. Henig, et al., *The Color of School Reform: Race Politics and the Challenge of Urban Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 261–273; Marion Orr, *Black Social Capital: The Politics of School Reform in Baltimore, 1986–1998* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 42–62, 144–147.

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ognizing the role of these "employment regimes," Stone and his colleagues may have underestimated their tenacity.

Despite their desire to learn how local alliances can be forged to promote sustained school improvement, the authors of the Civic Capacity project identified neither a clear strategic plan nor a substantive policy agenda. In part their inability to define a political strategy stems from an apparent ambivalence about the role the education establishment can and should play in implementing change. On the one hand they reject assertions that the education bureaucracy is self-serving and rigid.[41] On the other hand, they describe the public school establishment as a cartel incapable of reforming itself, and discuss the need to break up the subsystem.[42] In the end, they conclude that if school improvement is to be implemented and sustained, educational professionals must be brought along as part of the reform process. The authors recommend a dual level of action, including an inside strand focused on the content of schooling and an outside strand that garners support and resources. This is reasonable enough. But nowhere do the authors explain how this might be done. Nor do they give us a reason to believe that it is possible to motivate recalcitrant insiders to change the system that benefits them.

The most remarkable finding from the Civic Capacity project is the low level of mobilization evident in all but one city, Pittsburgh.[43] Citizen and parental involvement in reform efforts were negligible across the board. Business involvement in reform activity was evident in the three cities that scored relatively high on the civic mobilization scale (Pittsburgh, Boston, and Los Angeles), and in the four cities that scored at the intermediate level (Baltimore, Houston, Detroit, and Washington). This confirms the historic role that business leadership has played in the politics of urban school reform. Given the long-standing power of the education bureaucracy to subvert significant change and the inactivity of other external constituents in the reform process, it may also indicate that a strong business role is essential to the formation of an effective reform coalition. Such business involvement, however, is probably not sufficient.

The authors find a strong correlation between civic mobilization and systemic reform efforts. What this means is rather vague, not the least because there is so little mobilization found in any of the eleven cities studied.[44] Moreover, given their focus on mobilization, the authors' definition of positive movement is tied more to activity than results.[45] Rather than agree on clear, definable policy objectives, the authors argue that Americans have conflicting visions of

[41] Stone, et al., *Building Civic Capacity*, 13, 158.

[42] Ibid., 8.

[43] Ibid., 74–99.

[44] Ibid., 123–140.

[45] The activities they look at include school-linked social services, postschool transition to work and college, parental involvement in governance, administrative decentralization, school choice, preschool and early childhood development, evaluation research, innovative testing and assessment, parental involvement with their children, and privatization through contracting out. Ibid., 131.

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what schools ought to do and that there is a challenging need to discover common indicators of educational success that can be empirically validated. But how can action be meaningful without identifiable goals? Is urban school reform a rudderless ship without a specific destination? While they agree that it is more useful to examine outcomes rather than inputs (resources) in assessing the impact of reform activity, the authors reject the use of standardized tests as a primary measure of educational achievement, claiming that such data are insufficient and unreliable.[46] The authors seem to have gotten it backwards here. Yes, people tend to disagree about what schools should be doing in terms of activities and programs; but most parents and citizens believe that schools should be able to transmit basic skills to students in their charge. And with all its limitations, the most reliable way to assess whether schools succeed in developing literacy and numeracy is through standardized testing. Relying on tests to measure basic skills as a minimum criterion for performance exists on a wide scale and does not preclude the application of other objective and subjective indicators; if, however, reform efforts do not minimally result in a reduction of the racial learning gap endemic to urban public school systems, as measured by such tests, they have utterly failed.

At first glance the authors seem to be agnostic with regard to various educational innovations, but in fact they are nihilistic in claiming, "Rather than a focus on specific programs or institutional reforms, our policy orientation is built around attention to the relationships among groups and the conditions under which it is possible for disparate groups to find and build common ground."[47] They reject programmatic innovations such as curriculum improvements, new teaching methods, professional development, and revised school calendars as simplistic panaceas; they do the same with regard to institutional changes focused on governance or the market. Here again they confuse politics with policy, pretending that it is possible to address deep-seated public problems without deliberately determining the action to be taken or a technique for measuring its effect. The only two volumes in the series that seriously discuss educational strategies and outcomes are spin-offs that do not involve either of the project's two principal investigators, Stone and Henig.[48] Because these two books connect real politics to real educational outcomes, they prove to be more illuminating.

An underlying fault with the Civic Capacity project is the reluctance of the principal authors to come to terms with the nature and the severity of the crisis in urban education. At the conclusion of their last book, they criticize those who have "emphasized 'crisis' and the need for immediate and radical reform."[49] Claiming that school reform is "a marathon, not a sprint," they dispar-

[46] Ibid., 125; Henig, et al., *The Color of School Reform*, 286–287.

[47] Stone, et al., *Building Civic Capacity*, 142. See also Henig, et al., *The Color of School Reform*, 280.

[48] John Portz, et al., *City Schools and City Politics: Institutions and Leadership in Pittsburgh, Boston and St. Louis* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Orr, *Black Social Capital.*

[49] Stone, et al., *Building Civic Capacity*, 166.

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age the "quick fix" mentality of educational privatizers and voucher supporters who rely on idealized conceptions of markets. In one of their more astute observations, the Stone-Henig team recognizes how educational politics fits into an "iron triangle" institutional structure with an instinctive "bias" against change, in which prevailing norms and perceptions "marginalize and delegitimate potentially disrupting ideas before they can take root and flower."[50] This is an important insight. They don't seem to understand, however, how the academic establishment in education research—themselves included—is also blinded by this overwhelming cognitive bias.

The chronic failure of city school systems and the debilitating effect that they have on the millions of children who attend them *is* a crisis. Parents of these children don't want to be told that they should be patient with the situation until more sympathetic political coalitions form, nor should it be expected. But this otherwise impressive team of researchers seems to miss the point. It is notable that of the eleven cities in their survey, only San Francisco specifically had identified the improved academic achievement of disadvantaged children as a priority.[51] In another study of fifty-five city school districts, San Francisco was one of only three that exceeded its statewide average in both reading and math scores.[52] San Francisco, however, comes out at the bottom on the civic mobilization scale, its agenda having been dictated in top-down fashion by an aggressive federal court through a long-lasting desegregation suit.

Even a prize-winning volume focused on race manages to tiptoe around the central political and policy dilemmas.[53] While acknowledging the deplorable condition of city schools and the learning gap between the races, it too rebukes claims that the urban school system is virtually broken. In response to such assertions, the authors drift off into comfortable reminders that many American schools function quite well and that evidence of change is everywhere.[54] Unfortunately, relatively few well-performing public schools are located in cities, and most urban initiatives fail to reverse the overall pattern of low performance. But once again reformers are urged to trim the sails of their imaginations and hunker down to the realities of an inert system. They are advised to "identify interim, near-term objectives that can serve as benchmarks and to acknowledge from the first that the local commitment must be measured in decades not years."[55] In the world of elementary and secondary education, decades translate into generations—or what Langston Hughes, writing on Harlem in the 1950s, called "a dream deferred."

[50] Ibid., 49.

[51] Stone, *Changing Urban Education*, 9.

[52] "Beating the Odds: A City by City Analysis of the Student Performance and Achievement Gaps on State Assessments," Washington, DC: Council of Great City Schools, May 2001.

[53] Henig, et al. *The Color of School Reform.*

[54] Ibid., 3–12.

[55] Ibid., 280.

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The book offers interesting insights on the dilemmas of racial politics. While racial identity can be a galvanizing force, it can also be divisive. While black political leaders ostensibly support school reform, they are reluctant to shake up systems that employ so many of their constituents. And black citizens, we are told, are hesitant to criticize blacks in office. Given the wide support for vouchers within minority communities, the last finding may be overstated. Either way, the authors fail to grasp the most fundamental dilemma of school politics in the city. Those parents with children in the worst public schools lack the personal and social resources generally associated with political efficacy. For them and their children, politics is not the answer; it is the problem. The fundamental dilemma of educational politics in an urban environment is a dichotomy between constituents and clients.[56] Those actors to whom the system is politically accountable (constituents) and those whom the system is supposed to serve (clients) are not one and the same; and their interests can be different even when they are of the same race. Incremental change will not suffice as a mechanism to reverse or alter the overall pattern.

It is bewildering that mainstream political scientists have joined mainstream historians in rejecting choice proposals out of hand. One does not need to view choice as a panacea nor accept universal market-based proposals in order to seriously consider the role that choice might play in addressing the political and educational dilemmas of American cities. For those concerned with the plight of inner city populations, the equity argument is compelling. Targeted choice designed to help disadvantaged families is a form of redistributive social policy, not an abandonment of education to the forces of the market.[57] It allocates public resources to provide poor people with goods and services for the purpose of achieving a worthy public objective. It may not necessarily assure parents a decent education for their children, but it is a form of empowerment. When poor people are given the opportunity to withdraw their children and public dollars from public schools, they obtain leverage over an institution that has ignored their legitimate needs for decades. It is remarkable that historians committed to a democratic agenda might categorize such positive social action as selfishly counterproductive. It is also remarkable that political scientists studying power relationships within cities are too distracted by economic images of markets to discern how choice might function to adjust the political equation between the influential and the weak.

Stone, Henig, and their coauthors insist that market-oriented reforms arouse too much controversy to offer a realistic alternative to the traditional model of public schooling. But institutional change always provokes political resistance. The question for reformers is whether the battle is worthwhile. The central research question is whether choice will allow disadvantaged families to fare bet-

[56] See Joseph P. Viteritti, *Across the River: Politics and Education in the City* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983).

[57] Viteritti, *Choosing Equality.*

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ter than they do under the existing political-bureaucratic arrangement. The low level of parental participation found in the eleven-city survey is not unusual. A recent poll administered nationwide by Public Agenda found that the great majority of parents is not interested in becoming involved in running their children's schools.[58] One has to believe that parents are even less inclined to become involved in educational politics, where the opportunity costs for participation can be more exacting. Such costs are especially burdensome to disadvantaged families who lack the leisure time and social attributes—education, wealth, and status—commonly associated with effective political participation.

The prospect of choice provides researchers with an interesting problem. Political scientists have habitually looked toward politics as a way to make local service systems more responsive to the poor, leaving market choices to those with the resources to afford them on their own. We already know that parental involvement in schools is a function of class. Now we need to know whether equipping poor parents with the financial resources to function as consumers will allow them to realize their educational goals better. Once they have such resources, say in the form of a voucher, poor families may find the opportunity costs they assume as consumers less onerous than those required of them as political activists. The single mother faced with the demands of everyday life may find it more rewarding to shop for a decent school than to confront powerful interests in the game of educational politics.

Contrary to the skepticism exhibited by choice opponents, there is encouraging empirical evidence to suggest that poor parents are capable of acting as intelligent consumers when it comes to selecting a school for their children.[59] They may not be as well informed as middle class parents, but they seem to know enough to pick schools that meet their educational objectives. Certainly we need more research along these lines. But the authors of the Civic Capacity and Urban Education Project would not even take up the question. They fail to recognize that under some conditions consumer power and political power are complementary. This is not to say poor children will necessarily be better off because of the choices their parents make. That is an altogether different question to which I turn next.

## Markets without Competition

Market theory, as conceived by Milton Friedman, is based on the empirical proposition that competition will provide public schools with an incentive to improve and simultaneously force failing schools to close. Friedman's vision of education had two features that distinguish it from the literature discussed above. It was focused on academic performance, and it explained (at least theo-

[58] "Playing Their Parts: What Parents and Teachers Really Mean by Parental Involvement," New York, poll by Public Agenda, 1999.

[59] Mark Schneider, et al., *Choosing Schools: Consumer Choice and the Quality of American Schools* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

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retically) how an entrenched system might be prodded to adopt change. Since both proponents and opponents of vouchers believed that public schools were disinclined to change, Friedman's proposal led to speculation that parental choice would result in the demise of public education as we know it. Two political scientists, John Chubb and Terry Moe, initially put Friedman's theory to the test and brought it into the mainstream of policy debate in education. Their *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools* assembled mounds of evidence showing that private and parochial schools are academically superior to public schools.[60] They concluded that the performance of tuition-bound private schools was driven by market forces. Drawing on interest group theory from their own discipline, they also offered a biting explanation of how the bureaucratic and political structure of American education is institutionally programmed to obstruct reform.

Although it made people angry, nobody effectively challenged Chubb and Moe's institutional prognosis for public education. Many social scientists, however, responded to their comparison of educational outcomes by pointing out that children who attend nonpublic schools are a self-selected group, thus rendering the comparison with their public school peers invalid. Because parental choice was limited mostly to parents who could afford private and parochial school tuition, Chubb and Moe were unable to measure the precise effect that robust competition could have on student performance in either sector. For some odd reason, however, defenders of the common school remained less persuaded than choice proponents that the institutions they so cherished could successfully compete with nonpublic schools, even if the latter were flooded with low-performing students in search of educational alternatives. This remains the great irony of the choice debate.

The educational landscape changed markedly over the next decade. Publicly-supported vouchers became available in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida; private voucher programs were created in nearly every state; and charter school laws were enacted in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia. These initiatives created new opportunities for both children and researchers.

Paul Peterson of Harvard was one of the first researchers to aggressively exploit the new developments. He challenged the findings and the methods of fellow political scientist John Witte, who conducted Wisconsin's official evaluation of the Milwaukee voucher program.[61] Because Wisconsin's was the first publicly-supported voucher program in the nation, the outcome of the Milwaukee evaluation was closely watched in both educational and political circles. When Witte compared the test scores of voucher recipients in private schools with scores from a group of their public school peers, he found that there was no significant difference. Peterson objected that the two groups of students in

[60] John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990).

[61] See Viteritti, *Choosing Equality*, 105–107.

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the Witte study were not comparable and showed that children in the voucher program were more disadvantaged. He reanalyzed the data using a control group of students who had applied to the voucher program but were not chosen in the lottery. His results indicated that students in the voucher program had outperformed the control group of students remaining in the Milwaukee public schools in both reading and math. When Witte reanalyzed the data using a similar method, he found that the voucher students excelled in math, but not reading.[62]

The debate about reading in Milwaukee was never resolved. Peterson, nonetheless, significantly advanced the state of research. By designing a controlled experiment that could deal with the selection bias of private school students, he addressed an issue that had plagued researchers since James Coleman first compared the academic performance of public and nonpublic schools in 1982[63]—the same methodological problem that had vexed Chubb and Moe. Peterson and his colleagues later applied his methodology to study privately funded voucher programs in cities around the country.[64] Peterson's analysis of programs in New York, Washington, Dayton, and Edgewood (San Antonio) found that minority students scored an average of six points higher than their public school peers after three years. The most dramatic difference (nine points) was found in New York, where gains equaled the national gap in achievement found between black and white students. If vouchers could produce similar gains in other cities, they would provide an answer to the most daunting problem in American education. The same assessment showed, however, that there was no gain in achievement for Hispanic children who participated in the New York program. Although participants in the Washington voucher program registered a nine-point gain after two years, these gains were lost in the third year, when their scores were generally the same as those of their public school peers.

The research by the Peterson-led team was not limited to test scores. It revealed significantly higher levels of satisfaction among parents with children in nonpublic schools. It showed that students who attend nonpublic schools experience fewer problems such as fighting, cheating, property destruction, racial conflict, and truancy. While parents of voucher participants had relatively higher education and income levels than parents of children who did not apply, on the whole children who benefited from the programs were from families that were economically, socially, and educationally disadvantaged. The profile of students is primarily a function of program design, which in most cases limits participation to low-income families.

[62] John F. Witte, *The Market Approach to Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 132–142. See also Cecilia Elena Rouse, "Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 113 (May 1998).

[63] James S. Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore, *High School Achievement* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

[64] Paul E. Peterson, et al., *The Education Gap: Vouchers and Urban Schools* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

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Peterson's team did not investigate the impact that vouchers have on public school performance. This remains the most significant gap in the research on school choice, and the reason is rather straightforward. It is not possible to determine the effects of robust competition, as envisioned by Friedman, because healthy competition still does not exist. While school choice, in the form of public vouchers, private vouchers, and charters has grown significantly over the last decade, such programs represent a tiny share of the education market.[65]

The one scholar who has come closer than any other to patching this hole in the research literature is Harvard economist Caroline Minter Hoxby. Exploiting the structure of the existing education marketplace, Hoxby utilized a Tiebout economic model, which focuses on how families make implicit consumer choices involving public services when deciding where to live. "Tiebout choice" is possible when metropolitan areas offer residential shoppers a diversity of communities with distinct mixes of local services and taxes.[66] Hoxby found that the availability of such choice among public school districts in metropolitan areas significantly raises productivity by simultaneously improving achievement and lowering spending.[67] She also found that households in areas with more public school choice are less prone to use private schools. Hoxby's work is relevant, interesting, and informative; however, it cannot determine the precise effect of providing a wide range of public and private choice to disadvantaged families. It leaves the central question posed by Friedman unanswered.

In 2001, a group of economists from RAND released a report that promised to distinguish rhetoric from reality in the choice debate and tell us "what we know and what we need to know about vouchers and charter schools."[68] The report was released with great fanfare, attracting wide press coverage. Noting that vouchers and charters represent a major challenge to the common school model, the RAND team conducted an exhaustive review of the existing empirical evidence, looking at five outcome dimensions: academic achievement, choice, access, demographic integration, and civic socialization. The report confirmed that charters and vouchers make new educational options available to a disadvantaged population of underserved children and that parents of these children are generally pleased with the quality of the schools their children attend. It mentioned the difficulty under the present circumstances of measuring

[65] As of September 2002, the approximate number of students participating in public voucher programs was 11,000 in Milwaukee, 5,500 in Cleveland, and 575 in Florida. Approximately 60,000 students received private vouchers nationally. More than 500,000 students attended charter schools, only representing approximately 1 percent of the public school population.

[66] Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure," *Journal of Political Economy* 64 (October 1956).

[67] Caroline M. Hoxby, "Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?" *American Economic Review* 90 (December 2000).

[68] Brian P. Gill, et al., *Rhetoric Versus Reality: What We Know and What We Need to Know About Vouchers and Charter Schools* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

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the systemic effects of choice on public schools, the extent of total demand for new educational options, and the supply response of educational providers. The report is replete with cautionary messages warning "the evidence leaves us without a crisp bottom-line judgment of the wisdom of voucher and charter programs."[69] The reader is told that what we do not know about charters and vouchers far exceeds what we do know. That may be true; but we know more about these phenomena than one is led to believe from reading the RAND report.

I turn here to the bottom line consideration of educational achievement. As the RAND team observes, the performance data on charter schools, although somewhat encouraging, is especially mixed and inconclusive. Because charter laws and charter schools are so diverse, it may be some time before general conclusions can be drawn with regard to student achievement. Researchers are more likely to discover the circumstances under which charter schools succeed or fail, and hopefully the identification of such variables will serve as a guide to future policy makers.[70] For example, we already know that many charter schools lack both the managerial autonomy and external accountability inherent in their original design, compromising their capacity to function as intended. Many charters are also hampered by inadequate funding and the unavailability of appropriate space. Sometimes these factors are a function of their newness, hopefully to be ironed out with the benefit of gained experience. Sometimes these factors are a function of design, the result of legislative compromises engineered by powerful groups that oppose alternatives to traditional forms of governance. The political encumbrances may prove to be more tenacious than the operational ones; and all this makes it difficult to judge the viability of the charter school model and its potential impact on student achievement.

The voucher experience, while also complicated, is another matter. As previously observed, African-American recipients of public and private vouchers have registered significant academic gains, while Hispanic students in the same programs have not. The first pattern, if replicated, could have a huge impact on the racial gap in learning; the second is more sobering. The RAND researchers treated these results as tentative in nature. They pointed out that in some cities—Dayton, Washington, and Charlotte—the positive effects were driven by a single cohort of students, with no measurable benefits found in the other grades. They noted the high attrition rate of students in the voucher programs, which may eliminate low-performing students and skew the outcome. They also insisted that more research is needed to determine why black students are performing better in these nonpublic schools. We actually know quite a bit about that already, however.

[69] Ibid., xxiii.

[70] "The State of Charter Schools—Fourth Year Report" (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Education, January 2000); Chester E. Finn, Bruno V. Manno, and Gregg Vanourek, *Charter Schools in Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Sandra Vergari, ed., *The Charter School Landscape* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002).

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There is a substantial body of research on private and parochial schools, especially Catholic schools. It validates the finding that African-American children from low-income families benefit from attending Catholic schools, especially when achievement is measured in terms of high school graduation and college attendance. It also offers plausible explanations of why this occurs.[71] Among the variables commonly cited are the Catholic schools' sense of community, their orderly environment, their focus on basic skills, their higher academic standards, and their smaller size. On the whole, this body of research is built on a more solid institutional, empirical, and methodological foundation than the evaluations of the newer voucher programs.

The RAND researchers ignore these explanations when they discuss the private school literature. Although they acknowledge the higher achievement of African-American students, they emphasize the need to know more about why these schools do not have the same effect on other students. This is an interesting question, especially with regard to Hispanic students who exhibit academic deficits similar to their African-American peers. Once again, however, we know a lot more about this than the RAND report suggests. Beyond the economic and social disadvantages that afflict African Americans, Hispanic students also come from non-English speaking homes. They get funneled into bilingual education programs that are notoriously ineffective in teaching English, making their accumulated academic deficits more difficult to overcome.[72] The explanation with regard to white students is more straightforward. White students who attend public schools perform at higher levels than minorities in public schools. There is a smaller private school advantage to be realized when white children transfer from public schools. The most interesting discovery from the perspective of public policy in general, and vouchers in particular, remains the effect of private and parochial schools on racial minorities, even if it doesn't hold for all groups.

The RAND researchers are guilty of a significant oversight in their review of the private school and voucher studies. They fail to acknowledge that the private (mostly parochial) schools being compared with public schools in these surveys operate at a much lower cost. Estimates range from 20 percent to 50 percent, very often depending on the predisposition of the researcher. This is a major defect in a study by economists, who are supposed to be cognizant of cost and production functions in organizations. The omission has a decisive influence on their findings. The RAND team has cautiously concluded that voucher programs targeted at low-income families have "a possible (but as yet

[71] Grogger and Neal, *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs*; James S. Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, *Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Anthony S. Bryk, et al., *Catholic Schools and the Common Good* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[72] Christine H. Rossell, "Teaching Language Minorities: Theory and Reality" in Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti, eds., *City Schools: Lessons from New York* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

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uncertain) modest achievement benefit for African American students" but that there is no "consistent evidence of either benefit or harm" for students in other racial/ethnic groups.[73] They might have—perhaps should have—concluded that private schools can produce similar academic outcomes for most students at a significant cost saving; and that there is encouraging evidence to suggest that the same private schools produce even more favorable outcomes among a significant portion of minority students (specifically African Americans) that public schools consistently fail to reach. The RAND economists neglected to see this.

Once we recognize the inherent bias of school funding schemes operable under the prevailing common school model, it is possible to draw some interesting inferences regarding the educational marketplace. Because this arrangement usually restricts public funding to government-run schools, it forces most private and parochial schools to operate with fewer resources per pupil—especially those inner-city schools that serve children from low-income families. Even when public or private vouchers are available, they do not usually cover the entire cost of educating additional students. One can only speculate how much better nonpublic schools would perform with equal funding. But there are clear inferences that can be drawn based upon the information already available. It all depends upon your perspective. An optimist might conclude that these underfunded private institutions compete very well; a pessimist might conclude these same institutions are prevented from competing very much at all.

Notwithstanding noteworthy flaws in its observations and conclusions, the RAND study represents a noble attempt by its authors to render a balanced treatment of a volatile subject. Economists, as a group, may be the most even-handed of scholars wrestling with the voucher and charter questions. They are less inclined to vilify the actors in the debate or question their motives. They are not as apt to dismiss challenges to the common school model out of hand as being impractical or troublesome. They seem to be less political than historians and political scientists. Therefore the RAND researchers should be taken at their word when they pledge that their study "aims to be nonideological, driven by the assumption that empirical questions about vouchers and charters are what is critical."[74] The purified empiricism that economists prize, however, brings its own baggage to the discussion; and in the end it can have an inhibiting influence on the reform process.

## The Burden of Proof

The root of the problem can be traced to the empirical proposition posed by Friedman fifty years ago—the idea that one can or should demonstrate the

[73] Gill, et al., *Rhetoric Versus Reality*, 203.
[74] Ibid., 29.

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merit of the market mechanism. Monitoring market effects under current conditions is like testing a ship's hull in dry dock; it is an artificial situation containing all the elements that must be weathered except for the powerful force of an angry sea. Although the voucher and charter programs in operation mimic certain features of a free market, they remain a small part of an overall system that is monopolistic in nature, offering no serious threat to its functioning or survival. As a result these programs provide little impetus for meaningful systemic change. Even districts with relatively high concentrations of charters and vouchers—Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Edgewood (San Antonio)—have responded only modestly to the competition they offer.[75] Yet sophisticated social scientists continue to get bogged down with market metaphors, hoping to uncover the evidence needed to signal whether it is safe to proceed.

Many charter laws impose strict limits on the number of students who may participate. Charter schools continue to be hindered by public school administrators who seek to undermine their operation with the imposition of bureaucratic requirements and regulations. When the Milwaukee voucher program was first adopted, enrollment was limited to one percent of the school population. Litigation by opponents has created an air of uncertainty around all publicly supported voucher programs, discouraging parents from participation. Charter and voucher programs have not only been underfunded; public school districts have been allowed to retain a portion of the funding allotted for students who exercise choice and are educated elsewhere. Hence these programs reward the losers of the competitive stakes. A large proportion of the students who resort to these programs start with poor academic records in public school. Nonetheless, charters and vouchers are evaluated on the basis of their ability to successfully compete with public schools and produce better academic results.

One is well advised to be cautious when drawing conclusions on the basis of such research. But such caution should not be transposed automatically into the policy realm. For scholars who are philosophically committed to the status quo, empiricism provides the script for the riddle that implores policy makers to refrain from implementing choice until there is more evidence that it will succeed. But of course nobody can prove the success of any venture until it is seriously tried. Notwithstanding the enormous strides made over the last decade, the reality of robust choice remains sitting in dry dock, waiting for an opportunity to sail.

How might we begin to chart the indications of a successful journey? Is providing the same educational outcome at a fraction of the cost a reasonable measure? Does producing similar results for Hispanic students undermine the success realized with their African-American peers? Would students, however many or few, be better off embarking on new ventures in school choice than they are as hostages on a rickety old craft sinking to the bottom of the sea? Who should decide—scholars, educators, politicians, or parents?

[75] Frederick M. Hess, *Revolution at the Margins: The Impact of Competition on Urban School Systems* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

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There is something basically wrong with the prevailing conversation about school reform. The burden of proof has been placed very heavily on those who seek alternatives to the common school model, as if the system were doing just fine. But the risks of change are relatively small in a system that has neglected the needs of a large population of urban students. The decision of whether to stick with regular public schools or seek other educational providers should be put in the hands of those who must live with the consequences of the alternatives chosen—parent stakeholders. Even if there is a selection bias among poor parents who choose nonpublic schools, isn't it better from a policy perspective to provide them with the option? Should we assume that the majority of parents who do not opt out of failing public schools are unmotivated or uncaring? These kinds of gross assumptions lead to a blame-the-victim explanation of why urban schools fail.

The RAND researchers are correct in claiming that we cannot gauge the strength of the demand for charters and vouchers. But we do know from the long waiting lists that accompany most such programs—even under precarious and uncertain conditions—that demand exceeds supply. The economists are correct in asserting that we cannot forecast a supply response. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that the provision of equal funding for children who opt out of traditional public schools would increase both supply and demand. Right now the system of school finance imposes unfair opportunity costs on both consumers and suppliers who want to play the school choice option. Certainly, we cannot precisely predict how public schools would respond to real competition; however, if they do not respond favorably, it is their failure and not that of the market.

The burden of proof must be lifted from reformers who want to improve the range of options for children stuck in failing public schools. Even if one were to concede that the probability of finding a desirable educational placement is equal among the public and nonpublic schools found in urban environments, adding the latter to the mix would increase the number of desirable educational options in communities that have an inadequate supply of educational options. Notwithstanding the academic debates that rage over student performance in choice programs, we do have fairly solid evidence that these programs are reaching a population of underserved and underprivileged students, and that parents believe their children are better off in them than they were in traditional public schools. In a sense these questions of access and satisfaction may be more relevant than inconclusive achievement data.

The most significant question in the choice debate is not an empirical one, though. The threshold question of whether to extend choice to a population that does not enjoy its advantages is a normative one. It is the kind of a question to which political scientists trained in a moral philosophical tradition should be especially attuned. Giving people similar opportunities to decide where their children attend school is essential in a democracy. A system that provides choice to some and withholds it from others is unfair, especially when the opportunity

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is determined by income. Education is too fundamental. There is no justification for forcing anybody's children to attend bad schools when there are alternatives available.

Targeted choice makes good sense because it is more equitable than the current arrangement. The burden of proof should be shifted to those who would perpetuate a system that provides different opportunities to different people. A system of democratic schooling should strive to give every student a decent education, and every parent the right to decide what is best for their own children.

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











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# External Interventions and Domestic Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslav Macedonia

NIKOLAOS ZAHARIADIS

Ever since the declaration of independence in 1991, successive governments in the Former Yogoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have been hailed for engineering a successful transition to democracy with relatively few blemishes. International commentators have applauded the ability of government to avoid ethnic conflict in its territory despite the multiethnic character of its population. Observers repeatedly pointed out that all other former republics that declared independence from the Yugoslav federation witnessed bloody ethnic revolts. Exemplifying this view, Duncan Perry boldly asserts that "Macedonia has had more success than most emerging democracies regarding coping with ethnic issues, despite the international trend toward smaller but ethnically 'pure' states. . . . Democracy has given Albanians and others a platform from which to speak and speak loudly. It has also integrated Albanians into more mainstream political activity. Minorities, who had little role in governance during the Tito era, now have more representation in government, and a growing role in society."[1] Albanians, however, did not see it this way. Ten years after independence, FYROM's government found itself addressing the same demands it did in 1991, albeit made by a more radical Albanian population. A civil war ensued, with the country being stitched back together only by strong

[1] Duncan M. Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: Finding its Way" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 273.

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Western pressure. How did this happen? Were international observers uninformed or did they misrepresent reality?

I argue that neither explanation is true. The answer lies in the unintended consequences of public policy. Attempting to explain such unforeseen effects, Robert Merton argues that an actor's paramount concern with immediate consequences excludes the consideration of other consequences of the same act. Labeling this explanation "the imperious immediacy of interest," he contends that in the face of social complexity, "action ramifies, its consequences are not restricted to the specific area in which they were initially intended to center, they occur in interrelated fields explicitly ignored at the time of action."[2]

Using this logic as a platform, I maintain that political strategies crafted by FYROM's elites to deal effectively with external interventions retarded attempts to address Albanian grievances and at the same time provided strong incentives to all involved not to give due attention to growing ethnic tension. In this way, the dispute with Greece over international recognition under the name Macedonia gave rise to an ethnonational conception of the country that was antithetical to its multiethnic character and served to alienate ethnic Albanians. The presence of troops under the aegis of the United Nations raised and dashed expectations among ethnic Albanians. The eruption of armed conflict in neighboring Kosovo widened the chasm between ethnic Albanians and the governing Slav majority and served as a model of how to draw NATO to the Albanian cause. The end result of the external interventions, whose effects were mediated by government policy, was a ferocious armed conflict that caught everyone by surprise. I do not suggest that external interventions caused ethnic conflict. I argue that domestic strategies designed to deal with them had negative consequences that should and could have been considered.

My argument informs debates on transitions to democracy and ethnic conflict. Equality of minorities with the majority cannot be legislated. Respect for human rights and an appreciation of demands for social and economic change are important lessons that leaders in the West and in former Eastern Europe may ignore only at their peril.

## A Model of Ethnic Group Mobilization

While many attempts have been made to explain the mobilization of ethnic groups, one stands out as particularly appropriate to the task at hand.[3] Michael Hechter's argument of internal colonialism provides a good explanation of ethnic group mobilization and has three additional benefits.[4] First, it is most rele-

[2] Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," *American Sociological Review* 1 (December 1936): 903.

[3] For a recent review of the literature on ethnic group mobilization, see Rajat Ganguly and Ray Taras, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Longman, 1998).

[4] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London: Routledge, 1975).

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vant to industrialized societies. Second, it focuses on combining cultural and economic factors, as opposed to explicitly political ones. The end result is that it points attention to cultural and economic grievances in the face of political participation. Third, it is specific to ethnoregional movements that are formed within specific regions. This is particularly relevant to my case.

According to Hechter's theory of internal colonialism, ethnic groups mobilize as a result of a hierarchical cultural division of labor. There are many differences between ethnic groups, but not all of them lead to ethnic mobilization. In areas where members of an ethnic group have been made to feel peripheral by the core dominant ethnic group, ethnic identity among members of the peripheral group becomes stronger. The more that group membership determines an individual's life chances, the more significant ethnic membership is likely to be.[5] The greater the distance between members of two ethnic groups—be it cultural or economic—the greater the marginalization is likely to be. Such internal colonialism, as Hechter calls it, leads to reactive group formation and mobilization. The group's identity is formed in response to its environment.

The situation of ethnic Albanians in FYROM before and after independence certainly seems to fit this pattern. Ethnic Albanians have been poorly integrated into FYROM's society.[6] As a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, FYROM was the least prosperous of the six republics. It had the lowest per capita income in 1989 and actually experienced a loss of income between the years 1952 and 1989. By 1989, real per capita income was lower than it was in 1978.[7] Albanians tend to be concentrated in certain areas in the west and north of the country bordering Albania and Kosovo. Although they are not the dominant element in large urban areas such as Tetovo, they constitute a significant presence in cities such as Skopje and in the majority of the rural countryside. Albanians are predominantly Muslim, in stark contrast to the Christian Orthodox Slav majority of the country. They are also engaged mostly in agriculture and have low levels of educational attainment. Mixed marriages are not considered desirable by either side.[8] This cultural distance has tended to reinforce a sense of separateness between the two main ethnic communities in FYROM.

The cultural division of labor has become hierarchical and has given rise to ethnic mobilization because of the perceived lack of opportunities for Albanians in the new state, the loss of rights enjoyed previously under the Yugoslav

[5] Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, "Ethno-Regional Movements in the West" in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 184–195.

[6] Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia," 252.

[7] Dragomir Vojnic, "Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic Dimension of Yugoslavia's Demise" in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse, eds., *Yugoslavia: The Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), tables 4-1 and 4-2. For more information on the economic dimension of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, also see Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

[8] Jens Reuter, "Policy and Economy in Macedonia" in James Pettifer, ed., *The New Macedonian Question* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 37.

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federation, and the organizational capacity to mobilize politically. Albanians complain of the lack of opportunities for their kin in the new republic. Although this was the same problem when FYROM was still part of Yugoslavia, the complaints have taken on new urgency in light of the deterioration of the economy in the first ten years of independence brought on by events related to the Yugoslav conflict—embargoes, corruption, and a shift of resources to build a viable defense system. The UN-mandated embargo on Yugoslavia, which was lifted only recently, and Greece's closure of the border until 1995 crippled the fledgling economy by leading to a loss of the major trade routes and the loss of the two main export markets. According to the official government estimates, losses from both embargoes were put at more than $2 billion in an economy of a little more than $3.1 billion.[9] Though these numbers may be inflated, FYROM's President Kiro Gligorov estimated a loss of 60 percent of trade, because the country's infrastructure relied heavily on transport to Serbia in the north and Greece to the south.[10] The economy further lost steam as reforms aiming to convert the system into a free market economy failed, were derailed or delayed, or were generally marred by corrupt business deals. As a result, the state continued to be the main employer in the country. Albanians, however, complained that they were largely excluded from the public sector.

Paradoxically, even though FYROM declared independence and was hailed by Westerners as a democracy, Albanians bitterly complained that they enjoyed more rights under the communist Yugoslav federation.[11] For example, members of ethnic groups were allowed on public holidays and other occasions to fly the flag of kin foreign states. This right was deleted from the new constitution largely because the new Slav majority feared it would lead to secessionist tendencies among Albanians. When Albanians in Tetovo tried to fly the Albanian flag, they were quickly reminded through brutal force that this action was now illegal. In addition, the loss of educational opportunities was a major grievance. When FYROM was still part of Yugoslavia, educational opportunities and instruction in languages other than Serbo-Croatian or Macedonian were very limited but still protected under the constitution. In practice, ethnic Albanians could receive university education and instruction in Albanian in Kosovo. When FYROM declared independence, the situation changed considerably as these outlets were no longer available.

On the eve of FYROM's independence in 1991, ethnic Albanians bitterly complained of economic and social marginalization, the lack of educational opportunities, and the loss of constitutionally-guaranteed rights. Ten years later on the eve of civil war, Albanians complained more vocally of the same deprivations of rights and privileges they once enjoyed under communist rule.

[9] Ibid., 39.

[10] Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 236.

[11] For example, ethnic Albanians were given under communist rule the right to proportional representation in the legislature.

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## Ethnonational Development and Minority Identity

Nationalism is an essential ingredient in binding together disparate people into a group called the nation. Nationalism is defined here as "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' like others."[12] Central to this definition is the nation as a group of people who share a collective sentiment that features ties of history, culture, and common ancestry.[13] An ethnic group is a smaller group whose members hold attachments that are reciprocal, dependent on each other, and direct. Nations have members whose attachment to group identity is indirect and independent of attachment to other members of the group.[14]

Ethnonationalism is the conflation of ethnicity into nationalism. It is exclusive in that only members of the ethnic group are also members of the nation. It is potentially dangerous because members of minority groups are excluded. Exclusion may be ideational in orientation. For example, there is little mention of this ethnic group in the historical development of the nation; it may be economic, with members of the ethnic group economically marginalized; or it may be political, with minorities excluded from positions of power. When the number of ethnic minorities is small relative to the total population, the repercussions are not great. The likelihood of conflict increases as the numbers of the minority ethnic population increase.[15]

A person can have more than one identity, which can be evoked under different circumstances. For example, a person may consider him/herself to be an ethnic German, a member of the German nation, and a European. Movement across identities depends largely on the degree of salience attached to the referent groups—ethnic group or nation. Salience is in turn determined by how a situation is framed at the macro- and microlevels. External context and the public discourse are major determinants of framing.[16] Salience, however, is a zero-sum situation; when one group identity, say the nation, becomes prominent, it comes at the expense of other group identities. The more salient an identity becomes, the less others will be. Employing this logic, the implication across different groups, not identities, is that when ethnonationalism is on the rise, the groups that are not part of the ethnonational conception will mobilize against it. External interventions accelerate the process. When ethnonational-

[12] Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), 171.

[13] James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 2.

[14] For further elaboration on the differences between ethnic groups and nations, or common-identity groups, see Pamela Johnston Conover and Barbara E. Hicks, "The Psychology of Overlapping Identities" in Ray Taras, ed., *National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), 11–48; and Deborah Prentice, Dale T. Miller, and Jennifer R. Lightdale, "Asymmetries in Attachments to Groups and to their Members: Distinguishing between Common-Identity and Common-Bond Groups," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 20 (May 1994): 484–493.

[15] Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

[16] Conover and Hicks, "The Psychology," 29–30.

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ism is on the rise in response to a perceived external threat in a particular state, the ethnic identity of minority groups in that state will also rise to counteract the "loss" of identity space. The greater the intensity of the external threat, the greater the intensity of ethnonationalism and the stronger the mobilization of ethnic minorities will be.

## Ethnonationalism, Interethnic Relations, and the Dispute with Greece

The first external intervention that shaped the national environment in independent FYROM is the dispute with Greece, whose beginnings go back to World War II. The dispute gave rise to a strong ethnonational conception of identity in FYROM in a way that mostly excluded ethnic Albanians and other minorities. The tied-hands policy that was fashioned to deal with this threat inflamed nationalism and had the unintended consequence of further alienating Albanians.

In the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia pushed aside defeated Bulgaria and took the initiative to raise the national consciousness of the Slavic inhabitants of Macedonia. To eradicate the pro-Bulgarian sentiments of a large segment of the population of Yugoslav Macedonia, Joseph Broz Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia laid out the groundwork for a remarkable transformation process, turning the indigenous Slavs into ethnic Macedonians by "mutation."[17] FYROM's version of ethnonationalism has contributed significantly to the republic's push for national self-determination and international recognition. However, it is based on an interpretation of Macedonia's long history designed to suit the political needs of Yugoslavia's Communist party. The mutation process required the invention of the essential elements of a new, albeit artificial nationality: a distinct language and church affiliation; an easily identifiable name; and a splendid history.[18]

The formation of the Republic of Macedonia as an equal partner among the six republics of federal Yugoslavia was a crucial first step, for it deterred secessionist tendencies and annexationist ambitions. From then on, the cultivation of Macedonian culture played a decisive role in propagating Macedonian

[17] Evangelos Kofos, *The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation* (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987); and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Contemporary Macedonian Issue," *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (Fall 1994): 647–667.

[18] A representative sample of national "Macedonian" historiography appears in Stoyan Pribichevich, *Macedonia: Its People and History* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 37–155. In a critique of historical legacies in the region, Kofos suggests that "Macedonian" historiography has three primary goals: to advance "Macedonian" history as distinctively different from Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb history; to establish "Macedonians" as direct descendants of the early Slavic tribes which settled in Macedonia thirteen centuries ago; and to monopolize the Macedonian name for the Slavs of Macedonia. Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia* (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1993), 318.

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nationalism.[19] To sever the Bulgarian linguistic ties that the local dialect had, a commission of Yugoslav linguists produced a "new" literary language based on the Prilep dialect but also enriched by Serbian, Russian, and Polish contributions.[20] In marked contrast with Marxist practice elsewhere, the newly formed communist regime in the capital, Skopje, established by government decree the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church over the objections of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate. Though the church violated the canons of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and thus did not receive official recognition, it suited well the Balkan tradition of church affiliation as a determinant of nationality. Severing the spiritual ties that connected Yugoslav Macedonians with other Balkan Slavs was a compelling way to reaffirm their separate existence and raise Macedonian consciousness.[21]

The nation-builders in Skopje found the idea of unifying the three Macedonian regions in a single state impossible to resist. As a result, they intensified efforts to raise the national identity and cultural distinctiveness of Macedonian minorities across the borders. Macedonian literature and historical treatises as well as Greek-language broadcasts from Radio Skopje, for example, portrayed Greek Macedonia as the cradle that nurtured the Macedonian national ideology and minimized Greek contributions to the region's liberation.[22] Similar efforts were aimed at eradicating the Bulgarian origins of Slavs in Macedonia.

Still, the most visible way that Yugoslav policy makers sought to establish the historical and political legitimacy of the newly-formed state was to adopt the term "Macedonia" as its denomination. The term Macedonia has historically acquired several meanings,[23] but never before has it symbolized the national character of a separate Slavic people. During the second half of the nineteenth century, when the revolt against the Ottoman yoke was growing, the region had a multiethnic and multilingual population. In addition to Greeks and Bulgarians, smaller ethnic groups such as Vlachs, Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies made up the remainder of Macedonia's non-Turkish population. Significantly, however, the term Macedonia was not used to describe a separate nationality.[24]

[19] Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971), 154.

[20] The idiom spoken by Macedonian Slavs—in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and several villages near the border in northern Greece—was known as a Western Bulgarian dialect that had noticeable but not significant Turkish and Greek influence. Because the idiom lacked an alphabet, and consequently a written component, it tended to vary in pronunciation and vocabulary depending on the proximity to a major national group. The Prilep dialect has a close affinity to Bulgarian but is influenced by Serbo-Croatian.

[21] On the subject of the Macedonian Church and nationalism, see Palmer and King, *Yugoslav Communism*, 165–73.

[22] Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, 325.

[23] Nicholas P. Andriotis, "History of the Name Macedonia" in *Macedonia: Past and Present*, no ed. (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991).

[24] Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893–1903* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 19–20; Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism.* "Even as late as 1945," confirms Fromkin, "Slavic Macedonia had no national identity of its own." See David Fromkin, "Demetrios Returns: Macedonia and the Balkan Question in the Shadow of History," *World Policy Journal* (Summer 1993): 71.

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Tito employed the Macedonian label in 1945 to activate the mutation process. The application of this designation to the republic and its people offered several significant advantages. As a regional and geographic designation the label was well known to the population and very suitable for speedy adoption. It sharply contrasted with Bulgarian, Serbian, or Greek names and could consequently sever ties that Slav speakers had maintained with these three countries. But more importantly for political purposes, this name availed Skopje the opportunity "through the interplay of its regional and national meanings"[25] to breed massive confusion and obscure historical events. The name enabled the Yugoslav Macedonian authorities to diminish manipulatively the presence and contribution of other ethnic groups (Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Jewish) in Macedonia's recent history and refute a significant aspect of these peoples' heritage. Most importantly, the term Macedonian acquired both an ethnic, Slavic, and national connotation.[26]

When FYROM declared independence in November 1991, the ethnonational process intensified. The elections of 1990 brought to parliament a majority led by the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). By late 1991, the party openly advocated liberating unredeemed lands in Greece and Bulgaria and published currency depicting the White Tower, symbol of the Greek city of Thessaloniki.[27] IMRO was also instrumental in passing legislation that adopted the star of Vergina, an emblem of the ancient Macedonian kings found in Greece, as part of the country's new flag. All these aimed at fanning nationalist flames and creating a strong commitment to the newly-independent state's sovereignty.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, though not part of IMRO, encouraged such behavior as part of his tied-hands policy.[28] Because Greece objected

[25] Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism*, 320.

[26] During the years of the Yugoslav federation, Macedonians constituted both an ethnic Slavic group distinct from Albanians, Turks, etc. and a nation with its corresponding republic. While this was done to maintain the precarious ethnic balance in former Yugoslavia, it did contribute significantly to the rise of ethnonationalism in that republic. See Dusan Janjic, "Resurgence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia: The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the New Elites of Nationalism" in Akhavan and Howse, eds., *Yugoslavia: The Former and Future*, 29–44.

[27] IMRO's constitution calls for "the spiritual, economic, and ethnic union of the divided Macedonian people and the creation of a Macedonian state in a future united Balkans and united Europe." Moreover, it refers to ethnic Macedonians as "conquered people." Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: Findings its Way," 242. For more information on the positions of IMRO and several other splinter nationalist groups, see Janusz Bugajski, ed., *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 111–113; Basil Kondis, Kyriakos Kentrotis, Spyridon Sfetas, and Yiannis D. Stephanidis, *Resurgent Irredentism: Documents on Skopje 'Macedonian' Nationalist Aspirations (1934–1992)* (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993); and Citizen's Movement, *Borders, Symbols, Stability: Issues Relating to the Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (Athens, Greece: Citizen's Movement, 1993).

[28] For an elaboration of tied-hands policy within the framework of international negotiations, see Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: Double-Edged Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For an application to the Macedonian issue, see Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Domestic Strategy and International Choice in Disputes among Non-allies," *Polity*, forthcoming.

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to recognition of the new republic by the European Community and later the United Nations under the name Macedonia or derivatives, Gligorov embarked on a political strategy to discredit Greek arguments and justify an uncompromising position. Greece argued that recognition under the name Macedonia implied territorial aims against Greece.[29] FYROM countered that it harbored no such ambitions and besides, Gligorov's hands were tied because the nationalists controlled parliament.

In order for the tied-hands strategy to increase the chances that it would achieve cooperation between the two sides, two conditions were important: the perceived credibility of FYROM's hands being tied and the cost of no agreement. Credibility of tied hands is intimately related to institutional constraints. For example, successive administrations in Washington have used disagreements with Congress to extract more concessions in international negotiations. The argument is that the negotiators' hands are tied because Congress is unlikely to ratify an agreement if additional concessions are made. Divided government in the form of presidential systems increases the credibility of tied hands, particularly if different parties occupy the executive and legislative branches. In parliamentary systems where the executive and legislative branches are controlled by a single party or coalition, the credibility of tied hands decreases with the size of parliamentary majority and the degree of disagreement within the governing party. The smaller the number of seats in parliament that ratify the agreement, the higher the credibility is likely to be. Members of the governing party in a parliament know their power vis-à-vis the leadership increases as the legislative majority narrows, because their leadership desperately needs their crucial vote to ratify the agreement in parliament. Under these conditions, sharp disagreement within the party leadership decreases the chances of ratification.

Cost can take various forms. It can be economic—losses of exports, loans, or investments. Cost can also be political in the sense that agreement (or not) can translate into loss of votes in parliament. In rare cases, cooperation (or not) can threaten the survival of the government. Public opinion is a good barometer of political cost. The more the public seems to be against a particular solution, the higher the political cost is likely to be of adopting that solution.

Gligorov's strategy was simple. He pursued a tied-hands strategy to gain recognition with minimal concessions. The main factors tying his hands were institutional constraints and public opinion. FYROM's constitution, which created a presidential system with separation of powers, allowed for amendments to the constitution by a two-thirds majority vote in parliament. However, the largest party in parliament at the time was the ultranational IMRO, which won 37 seats out of 120 in the general elections of 1990. This meant that it was virtually impossible for Gligorov to get the change-of-name amendment passed

[29] For an evaluation of Greek strategy, see Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Greek Policy toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991–95," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14 (October 1996): 303–327.

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through parliament even if he agreed to it. In an interview in 1997 with the Belgrade weekly *Economiska Politcia*, Gligorov explained why he was not prepared to discuss even a compromise name, such as New Macedonia. "We refused that proposal a long time ago. . . . Giving a state a name would be a precedent for a nation, which would suffer unpleasantness if it woke up one morning and found it was not called by its name."[30] His foreign minister in 1993 put it even better: "the moment we give up our name the question will arise: if you're not Macedonians then who are you?"[31] Public opinion was also overwhelmingly against changing the name. Only a few months before, the Slav majority had voted for independence under the name Republic of Macedonia.

Most ethnic Albanians in FYROM were against FYROM's independence but for different reasons from the Greeks. First, Albanians boycotted the referendum on independence, not because they objected to the name, but because they feared their rights would not be respected under the constitution of 1991. In fact, Nevzat Halili, the moderate leader of the Party for Democratic Prosperity at the time (PDP), organized an unofficial referendum in western FYROM on political and regional autonomy. Naturally, it was passed by the Albanian majority in the region, which translated into 74 percent of those voting (put at 92 percent of all eligible voters).[32] Halili justified the referendum by explaining: "the state recognition of Macedonia is premature, as the rights of our minority in this country are trampled underfoot."[33] Moreover, PDP deputies in parliament abstained from voting on the constitution's adoption in 1991.

Within the first three years of FYROM's independence, interethnic relations deteriorated sharply. For example, prodded by the powerful Interior Ministry and encouraged by their large numbers in parliament, IMRO and the Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action staged a two-day rally in February 1993 protesting the government's decision to construct a camp to house Bosnian refugees. The nationalist leaders argued that the influx of Muslims was altering the balance in favor of ethnic Albanians and undermining the country's security.[34] Further fanning tensions were the violent break-up by paramilitary police in 1992 of a peaceful Albanian demonstration in Bitbazar, which witnessed four casualties, and the foiled plot by the All Albanian Army in 1993, which resulted in the purge of several prominent Albanian leaders including the deputy ministers of defense and health. It was speculated at the time that behind all these events was the Interior Ministry trying to purge ethnic Albanians from positions of power.

[30] Kiro Gligorov, "The Unrealistic Dreams of Large States" in Pettifer, ed., *The New Macedonian Question*, 103.

[31] Quoted in Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" *Mediterranean Quarterly* 5 (Winter 1994): 100.

[32] Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia," 253.

[33] Quoted in Reuter, "Policy and Economy," 36.

[34] Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics*, 112–113.

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Albanians responded in kind. Menduh Thaci, the deputy leader of the more radical splinter party (PDP Albanians, renamed the Democratic Party of Albanians in 1999) boldly asserted: "If Macedonians go on refusing Albanians' demands, there will be bloodshed here." His leader, Arben Xhaferi, also advocated no compromise on Albanian demands for autonomy along ethnic and territorial lines, accusing Slavs of wanting to "dominate non-Slavs."[35] Both leaders use the term Macedonian in an ethnic, not a national sense.

Ethnic tension intensified despite political concessions made by the government. This reinforces the point that a hierarchical cultural division of labor increases ethnic tension even in the face of political rights and concessions. Since 1992, ethnic Albanians have participated in governing coalitions. However, such participation has largely been viewed as a token to placate Albanian voters and give outsiders the impression of real cooperation.[36] Albanians were given few ministerial positions—most often the highest positions were assistant or deputy minister without office or staff—and never positions in the Interior Ministry, which is widely seen as the source of power in FYROM.[37]

## The United Nations and Interethnic Conflict in FYROM

Responding to the violence in former Yugoslavia, the Security Council authorized in 1992 the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the mandate of protecting certain areas in former Yugoslavia. Part of the contingent was stationed in FYROM patrolling its borders with Serbia and Albania. A separate mandate later created the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) as a preventive diplomacy measure to reduce ethnic conflict in that republic. While there were certainly many UN successes in reducing tension, expectations among ethnic Albanians were raised high and were subsequently not met. This reinforced the limitations of external interventions on behalf of Albanian demands and led to thoughts among the local Albanian population about pursuing their agenda by other means. To illustrate the limitations of UNPREDEP, I will examine the events surrounding the Albanian university in Tetovo.

One of the most successful innovations in the UN's role of preserving peace has been preventive deployment. Unlike the better known peacekeeping missions during the cold war years, preventive deployment of troops, charged with preserving peace *before* conflict erupts, has been a stunning success. This tool of action has been used far less frequently than peacekeeping, partly because of political considerations during the cold war and partly because it involves a substantial commitment on the part of the international community to avert war. The conflict in former Yugoslavia provided an opportunity to do just that.

[35] Both are quoted in Perry, "The Republic," 240.

[36] Ibid., 237.

[37] James Pettifer, "The Albanians in Western Macedonia after FYROM Independence" in Pettifer, ed., *The New Macedonian Question*, 141.

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Overall, the mission was successful despite some blemishes. But the key point is that the mandate was so narrow that it left several problems unresolved in FYROM, spelling disillusionment among ethnic Albanians with the UN's well-intentioned forces.

The UN's presence in FYROM began with the deployment of troops in early 1993. The mandate was to deter aggression against FYROM and to monitor and report developments that might threaten peace and stability in the country. This meant that UN troops provided a service that had internal as well as external components. Through the instrument of good offices, the UN was also able to mitigate domestic disputes by serving as an objective conduit in talks between political parties and ethnic groups. By 1996, it was evident that the principal destabilizing threats were going to come from within FYROM. As Secretary Boutros-Boutros Ghali said: "The original purpose of deploying a preventive United Nations mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was to prevent conflicts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia from spilling or threatening that country . . . [I]t has become increasingly evident that the primary threat to the country's stability may come from internal political tensions."[38]

The tensions involved largely interethnic relations between the majority Slavs and ethnic Albanians. In the face of a crippling UN embargo on Yugoslavia since 1992 and another by Greece between 1994 and 1995, the economy tumbled with per capita income registering one-third in 1994 of what it was in 1990.[39] Opportunities for Albanians became even more limited, adding to frustration and tension. The government was not enthusiastic about the good offices mandate, which it viewed as interference in domestic affairs, although Albanians welcomed it as an impartial broker in their campaign for equality. Although Washington went to great lengths to publicize its objectives as a message of deterrence against the Serbs, the Albanians were convinced it was the symbolic beginning of American support for the Albanian cause. American troops were part of UNPROFOR. Why else would President Bill Clinton "have sent troops to Macedonia," wondered Tahir Xhema, a prominent Albanian nationalist in FYROM, if not "to support Albanians in Kosovo"? The United States sounded worried: "Albanians are reading the wrong message," a U.S. diplomat anxiously noted.[40]

The lack of educational opportunities since independence in 1991 was a major source of Albanian dissatisfaction. Leaders deplored the fact that the constitution provided for instruction in Albanian only in primary and secondary education. Given the terrible shape of the economy, that meant essentially primary education. Statistics indicated the absence of Albanians in higher education in-

[38] Quoted in Abiodun Williams, *Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 133–134.

[39] Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic," 98.

[40] Frank Viviano, "Next Balkan Flash Point—It Could Be Macedonia," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 25 August 1993.

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stitutions, fueling resentment over the lack of Albanians in institutional positions of power, such as the civil service, police, etc. The main point of contention was language. The issue had two dimensions. First, Albanians objected to the fact that the country's constitution did not recognize Albanian as an official language, even though it called for equality among all spoken languages and provided for some instruction in them. Second, the widespread lack of instruction in Albanian meant a lack of economic and social advancement for ethnic Albanians in the new republic and a loss of cultural identity. Albanian leaders eagerly pointed out that the situation was different under communist rule.[41] For example, an assessment of school texts revealed a minimization of Albanian contributions to FYROM's history and cursory references to Albanians as more-or-less guests of the previous rulers, the Ottomans, or at least as nonindigenous people.[42]

In mid-1994, a group of Albanian intellectuals established the University of Tetovo in a large city dominated by Albanians whose purpose was to offer instruction in Albanian in six areas: philosophy, literature, arts, law, natural sciences and mathematics, and economics. The effort had the support of all the Albanian parties and media, which viewed it as "an affirmation of Macedonia as a democratic country."[43] In October, the group submitted notification to the Education Ministry for formal recognition. The government denied the request on the basis that it was unconstitutional. The constitution says that all higher education institutions need to be sanctioned by the state and that instruction in minority languages is not permitted in higher education. Instead, the constitution states that the official language of the state is the language of the Macedonian (Slavic) people and that instruction in minority languages can be offered only at lower levels. It is noteworthy that the term Macedonian is used both in an ethnic and national sense. Slav students at other universities in FYROM organized protests arguing that the establishment of an Albanian university amounted to separatism. The police mobilized forces and in early 1995 violently closed down the school and threw several of its leaders into jail.

Both UNPREDEP and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which maintained an office in Skopje, were asked to mediate. They found themselves in a difficult position. On the one hand, they sympathized with claims that minorities should be educated in their own language. On the other hand, the government, except for the Albanians, was vehemently opposed to the university. UNPROFOR's press release expressed reservations

[41] For example, leaders pointed out that there weren't enough teachers trained in Albanian in FYROM. Given that the opportunity to study in neighboring Kosovo was no longer an option, this led to a vicious cycle. The absence of instruction of Albanian in higher education discouraged the training of teachers which in turn led to shortages in secondary schools, which further discouraged teacher training. Williams, *Preventing War*, 118.

[42] Evangelos Kofos, *The Vision of "Greater Macedonia": Remarks on FYROM's New School Textbooks* (Thessaloniki, Greece: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 1994), 23.

[43] Quoted in Williams, *Preventing War*, 119.

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about anything that might lead to separation rather than integration of ethnic groups in FYROM. Hence both international institutions decided to follow a middle road by arguing that the constitution needed to be respected. In essence, this meant that they sided with the government, because the university could not go forward.

As a result of the impasse, the two ethnic groups were further polarized, while UNPREDEP's presence led to disillusionment among Albanians. The government became even more vocal in its opposition to the university. In an interview with a German newspaper in 1996, President Gligorov called the university leadership "Albanian separatists." He undoubtedly expressed the sentiment of the majority of Slavs in FYROM, but he infuriated Albanians, leading to further demonstrations and clashes with police.[44] All of this boxed UNPREDEP into a corner. To maintain its aura of impartiality, it had to listen to Albanian grievances. However, as the University of Tetovo incident made abundantly clear to Albanians, UNPREDEP could do very little. It appeared to side with the government for reasons of maintaining the country's stability. It also could not impose any of its wishes; rather it could only offer "good offices," meaning mediation in disputes, provided that all parties agreed to the mediation. The government was in no hurry to do so, particularly since it de facto got what it wanted. The issue was simply left to fester over time. The university continued to operate in private houses until the reforms of 2001, while the government would on occasion clamp down on the university's activities by jailing professors, administrators, or students.

While the UN's presence in FYROM had an overall positive effect, it demonstrated in clear terms the limits of assistance that Albanians could expect from the outside. The early euphoria that accompanied UNPROFOR was replaced by frustration and resentment. In his assessment of the UN, James Pettifer boldly asserts that the force "is seen [by local Albanians] as ineffectual, too close to the government, and the mixed troop contingents who replaced the US soldiers as openly anti-Albanian."[45] While his statement may be debatable, the fact remains that UNPREDEP was increasingly seen as impotent in stopping perceived abuses by the government and paramilitary police.[46] The end result was further radicalization of the Albanian National Democratic Party, which joined PDP-Albania in 1996, a split between the moderate PDP leadership and the radicals, and a consequent loss of support for the PDP moderates among ordinary Albanians.

## The Crisis in Kosovo and the Collapse into Chaos

The crisis in Kosovo served as the catalyst for bringing an end to the idyllic portrayal of ethnic relations in FYROM. While the dispute with Greece radi-

[44] Ibid., 126.

[45] Pettifer, "The Albanians," 143.

[46] For example, the brutal response by the government to Albanian demonstrations in Gostivar in 1997 showed Albanians that they could expect little help from UNPREDEP.

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calized ethnonationalism among Slavs in FYROM, the presence of UNPREDEP illustrated the limitations of outside help in addressing Albanian grievances. The war in Kosovo in 1999 brought to the fore two issues that led to open interethnic warfare. First, it served as a model of how to bring in outside powers on the side of the Albanian cause. Second, it flooded the area with refugees and arms, giving radical Albanians in FYROM the capability for armed insurrection.

There is a rich literature on the impact of external conflict spilling over across borders.[47] Much of this so-called contagion hypothesis focuses on two mechanisms that facilitate spillover. First, it is argued that conflict in neighboring lands is due to the strains on resources posed by incoming refugees. This is particularly true when the number of refugees is in the hundreds of thousands. Resources to feed, clothe, and shelter them are diverted from other uses, creating tension and apprehension. Refugees fleeing the violence in Ethiopia, Sudan, and other parts of Africa are examples of this contagion mechanism. The second mechanism centers on the flood of arms and radical individuals flocking to the refugee camps and taking their grievances with them. An example is the Tutsi and later Hutu refugee camps in what is now Congo, fleeing the violence that engulfed Rwanda in 1994–1995.

I add one more mechanism to these two: political short-term strategies designed to deal with the influx of refugees. Violence is more likely to spread when the refugees are of the same ethnic group as the largest minority group in the country. Strategies dealing with the refugee crisis are likely to lead to calls for stemming the tide in fear of inadequate resources and upsetting the ethnic balance in the country. Reaction against these policies will exacerbate ethnic tension. Coupled with the flood of arms, grievances are likely to escalate into open violence.

Repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo had increased dramatically after the Dayton Accords, which in 1995 put an end to the Bosnian imbroglio. This was partly a response to the radicalization of Albanians there and the armed insurrection that followed. The end result was streams of refugees flooding into FYROM. The government's response was both predictable and unfortunate. Prior to NATO's intervention in Kosovo in April 1999, the government's policy had been one of discouraging refugees from settling into FYROM and insisting on diverting them to neighboring Albania. The main argument was that they would feel "better" if they were among their own ethnic kind. Unfortunately, there was a sinister side to this policy as well. Allegations were made in Skopje's parliament that militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army were mixing with refugees and were using FYROM as a base to launch attacks against Serb posi-

[47] See, for example, Benjamin Most, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geo-Politics, and the Spread of War," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980): 932–946; and Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War: System, Process and Conflict Dynamics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). Thanks to Cassady Craft for raising this point with me.

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tions in neighboring Kosovo.[48] Of course, it did not escape notice among ethnic Albanians that the government considered the refugees unwelcome, fearing for its own popularity among ethnic Slavs in the country. To make matters worse. Skopje initially tried to forcibly deport Kosovar Albanians to third countries, while the security police kept them in poorly constructed camps that were fenced and very close to the border without water or proper sanitation. Following an international outcry, the government was forced to reverse course, but not until the damage to domestic interethnic relations was done.

The harsh camp conditions and forcible deportations of Kosovar Albanians deepened the gulf between the two main ethnic groups in FYROM. Albanians drew several lessons. First, the whole episode in Kosovo simply illustrated in the clearest terms that Western powers will come to the aid of Albanians under certain conditions. Unfortunately, the conditions were armed insurrection against the Serbs drawing attention to the consequent repressive countermeasures.

Second, the position of ethnic Albanian parties on successive governing coalitions did not yield the expected benefits. While most Albanian participation in government was until recently in token positions, even greater representation after 1998 did not make things better and may have made them worse. The grievances about education, language, and economic and social advancement remained the same with no end seeming in sight. However, Slavs now started complaining vocally about discrimination in favor of Albanians. For example, the number of Albanian positions in government since 1994 was higher than the proportional parliamentary strength of Albanian parties. The issue of language also created tension. The argument was that if Albanian were made an official language, it would give undue power to only 20 percent of the population and further isolate Albanians, because ethnic Slavs are not required to receive instruction in Albanian.[49]

Third, the strategy of pursuing satisfaction of grievances through democratic means and participation in government seemed like an empty promise. The power and support of the parties participating in the coalition began to wane among ethnic Albanians who saw other means for achieving their goals. Some elements within the Albanian parties and the general population wanted independence and dreamed of a "Great Albania." But it is very difficult to ascertain whether they constituted the majority. Given the results of the referendum in the early 1990s and the position of Albanian parties since, it is probably fair to conclude that the majority of Albanian citizens in FYROM wanted enhanced rights and some form of autonomy.

[48] Pettifer, "The Albanians," xii.

[49] For a sympathetic treatment of this and other issues concerning the rights of ethnic groups, or nationalities as he calls them, that is close to the government's position, see Gjorgi Caca, "Status and Rights of Nationalities in the republic of Macedonia" in Pettifer, ed., *The New Macedonian Question*, 148–164. For an alternative view, see Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, "Changes for Macedonia's Constitution?" *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 17 April 2001.

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The whole issue came to a boil in early 2001. Following the outbreak of violence in neighboring Kosovo in March 2001, gunfire erupted in villages around Tetovo. The Interior Ministry reported clashes between armed insurgents and the military with casualties on both sides. The government's position was clear as to who the insurgents were. It labeled them Albanian "extremists and terrorists."[50] However, the insurgents claimed they wanted equality between Albanians and Slavs and recognition of Albanian as an official language.[51] After considerable international pressure, the government was reshuffled to include several key opposition parties. The government, which now dealt with the rebels in open combat, was headed by the nationalist IMRO-DPMNE, which won the parliamentary elections in 1998. Ministry portfolios were also given out to the Social Democrats, the Liberals, and one Albanian party, PDP-A.

Finally, on 9 July a cease-fire was agreed. The proposal drafted by noted expert Robert Badinter and supported by the EU, NATO, and American envoys aimed at addressing the Albanian grievances while still making it palatable to the Slav majority in power.[52] President Boris Trajkovski, a member of IMRO who succeeded Gligorov in 1999, as well as Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, also of IMRO, were not happy with the proposal. The prime minister walked out of the talks at Ohrid in August 2001 when A. Xhaferi of the PDP-A spoke in Albanian without a translator. Both politicians thought the eventual agreement gave too much power to Albanians. Indicative of the mood of many Slavs were editorials in major newspapers, which appeared after heavy fighting in the week of 6 August. Writes commentator Branko Geroski in *Dnevnik*: "there is nothing more to talk or to negotiate. . . . The Macedonians gave whatever they [Albanians] have asked for. . . . We ask Commander-in-Chief [President] Boris Trajkovski to put on a camouflage uniform and show himself to his soldiers in Tetovo."[53]

Things have gotten better in the last year or so with the passage of legislation in parliament and the consequent constitutional amendments as a result of the Ohrid accords. Even though open ethnic conflict has subsided and the Albanian Liberation Army has apparently handed over weapons, much work remains to be done in order to stitch the republic back together. First, there is significant animosity between Albanians and Slavs as to the rights given to eth-

[50] Patrick Moore, "Question from Tetovo," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 16 March 2001.

[51] Ibid. See also Patrick Moore, "Is Language at the Heart of the Macedonian Dispute?" *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Newsline*, 18 July 2001.

[52] For an elaboration of the details of the proposal and the eventual agreement at Ohrid in August, see Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, "Macedonia: A Cease-Fire and a Proposal," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 12 July 2001; and Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, "The Macedonian Peace Agreement: Parts I and II," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 17 and 21 August 2001.

[53] Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, "Peace or War for Macedonia?" *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 14 August 2001.

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nic Albanians. Indicative of the mood of Slavs are the words of the prime minister. He expressed his disdain for "a shameful capitulation and a shameful agreement under pressure from Albanian terrorist paramilitaries."[54] He also threatened for several months to put approval of the agreement on a referendum, knowing full well that it would be voted down by the Slav majority. The interior minister and member of the ruling IMRO epitomizes the hardliners' position on the agreement and ethnic Albanians in general. "We are in the second half of the war now" against "terrorists and bandits" of the Albanian community, he told Reuters. He further stressed that "Macedonia is a sovereign state, and we cannot have the attitude of a protectorate" toward the international community. He also referred to the previous achievements in the peace process as "a farce."[55]

Albanians insist on passing the necessary legislation and object to tactical delays in parliament, particularly in connection with the law on municipalities designed to give more autonomy to local governments. The compromise came in early January 2002. The new law gives the power to some municipalities to form common administration with neighboring authorities, but only in certain areas.[56] In response to objections by the ruling party and other Slavic politicians, common administration can be formed only in the areas of education and health care, the latter leaving transportable elements, such as insurance, to the national government. The return to normalcy was also given a boost by an amnesty law passed in late January 2002. But the return of ethnically "mixed" patrols of the national army and police to strongholds of former Albanian rebels has been slow and in some cases violent.[57]

Western powers are pressing for a continuation of the process by promising a big donor conference only after the necessary legislation has passed.[58] Indicative of external optimism and domestic pessimism is that Western leaders are significantly more enthusiastic about the adoption of the law on municipalities than either the Albanians or Slavs in FYROM. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer hailed the new law as a major step toward lasting peace in FYROM. Some Slav politicians responded by challenging the constitutionality of the new law before the Constitutional Court. Albanians welcomed the legislation, but they declared their desire for even more rights granted to local governments. It is clear that neither domestic side trusts the other, with accusations

[54] Patrick Moore, "Quotations of the Week," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 14 August 2001.

[55] Quoted in Patrick Moore, "Macedonian Minister Defiant Against West, Albanians," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Newsline*, 13 November 2001.

[56] Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, "Macedonia Has New Law on Local Self-Government, But . . ." *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 1 February 2002.

[57] "Macedonia: Political Leaders Strike Amnesty Deal," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Newsline*, 31 January 2002.

[58] Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, "The Macedonia Game Goes On," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Balkan Report*, 11 December 2001.

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of treason and extortion exchanged regularly. Only Western pressure can forcibly stitch the republic back together.

In sum, the crisis in Kosovo provided the catalyst for an eruption of ethnic conflict in FYROM. The grievances by Albanians were remarkably similar to those they had in the days before FYROM's independence despite participation in governing coalitions for ten years or so. The only difference is that the population is far more radicalized now, partly because strategies designed to deal with external interventions focused on short-term gains at the expense of long-term consequences on interethnic relations. Certainly, the worsening economic environment and endemic corruption have contributed to distrust and conflict between the two sides. The fragile peace, so touted as a unique accomplishment of FYROM in the early 1990s, masked considerable tension that finally led to open conflict.[59]

## External Influence, Internal Reconciliation, and Ethnic Conflict

I have examined the effects of external interventions on domestic ethnic conflict in FYROM. I have argued that the dispute with Greece gave rise to an ethnonationalist conception of the country that was antithetical to its multiethnic character. The presence of UN troops dashed expectations among ethnic Albanians about outside help for their cause, despite initial enthusiasm. Finally, the Kosovo crisis provided the catalyst for armed insurrection. As a result, the strategies crafted to deal with each intervention, while successful in their immediate objectives, exacerbated interethnic relations. By 2001, a democratic FYROM faced a more radical Albanian population making the same demands it did prior to independence from the country's communist past.

Recent developments in FYROM have brought Greece and FYROM closer together in stark contrast to the acrimonious dispute in the first years following independence. As fighting broke out in FYROM in 2001, Greece offered material support to prevent a possible break-up of the former Yugoslav republic. In an interesting reversal of preferences, Greece has turned out to be one of FYROM's closest allies by being not only the second biggest investor in the country and not pulling out in 1999 as a result of NATO's bombing of Kosovo. Greece was also being cognizant of the fact that a break-up of the republic would hurt Greece about as much as it would hurt FYROM, because of the potential influx of refugees.[60] In terms of strategy, the effect has been that while negotiations are still going on in New York under UN auspices about the name,

[59] See for example, President Krio Gligorov's memoirs, where he extolls the virtues and accomplishments of FYROM to foreign diplomats. Interestingly, he does not include a single chapter discussing domestic interethnic relations. But he does recommend a comparative study of minority policies in the Balkans proudly proclaiming that "all the minorities are recognized by the constitution." Kiro Gligorov, *Memoirs* [in Greek] (Athens: Courier Publishers, 2001), 398.

[60] For an articulation of this issue, see Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic."

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Greece has quietly dropped the leverage it may have had to pressure FYROM in its time of need. The issue of the name is now dead for most practical purposes, largely, though not exclusively, because worsening relations might cost Greek business dearly. This is despite the fact that some politicians in Greece, such as former Defense Minister A. Tsochatzopoulos, and expatriate organizations, such as the Pan-Macedonian Association, still adamantly oppose any deal with FYROM that would include the term Macedonia as part of that state's permanent nomenclature. But the Greek government as a whole appears unwilling or unable to press this issue any further.

The case of FYROM illustrates in the most vivid terms the risks facing many East European governments in the transition to democracy. First, democracy needs to be something more than just a name attached to a system that may be more corrupt or unfair than its communist predecessor. Protection of individual rights and minorities has to be firmly embedded in legislation.[61] The level of protection may vary from country to country, but the rights and responsibilities of the people cannot be taken away arbitrarily. The reason is that expectations of political, social, and economic improvement are high during the transition to democracy. Yet FYROM chose a path that reflected distrust of ethnic minorities by taking away rights they previously had enjoyed. While there was a rationale behind the government's action, the end result was in the eyes of many ethnic Albanians that life under a democratic regime ended up being worse in social and economic terms than life under communism.

Second, simply legislating equality among individuals or ethnic groups is not enough. Pointing out that there are constitutional protections of rights, when the matter is debatable both in terms of accepting the legitimacy of the constitution and the actual protection it affords, cannot serve as a substitute for implementing policies that show trust and compromise. This is true not only of policies by the government itself but also of assistance by outsiders, such as the UN. Surely, the UN's efforts may have prevented a further overt deterioration of ethnic relations, although they did not fully prevent this outcome. The cost of the UN force, estimated at $255 million in 1997, is insignificant compared to the economic cost associated with an intermediate conflict in FYROM, estimated at $15 billion.[62] However, the point is that narrow mandates designed not to upset the sacred noninterference in internal state affairs make little sense in the case of preventive deployment. Conflict, particularly interethnic, re-

[61] For a lengthy treatment of democratic theory and its problems, see Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Surely competitive elections are not the only indicator of the consolidation of democracy in countries facing this type of transition. For a theoretical discussion of consolidation issues with references to Southern Europe, see Bruce Parrott, "Perspectives on Post-Communist Democratization" in Dawisha and Parrott, eds., *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, 1–39.

[62] Figures cited in Bradley Thayer, "Macedonia" in Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 139, 141.

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quires impartiality and bold action. Otherwise, towing the middle line, which in effect supports the status quo imposed by the government, ends up dashing expectations and may make matters worse.

There is a policy lesson in all of this: strategies crafted to deal with pressing problems have to be thought through to avoid negative unintended consequences. While democratic politicians have short-term horizons, which in effect provide incentives for neglecting long-term consequences, policy makers dealing with ethnic tension have to take the long-term view. One cannot simply satisfy short-term interests in isolation of broader ramifications and at the expense of long-term stability. The case of FYROM vividly illustrates this is done only at a country's peril.

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# Thinking Allowed

## Distant Proximities

Dynamics beyond Globalization

**James N. Rosenau**




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## Black Faces in the Mirror

African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress

**Katherine Tate**




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


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
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# Is Eastern Enlargement of the European Union a Beneficial Investment for Germany?

STEPHEN WOOD

Germany is a central actor in European integration, regarded as the locomotive for major economic and, increasingly, political developments.[1] Political leaders consistently justified the country's provision of around 60 percent or more of net transfers to the European Union (EU)—while disposing of disproportionately low voting shares in EU institutions[2]—by reference to a consolidation of peace and security in Europe and to Germany's export dependence and volume of trade with EU states. This article examines Germany's relationship to the EU's enlargement, now in the preaccession stage, to include up to ten Central and Eastern European candidate states. It analyzes benefits and costs and the political dynamics of Germany's evolving position. Until relatively recently, German elites supported integration and expansion and accepted the consequences, imprecise as they were, without serious challenge to

[1] Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, *The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Michael G. Huelshoff, Andrei Markovits, and Simon Reich, eds., *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics After Unification* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); Arnulf Baring, ed., *Germany's New Position in Europe* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1994); Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffrey, and William Paterson, *Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000).

[2] Claus Giering, Josef Janning, Wolfgang Merkel, and Michael Stabenow, *Demokratie und Interessenausgleich in der Europäischen Union* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann, 1999); Karlheinz Neunreither, "The European Union at Nice: A Minimalist Approach to a Historic Challenge," *Government and Opposition* 36 (Spring 2001): 184–208.

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basic policy directions or the provision of financial support. Scholarly accounts tend to concur, if often favoring further and faster integration and enlargement.[3]

Enlargements in 1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Spain and Portugal) increased demands on the national budget without significant adverse political reaction or excessive financial strain. The 1995 inclusion of Austria, Sweden, and Finland was clearly favorable for Germany. Besides security and political advantages accompanying the end of the cold war, some observers envisaged an economic windfall for Germany through the opening of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).[4] While the current enlargement can be considered an investment entailing opportunity, risks, premiums, and uncertainties, the conjecture that Germany as a whole will profit from the project has to take sufficient account of the costs and also balance the probable winners with losers. Potential compensatory measures for losers may have to be added to the overall equation. Contrary to successive German governments' attempts to convince the broader population that widespread positive benefits are assured, definitive evidence for this is not palpable.

What are the costs and benefits of eastern enlargement into the EU for Germany? How are they to be evaluated? The entry of some countries may have advantageous results for Germany relatively soon, while others could have negative consequences. Appraisals of individual countries are also likely to alter over time. The so-called Luxembourg Group of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia signified the more advanced candidates from CEE. The EU's Helsinki summit in 1999 effectively eliminated formal distinctions.[5] I consider three areas, often closely linked or overlapping: domestic and international politics (including security-strategic elements), economics and commerce, and European political economy. A range of foreign and security policy considerations encourage support for enlargement. A complex of other nonmaterial (or not immediately material) influences, often related to public anxiety or disapproval, must also be included. Here tensions between external

[3] Jörg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels, eds., *The European Union After the Treaty of Amsterdam* (London: Continuum, 2001); Ludger Kühnhardt, *Towards Europe 2007: Identity, Institution Building and the Constitution of Europe*, Discussion Paper C85 (Bonn: ZEI, 2001); "Neue Konstellation für Europa," *Internationale Politik* 55 (August 2000); Alan Mayhew, *Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann, 1996); Bulmer, Jeffrey, and Paterson, *Germany's European Diplomacy.*

[4] *The Economist*, 14 October 1989; Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, "Should Europe Fear the Germans?" *German Politics and Society* 23 (Summer 1991): 1–20.

[5] Cyprus also belongs to the Luxembourg group. The Helsinki group, any of which could theoretically be among the first admitted, are Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania from Central and Eastern Europe; and Malta. Turkey has associate status.

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and internal security interests emerge.[6] A good deal of evidence suggests that the political establishment has relied on an apathetic or excluded public in order to pursue European policy projects including eastern enlargement.[7] Of further concern is consistent adherence by future members to EU legal requirements, often in commercial and property ownership matters.[8] As an indirect consequence of enlargement, reforms that redistribute financial burdens among the EU's current fifteen members could be advantageous for Germany. This will be a focus of political conflict well into the future.

By 2000, the five Luxembourg Group candidates had an average GDP growth of 11 percent over 1989. GDP of the eastern Helsinki Group averages around 80 percent over 1989 levels. By 2002, the largest CEE candidate, Poland, had a GDP increase of about 33 percent over 1989. If its economy grows at 4 percent per annum and that of the EU15 at 2 percent, Poland will reach EU average per capita income in about forty years. For the currently most progressed candidate, Hungary, it will take about thirty years. Savings and investment levels that might enable a self-financed catch-up process are too low. Significant contributions will have to come from other sources.[9] Without extensive liberalization and economic expansion in old and new EU members, and a reform of core community policies in the short to medium term the material benefits of enlargement for Germany will be outweighed by the costs. German elite support for the undertaking represents the political and financial price paid to encourage a reformist direction. It is also conceived as an insurance against destabilization. Neither the investment nor dividends are guaranteed. How much the total bill for German taxpayers will be or how long they will pay until the initial stages of enlargement are completed is unknown.

## Enlargement as a Political Investment

Although popular attitudes changed after the initial association agreements with Poland, Hungary, the then Czechoslovakia, and later the Copenhagen Cri-

[6] Heather Grabbe, "The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards," *International Affairs* 76 (July 2000): 519–536; Marek Chicochki, ed., *Warum Haben die Deutschen Angst vor der EU-Erweiterung um Polen und andere Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas?* (Warsaw: Center for International Relations, 2001).

[7] Stephen Wood, "Germany and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU: Political Elites, Public Opinion and Democratic Processes," *Journal of European Integration* 24 (no. 1, 2002): 23–38.

[8] Albrecht Rothacher, *Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft in Tschechien, Polen, Ungarn, Slowenien, Kroatien und Litauen* (Vienna: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 1999); Deutsche-Tschechische Industrie- und Handelskammer, "Tschechien ist noch nocht am Ziel: Deutsche Investoren mahnen Reformen an," *Pressemitteilung* (Prague: DTIHK, June 2002); Herweg Roggeman "Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union—Politische und Rechtliche Probleme," *Berliner Osteuropa Info* 14 (2000): 4–7.

[9] Wolfgang Quaisser and Richard Woodward, *Adaptionsprobleme der EU-Struktur- und Regionalpolitik in den MOE-Ländern*, Working Paper 234 (München: Osteuropa Institut, 2002), 6–10.

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teria on accession set out in 1993,[10] it was almost iconoclastic to present critical views on the merits of enlargement for Germany. Open recognition of uncertainties and potentially unfavourable outcomes has, by and large, been evaded by public figures as the foreign policy and historical imperative of enlargement was pressed. One of the few exceptions was the Bavarian minister-president and 2002 chancellor candidate, Edmund Stoiber. A generally more cautious stance and sober appraisal of German interests resulted in his acquiring a reputation as a "Euro-sceptic."[11] The controversy unleashed by the published reflections of EU Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen in September 2000, however, demonstrated that the German media and various other actors either wanted or were swiftly persuaded to engage in a less restricted discussion. Among other issues, Verheugen broached the taboo theme of a possible referendum on enlargement in Germany.[12] Were this to actually transpire it would result in a "no," or at least a "not yet," or "not for all" vote. Politicians, including Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, took note. As more indications of the potential costs in financial and political terms emerged, the tone for domestic audiences altered, and national preferences were forcefully impressed in EU forums. Even if all German parties regarded Eastern enlargement as a project or task for which there was no alternative, insistence on candidates meeting conditions and disputes with current members over the distribution of funds intensified.

### *External Considerations*

Political elites and academic commentators have consistently emphasized that enlargement of the EU will lead to greater stability in Europe. Germans in particular have stressed this, contending that the integration of CEE states into Western structures will engender an increase in military security for the continent.[13] The EU and NATO may have complementary functions, but there has

[10] The Copenhagen Criteria required that before their entry candidates had to have democratic institutions, functioning market economies, and accept the obligations of membership, including transposition of European Community law into national legislation. These obligations were set out in more detail in thirty-one chapters of specific policy and legal fields, the *acquis communautaire*.

[11] Edmund Stoiber, "Reformen für Europas Zukunft," speech in Berlin, 27 September 2000 (http://text.bayern.dePress_Info/Reden/2000/00927.html).

[12] Andreas Oldag and Stefan Ulrich, "Verheugen will Referendum über EU-Erweiterung" and "Das Volk soll über die EU-Erweiterung entscheiden," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2–3 September 2000.

[13] Lothar Gutjahr, "Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing Perspectives on National Interests," *Review of International Studies* 21 (July 1995): 301–317; Franco Algieri, Josef Janning, and Dirk Rumberg, eds., *Managing Security in Europe: The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann, 1996); Gerhard Schröder, "Polen und Deutschland: Partner in und für Europa," speech in Warsaw, 17 June 1998 (http://www.sozis.de/kmw/schröder/v1/reden/reden4.htm); "Polen und Deutsche an der Schwelle des neuen Jahrtausends," communal letter by the German and Polish Foreign Ministers Joschka Fischer and Bronislaw Geremek, *Tagesspiegel* and *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 February 2000.

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been a lack of clarity about which does or will provide what. Some analysts place the first phase of enlargement in a larger context of acquiring some control over Russia and the former Soviet Union, and pacifying the Balkans.[14] Western European security improved through the entry of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary into NATO, notwithstanding the debate about this extension antagonizing Russia. Security will not be decisively increased through the accession of CEE states to the EU.[15] The likelihood of a military threat being launched against or from one of the candidates should their entry to the EU be delayed or rejected is minimal. The stability frequently cited as a goal and consequence of EU membership or the precise condition that will result if membership does not occur lack substantive explanation from the European Commission, current member states, or candidates. Frank Schimmelfennig notes that "governments in Central and Eastern Europe could not argue convincingly that, without the prospect of EU membership, their countries would become politically and economically unstable, threatening Western European security and welfare. . . . 'Self-inflicted chaos' is no credible bargaining strategy."[16] Shortly after his referendum interview, Verheugen told the European Parliament that in CEE states the "stability of democratic systems is already so high that we no longer fear any retreat into authoritarian structures." The commission similarly declared the states to be "systematically . . . already so robust that there need be no risk of a relapse into authoritarianism."[17]

Although "euphoria" was then a prevalent term for the pan-European mood, state responses to the changes of 1989–1991 were varied. French reservations centered on a looming German dominance of Central and Eastern Europe and France's relative marginalization. As signs of forthcoming difficulties emerged, change in German perceptions toward the East may have calmed French concerns to some degree. Germany's power and position is demonstrated as simultaneously placing international limitations on itself. France and others that have been less keen about enlargement try to take cover behind Germany, where a sober reappraisal of the situation has occurred. French intransigence over agricultural reform is a factor in why eastern enlargement, under the conditions applying in 2002, does not promise net financial gain for Germany. Germany's economic strength and geography, meanwhile, mean it is perceived in

[14] Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Jenseits der EU-Erweiterung* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann 2001); Laszlo Csaba, "East European Economies post-Helsinki," *Berliner Osteuropa Info* 14 (2000): 9–11.

[15] Martin A. Smith, "The NATO Factor: A Spanner in the Works of EU and WEU Enlargement?" in Karen Henderson, ed., *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union* (London: University College London Press, 1999), 53–70; Stuart Croft et al., "NATOs Triple Challenge," *International Affairs* 76 (July 2000): 495–518; Adrian Hyde Price, *Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000).

[16] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55 (March 2001): 47–80.

[17] European Parliament, *Conference of Presidents Open to all Members*, Strasbourg, 8 November 2000; *European Commission Strategy Paper: Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the Candidate Countries*, Brussels, 8 November 2000.

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CEE as preeminent in decision making and bears much responsibility for the outcomes, especially if they are unfavorable. Concurrence between national elites is not as certain as some declarations have suggested.[18]

Evaluations of material costs and benefits are complicated by "moral-historical" debt: as a consequence of World War II and the role of opposition movements in CEE in generating preconditions for German reunification and ending the cold war. In 1989-1990, reconciliation was linked with an imminent return to Europe for those behind the collapsing Iron Curtain. As enthusiasm in Western Europe diminished, populations and governments were reminded of their responsibilities. It is difficult to pinpoint the critical mass of support and political pressure for this. Some arise within Germany, the rest of the EU15, and the United States. Disputes pertaining to the expulsion of Germans from Central Europe in 1945 and after remain unresolved. The multilateral project of European institutional enlargement merges with sensitive bilateral relations and history with contemporary politics.[19]

These themes permeate Schimmelfennig's analysis in which he combines intergovernmentalist and sociological explanations to account for the collective position of EU members toward aspirants to join the CEE. The intergovernmentalists can be equated with a rationalist, national-interests approach wherein states are the dominant actors, representing national populations with particular demands, which vote governments in and out. The sociological explanation focuses on normative elements, on a logic of appropriateness, and the capacity for states to be shamed into following a particular course of action even if it does not concur with their materially evaluated self-interests. To encourage them, the author suggests, "some sort of moral appeal was needed," which he terms "legitimacy."[20] This does not refute the possibility that states shamed into action do not simultaneously employ a self-interested pragmatism. They will consider, for example, how their actions will be interpreted over time and how the bilateral and international context may alter in ways that could prove unfavorable. Schimmelfennig's argument is persuasive in its stress on the movement from association agreements to accession. At this point sociological institutionalism takes over when a rational intergovernmentalist approach might contend otherwise. According to Schimmelfennig, Germany is "clearly the greatest beneficiary of integration with the east."[21] Therefore, it is the leading proponent or driver of enlargement for self-interested reasons. I alter the presumptions behind this, namely that Germany may not in purely utilitarian cost-benefit terms be such a clear beneficiary.

[18] Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Janusz Reiter, *Die Deutsch-Polnischen Beziehungen: Eine Interessen- und Wertegemeinschaft?* (Berlin: Wissenschaft Zentrum Berlin, 1999).

[19] Holger Münch, "Die Demokratien in Mittel- und Osteuropas Sind Nicht Stabil: Wir Müssen Uns Beeilen," and Mateusz Falkowski, "Die Polnische Landwirtschaft als Preis dafür, ein 'Global Player' zu werden" in Chicochki, ed., *Warum Haben die Deutschen Angst,* 42–57, 72–73.

[20] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap."

[21] Ibid., 55.

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Germany's political class is influenced by normative considerations in European policy, though perhaps different from what Schimmelfennig's sociological institutionalism suggests. As it sought acceptance and integration into Western Europe from the 1950s to its reunification in 1990, Germany has a political interest in reconciliation and feels a debt toward some of its Eastern neighbors. Official support for enlargement represents an extension of Germany's EU orientation, a political orthodoxy on how to best pursue German national interests, defined more broadly than financial gain or loss from the EU budget. The normative legitimacy involved also constitutes a mechanism by which CEE states can persuade, convince, or coerce other actors (Germany) to accept the interests, however defined, of the former. It is an example of what one theorist has termed "normative realism."[22] German elites believe that without ongoing European integration there will be disintegration and alliances will be formed against Germany. The influence of the United States, for example through its close relationship with Poland, should also not be underestimated when assessing Germany's position.

Others oppose traditional realist and normative biases. Albrecht Rothacher states that "no-one should be favoured through geopolitical or pseudo-moralistic motives," adding that no one should, despite acceptable achievement, be forced to wait because of hesitant and anxious neighbors.[23] This is a veiled reference to Poland and possible favoritism for it over smaller or less strategically important candidates. James Sperling argues that Germany lacks the structural power to unilaterally enforce goals or dominate in Europe, even if it aimed to.[24] I contend that German support for enlargement is based as far as possible on German preferences. A willingness to exert this solidified in the lead up to Germany's EU presidency in 1999 and was demonstrated in institutional settings. Contemporaneously, grounds for purely sociological explanations weakened. After the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the Agenda 2000 meetings, and the Berlin Council, it was anticipated that the Nice IGC in 2000 would propel the process forward.[25] High on this agenda was the expected reform of voting procedures to enable more qualified majority decisions, a compromise solution on community financing, the distribution of structural funds, and greater powers invested in the European Parliament.

Despite the familiar prelude that genuine communal European policy and identity would be pursued, Nice was another round of "European poker," with

[22] See Consuelo Cruz, "Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember their Pasts and Make Their Futures," *World Politics* 52 (April 2000): 275–312.

[23] Albrecht Rothacher, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Osterweiterung für die EU," *Politische Studien* 376 (March/April 2001): 73–85.

[24] James Sperling, "Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post-Cold War Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (April 2001): 389–425.

[25] Some analysts interpreted the Nice outcome as relatively successful. See Wolfgang Wessels, "Nice Results: the Millennium IGC in the EU's Evolution," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39 (June 2001): 197–219.

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all states pursuing their own priorities and seeking to impose or reject proposals based on calculations of domestic political and national interest. Nice demonstrated that enlargement is not universally seen as a win-win scenario. National considerations will not be subordinated and a pan-European federalism is not on the horizon. For most candidates, the precise form and date rather than the actual prospect of accession are undecided. Nonetheless, three questions were still undecided in summer 2002:[26] When will enlargement take place, who will be admitted, and how will the EU function effectively?

### *Internal Factors*

If assertion by German governments is likely to intensify political conflict at the international level, the polity to which it responds continues to impress its own concerns about European policy. Challenges confronted the Schröder government as it attempted to satisfy domestic and external actors.[27] Since a coalition of the Social Democratic party (SPD) and Alliance 90/Greens (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) in 1998 replaced the Christian Democratic (CDU-CSU) and liberal (FDP) coalition government of Central and Eastern Europe's ostensible champion, Helmut Kohl,[28] the CEE countries have been less sure of what they are dealing with. Yet signs of an unsupportive position appeared in the later Kohl-era and the SPD-Alliance 90/Greens coalition, which politicized enlargement when in opposition and has further modified the views firmly held by the politicians. The new incumbents attempted to disguise this somewhat by characterizing the opposition Christian Democrats as being against eastern enlargement: "As [the time for] concrete decisions draws near, a political controversy over the eastern enlargement of the EU has begun in Germany. The danger is clearer that leading figures in the CDU/CSU will abandon the, until now, valid European consensus and shift to a populist course against European integration because it promises party-political advantages."[29]

Apart from a European policy offensive against the instrumentalizing of anxieties, the party claimed it would produce a detailed paper on questions of enlargement by autumn 2000. It was less detailed than expected. Enlargement was declared a win for new and current members, because all had "communal goals of democracy, legality and human rights." "Further reform must follow." In the "most difficult areas—agriculture, cross-border traffic, and environment—transition periods before the full application of community law were un-

[26] David Phinnemore, "The Challenge of EU Enlargement: EU and CEE Perspectives" in Henderson, ed., *Back to Europe*, 71–88.

[27] Marcin Zaborowski, *Poland, Germany and EU-Enlargement: The Rising Prominence of Domestic Politics*, Discussion Paper C51 (Bonn: Zentrum Europäische Integration, 1999).

[28] Krzysztof Skubiszewski, "Deutschland: Anwalt Mitteleuropas: Eine Polnische Sicht der Deutschen Europa-Politik," *Internationale Politik* 52 (February 1997): 29–33.

[29] *Positionspapier der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion zur Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union*, Berlin, 28 June 2000 (my translation).

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avoidable." The party urged a "careful" pursuance of negotiations that will allow the candidates that had made the most progress to enter before the next European parliament elections in 2004. "Particularly sensitive areas" of free access for work seekers and provision of services were subject to seven-year transition periods.[30] The paper contains nothing definitive on how the average German will positively benefit from enlargement.

Contrasting with the consensus on an improved external security situation, internal (or social) security is perceived as under threat among some EU populations, notably Germany and Austria. Here there is apprehension about the consequences of enlargement, very likely linked to a lack of endearment or interest in what is still known as the *Ostblock*.[31] A *Eurobarometer* survey conducted in April/May 2001 indicated 35 percent of Germans and 33 percent of Austrians were in favor of enlarging the EU. In October/November 2001, 39 percent of Germans favored enlarging to include all thirteen candidates, although the share now saying "yes" to any form of enlargement rose to 47 percent. These rather lukewarm attitudes encourage analogous responses in CEE.[32] German public opinion could be shifted toward a more favourable perception through a visible, rapid transformation of CEE into a more affluent and modernized economy. As Helmut Leipold pointed out some years ago, this is circular, because it requires current members to allow full access to EU markets without additional subsidies, flanking measures, or other compensatory devices for anyone.[33] Whether of people or goods, full and genuine competitive access has a range of opponents. The general population is more inclined to believe that outcomes will be unfavorable than to perceive positive opportunities. Prominent negative images include mass immigration, job losses and/or lowering of wages and conditions, an eastern mafia and other less-organized crime, and a diffuse sociocultural intrusion.[34] Despite EU-promoted regional and local projects, and numerous short-term trips over the Polish or Czech border to purchase cheaper goods and services, most Germans know relatively little of these countries or have much interest in discovering more about them. This may be changing. Nonetheless questions are raised as to how interchange between the societies will actually occur and what character it will assume after the enlargement.

[30] *Verantwortung für Europa*, SPD Bundesparteitag, Nürnburg, 19–23 November 2000 (as at 30 April 2001, my translation).

[31] *Eurobarometer* 55 (October 2001): 53; *Eurobarometer* 56 (April 2002): 79.

[32] Jakob Juchler, "Die Akzeptanz der EU-Osterweiterung in den Kandidatenländern," *Osteuropa* 52 (July 2002): 921–931.

[33] Helmut Leipold, "The Eastwards Enlargement of the European Union: Opportunities and Obstacles," *Aussenpolitik* 46 (no. 2, 1995): 126–135.

[34] Given its large population and proximity, Poland is a focus of these concerns. See Cichocki, ed., *Warum Haben die Deutschen Angst*; Xymena Dotiwska and Mateusz Fatkowski, *Polen und Deutschland: Gegenseitige Wahrnehmung vor der Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union* (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2001).

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A perception that important European projects can only be organized and implemented by bypassing the public has sharpened in Germany. In the past dozen or so years the public has experienced several unrealized optimistic forecasts on major issues. First, German reunification was not going to impose huge costs on the old Federal Republic, nor lead to lasting high unemployment and other unfavorable outcomes. Helmut Kohl assured that the new eastern *Länder*, formerly the German Democratic Republic, would be transformed into "blooming landscapes." Transfer payments from West to East have totalled around 100 billion Deutsche marks (DM) per annum since. Second, the euro (€) would spearhead a powerful new economic force through being certifiably as strong as the mark and ensured by a strict enforcement of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) criteria.[35] When the Euro was launched, Italy and Belgium had double the level of debt to GDP specified in the criteria for membership. In the first two years of its existence the Euro lost around 25 percent in value vis-à-vis the $US and other amounts against other currencies. A move up to parity with the dollar by July 2002 still left it well short of its initial, European Central Bank-determined worth on 1 January 1999. Western European unemployment rates reduced only slowly, and in many CEE states they worsened. Third, the 1991 Treaty on European Union, with EMU at its center, would inspire positive spillover effects into other areas. It would bring Europe together and develop a pan-European identity. Whether this will transpire now that the Euro has been introduced as cash remains to be seen. To the present, none of these projects has developed as promised. What is verifiable is that since 1990 (West) German per capita incomes have fallen compared to other Western European states. There are no convincing reasons why Germans should believe that eastern enlargement will be an indisputable economic success, based on the figures so far proposed as approximating the expenditures. Verheugen stated in 1999 that guesswork and uncertainty were intrinsic features of the project, including calculations of the cost.[36]

### *Negative Benefits*

Little in the way of positive benefit for Germans as private citizens can be guaranteed by eastern enlargement. The benefits are largely of a negative nature and often implicit: undesired developments, which could otherwise occur should enlargement not take place or be delayed, will be prevented. They include mass, illegal immigration; the reappearance of trade barriers and hindrances to investment; weaker controls on criminal elements stemming from further east; worsening of environmental problems and their spread westward; the rise of extremist political forces leading to the return of authoritarian regimes; and even potential alliances of CEE states with Russia. A study of Ger-

[35] *Stark wie die Mark* (Bonn: Bundesministerum der Finanzen, 1996).
[36] "Das Kann Keiner Kalkulieren," *Der Spiegel*, 13 September 1999, 220–224.

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man media reportage on the theme concludes: "The fact is, however, that there is a deficiency of argumentation at the level of elites through all political camps. Neither politicians nor publicists have, up to now, been heard to make easily understandable, positive arguments to the public for an expansion. Also problematic is that even the grounds for entry follow *ex negativo*. Foremost here is the stabilisation thesis, which in practice warns of a Balkanisation of East-Central Europe."[37]

A premise, if not explicit policy, of German officialdom is that immigration from the CEE should be minimized, except for persons with explicitly required skills. This is interpreted as necessary to restrict the potential for sociopolitical discontent in Germany.[38] For governments of all persuasions, projects allocating financial and technical assistance in the CEE are portrayed as encouraging the consolidation of democracy and market economies and, ostensibly, contributing to lower rates of emigration to Germany.[39] Consolidating stability in the East means ensuring that the East will not go West. Yet as figures indicate, even lower estimates of work-seekers and other immigrants entering Germany after enlargement involve significant numbers of people. Predictions are fairly constant. A *Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaft* study forecasts 220,000 per annum initially, with free access for all ten CEE accession countries. This would increase the number of persons from these countries in Germany from 550,000 in early 2001 to almost 2,000,000 by 2010. Tito Boeri and Herbert Brücker suggest 220,000 per annum, of whom about 35 percent will be workers. Ifo estimates 160,000 to 380,000 per annum to Germany for the next fifteen years. Martin Brusis cites estimations of up to 680,000 per annum from Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Slovenia entering the whole EU. Thirty-seven percent of potential migrants aim to enter Germany.[40]

Roland Freudenstein and Henning Tewes argue that fears of a flood of work seekers into Germany are based on inappropriate speculation and lack of proper discussion about German interests. Such are the political effects, however, that there will be a transition period before access to the German labor market is allowed. In practice, the authors suggest, this does not so much protect German workers from enlargement as it protects enlargement from

[37] Münch, "Die Demokratien in Mittel- und Osteuropas Sind Nicht Stabil."

[38] *Politische Studien* 379 (September/October 2001).

[39] *Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropa beim Aufbau von Demokratie und Sozialer Markwirtschaft: Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung*, Transform Program, doc. 439 (Bonn: BMWi/KfW, 1998).

[40] Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaft, "EU-Osterweiterung: Keine Massive Zuwanderung zu Erwarten," *Wochenbericht* 21 (2000): 315–332; Tito Boeri and Herbert Brücker, "Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities," IZA Discussion Paper 256 (Bonn: IZA, 2001); Hans-Werner Sinn et al., *EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskräfteimmigration: Wege zu einer schrittweisen Annäherung der Arbeitsmärkte* (München: Ifo, 2001); Gerhard Schüsselbauer, "Politik und Ökonomie der Erweiterung der EU-finanzielle Kosten und Stabilitätspolitischer Nutzen," *Aktuelle Ostinformation* 33 (Nos. 1/2, 2001), 9–10; Martin Brusis, *Obstacles of Eastern Enlargement* (München: CAP, 1999).

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German workers. Germany's aging population means gaps in the labor market that cannot be covered by Germans alone. Nor can pensions be paid. There is almost no reserve of qualified workers; rather, yearly shortages of up to 7,000 electrical engineers, for example, and 12 percent vacancies for mechanics and other production-related trades. Open access in particular fields will help solve economic problems in Germany by introducing more innovation, flexibility, and dynamism. Germany's four-million unemployed are the result of home-made factors like overregulation and suboptimal orientations in education and vocational training.[41] Polish sources claim that the numbers of Poles likely to enter Germany on a long-term basis after EU accession is far less than many Germans apparently fear. But Poland insists on the right of its citizens to free movement around the EU and access to the German labor market.[42] A factor that could exert an influence on developments is the Polish unemployment rate, which by mid-2002 was almost 20 percent and rising.

## Economic Costs and Benefits for Germany

Helmut Kohl's promotion of eastern enlargement was supported by a business community generally optimistic about the prospects. Organizations representing commerce and industry were prominent in interchange with the CEE and enterprises that had made or intended to make substantial investments engaged in extensive lobbying activity. They stressed the benefits and opportunities of increased trade and investment and the job creation they contended would result. In an early expression of support, the *Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag* (DIHT—German Industry and Trade Forum) cited the stability and fulfilment of historical purpose that would ensue.

> Politically and above all economically, the Eastern enlargement of the European Union represents a unique chance for Germany. The inclusion of the CEECs in Europe's political and economic structures delivers a significant contribution to the long-term stability of the region. With the admission of the former communist states into the European Union, the end of the division of Europe will be impressively documented.
>
> So it is not surprising German politicians emphatically speak in favor of the integration of the CEE states. Günter Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for enlargement, now also comes from Germany. Besides this, since the summit meeting in Luxembourg in 1997, the Eastern enlargement of the European Union is a concluded issue.[43]

[41] Roland Freudenstein and Henning Tewes, *Die EU-Osterweiterung und der deutsche Arbeitsmarkt: Testfall für die deutsch-polnische Interessengemeinschaft*, Arbeitspapiere 33 (Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2001).

[42] Author's confidential interview with Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, September 2001.

[43] Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, *Position Paper*, December 1997, and Klaus Mangold, "Deutschland im Zuge der Globalisierung: Die Bedeuting der Region Ost- und Mitteleuropa für die deutsche Wirtshaft" in Henner Geldmacher and Manfred Busche, eds., *Ost- und Mitteleuropa als Partner der Deutschen Wirtschaft* (Münster, Germany: Ost-West Contact, 1999), 27–40.

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A larger economy is one of the major positive arguments for enlargement, as it was for previous EU expansions. If the economy increases in gross size but otherwise status-quo conditions prevail, there is little change in the overall structure of the European economy or in community policies. Then the economic advantages of eastern enlargement for Germany are questionable. Though they may formulate their positions differently, the German Industry and Trade Forum and others concur. Enlargement is declared as a unique opportunity, which will impel a range of connected liberalizing effects and spur growth. But this will not occur without the requisite political action at national and European levels to enable a more competitive and larger European economic space to emerge. "This will enliven the intensity of competition in Europe, which is required for flexibility, innovation, and economic growth. Simultaneously, entrepreneurs acquire great advantages through cross-border activities and can optimize purchases and sales connected with lower costs for goods transport. This will contribute significantly to the competitive position of European enterprises and secure Europe's long-term economic position."[44]

In 1997, the DIHT outlined recommendations to enable European competition. Most were adopted in some form by the Schröder government or pushed for at EU level: institutional reform as a pre-condition; greater transparency; raised efficiency in use of funds; more market orientation. A rethinking was required, especially in agricultural and structural policy, which were no longer suitable for a larger, more heterogeneous Union. Enlargement was an opportunity to examine the EU's transfer-payments system as part of a larger overhaul of financing. While national room for maneuver must remain, new political and economic impulses were predicted and would enable disputes to be contained or resolved. Further economic expansion was expected through liberalization of the transport market and the provision of new infrastructure. According to an Austrian Transport Ministry study, the EU Imonet project will stimulate regional development via a network of nodal points that increase cooperation. Economic growth will be invigorated and give further impulse for commercial and personal traffic. After enlargement, haulage costs will become more competitive; vehicles and roads will improve to Western standards much quicker than otherwise.[45]

### *Trade and Investment*

German trade with the CEE has increased steadily with some sectors experiencing advantages. CEE is a leading source of demand for German machines and technology, and it supplies parts and components for German internal industry and exporters. Christian Keuschnigg, Mirela Keuschnigg, and Wilhelm

[44] Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, *Position Paper.*

[45] Leonhard Höfler and Gerhard Platzer, *Auswirkungen der EU-Osterweiterung auf den Verkehr* (Vienna: Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie, 1999).

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TABLE 1

*German Trade with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, 1993–2001*

| | *Trade with Germany (Billion Euro)* | | | | | | *German Surplus/Deficit (Billion Euro)* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *1993* | *1997* | *1998* | *1999* | *2000* | *2001* | *1993* | *1997* | *1998* | *1999* | *2000* | *2001* |
| POLAND | 9.3 | 17.9 | 20.7 | 21.5 | 26.4 | 28.7 | 0.57 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 1.7 |
| CZECH REP. | 14.6 | 15.4 | 18.3 | 20.1 | 25.5 | 29.4 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 0.78 | −0.11 | −0.72 | 0.42 |
| HUNGARY | 4.9 | 11.4 | 15.1 | 17.4 | 20.8 | 22.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.35 | −0.46 | −0.28 | −1.4 |
| SLOVENIA | 1.2 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 0.26 | −0.27 | −0.18 | −0.33 | −0.30 | −0.18 |

*Sources: Wirtschaftsentwicklung in ausgewählten MOE Ländern 1997–98; Ostmittel- und Osteuropa im Aufholprozess; Wirtschaftslage und Reformprozesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, Working Papers 209 and 232; Sammelband 2002 (München: Osteuropa Institut, 1998, 2001, 2002).

Kohler suggest trade gains of 7.2 percent for Germany through enlargement.[46] This may be overly optimistic. Germany acquired healthy surpluses with CEE states in the early- and mid-1990s and has maintained this to some degree with the largest, Poland. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia achieved positive trade balances with Germany in 1999 and 2000. As Table 1 shows, the trend is toward reducing German surpluses or a change to deficits. This might signal that CEE countries are developing stronger economies, which reduces pressures for economic migration. Germany has long been dependent on its own surpluses. A longer-term shift to a trade-deficit economy would be unsustainable.

In contrast to Keuschnigg et al., Hugo Dicke and Federico Foders argue that the association agreements have already removed most trade barriers and propelled Germany's trade increase with CEE. They foresee no significant additional expansion of German exports (direct trade effects) through full extension of the EU eastwards.[47] For new members, continued growth and a catching up to the EU15 depends on the depth of market reforms. If deviations from a liberal orientation occur, especially in monetary, banking, fiscal, or exchange-rate policy, then a reversal is probable. Boeri and Brücker also suggest that trade flows have reached their potential. They emphasize that while it is often argued that the overall trade surplus for current EU members is a "job-generating machine" there is a converse capital deficit within the EU.[48] These discussions hint at a more critical assumption behind German European policy: without the EU and its complex of institutions, subsidies, and side-payments, German trade with European states and German prosperity would be drastically reduced. Political barriers would be erected.

In 1990, CEE was seen as presenting limitless opportunity for German investment, but capital inflow has not fulfilled its potential. In 1997, cumulated per capita German FDI was DM742 in Hungary, DM670 in the Czech Repub-

[46] Christian Keuschnigg, Mirela Keuschnigg, and Wilhelm Kohler, *Eastern Enlargement to the EU: Economic Costs and Benefits for the EU Present Member States? Germany*, Final Report on Study XIX/B1/9801 (Brussels: European Commission, 1999), 17–18, tab. 6.

[47] Hugo Dicke and Federico Foders, *Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen einer EU-Erweiterung auf die Mitgliedstaaten* (Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, 2000), 157.

[48] Boeri and Brücker, "Eastern Enlargement," 7–8.

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lic, and DM144 in Poland.[49] These countries account for about 85 percent of German FDI in all CEE candidate countries. Between 1996-2001 inclusive, net German FDI totaled €4.47 billion in Hungary, €4.15 billion in the Czech Republic, and €8.72 billion in Poland.[50] For Dicke and Foders, a significant rise in investment because of EU entry is not envisaged. They also do not expect real income gains in Germany in comparison to market development in CEE without EU entry. Other studies dispute that accession will generate an immediately-expanding liberal market development, contending that capital markets will neither rapidly integrate nor that increased flows of money into CEE are likely. Macroeconomic vulnerabilities and a need for further reform remain.[51] German investors are concerned about protection for creditors and other deficiencies in local legal systems. Corruption persists as a major problem. Moreover, it is unlikely that the eastern enlargement will entail a full liberalization with unhindered opportunities for German companies and individuals. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary all projected 1 January 2003 as the reference date of accession to the EU. Each claims it "accepts and is ready to implement the Community *acquis* concerning Free Movement of Capital. The only exception concerns the free acquisition of real estate" as enshrined in the TEU. Transitional periods for acquisition of real estate by community nationals and companies are requested by all three, in the Polish case up to eighteen years for agricultural land.[52] Finally, notwithstanding the stress from almost all commentators on the need to attract FDI, Volkhart Vincentz states that several studies indicate "worrying results" about the capacity of local firms in CEE to converge with Western European productivity levels. FDI, he argues, "has no demonstrable positive effect on the performance of local firms. In many cases there are even negative effects. The negative effects of strengthened competition obviously more than compensate for the positive effect of technology transfer to recipient economies."[53]

### *Winners and Losers*

Estimates of growth in German GDP as a result of eastern enlargement cohere around 0.5 to 1 percent. Quaisser et al. suggest German net contributions to

[49] Alexander Protsenko and Volkhart Vincentz, *Direktinvestition und andere Kapitalströme nach Osteuropa*, Working Paper 222 (München: Osteuropa Institut, 1999), 22.

[50] Hermann Clement et al., *Wirtschaftslage und Reformprozesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Sammelband 2002* (München: Osteuropa Institut, 2002).

[51] Claudia M. Buch, *Capital Mobility and EU Enlargement*, Working Paper 908 (Kiel, Germany: Kieler Weltwirtschaft Institut, 1999); Deutsche Bank Research, *Monitor EU-Erweiterung* 5, 12 September 2001, 16–22; Libor Krkoska, "Assessing Macroeconomic Vulnerability in Central Europe," *Post-Communist Economies* 13 (March 2001): 41–54.

[52] *Position Paper on Free Movement of Capital* (Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2001); *Poland's Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union* (Warsaw: Chancellery of the Prime Minister, June 2000).

[53] Volkhart Vincentz, *Entwicklung und Tendenzen der Finanzsysteme in Osteuropa*, Working Paper 237 (München: Osteuropa Institut, February 2002), vi, 4–9.

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the EU will rise from 0.54 percent to 0.58 percent of GDP, while Keushnigg et al. predict an increase to 0.645 percent of GDP.[54] Concurrently, the accession of the five Luxembourg Group candidates will reduce total EU per capita GDP by about 12 percent.[55] Although production shifts and structural adjustment have been underway for decades and in some areas may be largely completed, enlargement will affect the growth and distribution of workplaces with gains and losses varying among countries and sectors. Keuschnigg et al. foresee chemicals, textiles, and clothing among the winners along with capital owners and a healthier public sector budget. In an otherwise optimistic scenario, agriculture and food are clear losers, while "the full benefits to worker households will materialize only after some time." Vincentz includes textiles and clothing, along with furniture and the metal-industry as branches that react quickly to relative cost. Employment in these areas in Germany was sinking before the system change of 1989, and the trend is exacerbated. The automobile industry is also affected and manufacturing is under the most pressure. This sector has dominated German investment in CEE.[56]

Wages have risen in the most advanced candidate countries, and gaps in income levels with Germany are gradually reducing, encouraging prognostications, like that of Freudenstein and Tewes, that fears of job losses are exaggerated. Yet definitive quantitative predictions of effects on the German labor market are hard to find.[57] Those favoring a rapid enlargement present vastly different estimates of job creation than others, some up to 1.2 million in the EU over five years.[58] Anxieties in Germany about the consequences for wage levels and workplaces are aggravated by geographical proximity and the institutional confirmation of a liberalization process that extends beyond trade and capital movement. While the EU entry of Austria, Sweden, and Finland was part of this development and did not provoke fears, CEE does. Border regions and lower-paid and lower-skilled workers will be affected. Nonetheless, according to Vincentz, on balance trade with CEE and the entry of workers creates rather than eliminates jobs. Between 1990–1996, workers from CEE

[54] Schüsselbauer, "Politik und Ökonomie der Erweiterung der EU," 11; Wolfgang Quaisser et al., *Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union: Konsequenzen für Wohlstand und Beschäftigung in Europa* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000); Wolfgang Quaisser and John Hall, "Making the European Union Fit for Eastern Enlargement," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* (July 2001): 268–276; Keuschnigg et al., *Eastern Enlargement to the EU.*

[55] Brian Ardy, "Agricultural Policy, Structural Policy, the Budget and Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" in Henderson, ed., *Back to Europe*, 107–128.

[56] Kleuschnigg et al., *Eastern Enlargement to the EU*; Volkhart Vincentz, *Die außenwirtschaflichen Beziehungen mit Osteuropa und ihre Auswirkungen auf die deutsche Wirtschaft*, Working Paper 207 (München: Osteuropa Institut, December 1997).

[57] Janice Bell and Tomasz Mickeiwicz, "EU Accession and Labour Markets in the Visegrad Countries" in Henderson, ed., *Back to Europe*, 129–150; Freudenstein and Tewes, *Die EU-Osterweiterung und der deutsche Arbeitsmarkt.*

[58] Wladimir Andreff, "EU Accession Process—How Long Will It Last? Views from a Conference" (http://www.masterpage.com.pl/outlook), *Poland Library*, accessed on 29 November 2000.

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caused a 0.5 percent rise in German workplaces. Changes in income distribution were marginal. His cited estimations of enlargement-related wage reductions range from 0.5 percent to 1 percent. Boeri and Brücker suggest that a 1 percent increase of migrants in a given branch will reduce wages by about 0.6 percent with a 0.2 percent risk of job loss.[59]

Dicke and Foders argue that in contrast to the situation with previous EU expansions, in Germany today there is an oversupply of labor in nearly all qualification levels. The expectation of mass immigration of jobseekers wanting better positions is difficult to substantiate, they declare. The exception is the demand for highly qualified persons. A high flow of workseekers is also unlikely because of high structural unemployment in Germany/the EU and the expectation of rising demand for labor in entrant countries as income rises. This means no notable net wandering to the EU15 and that transition periods before free access for workers are not economically founded.[60] Schüsselbauer posits that Germany will require a "massive net immigration" of up to 600,000 people by 2020 in order to maintain a stable level of labor. A commission study suggests that given its low birth rates and aging population, increased immigration is the most obvious solution for Germany to maintain its overall population size and level of tax receipts without large tax increases.[61] The proximity of CEE and that these citizens will have qualified to migrate within the EU would weigh in their favor should they actually want to move to Germany.

The economic value that FDI brings to receiver countries (how wide is the distribution of benefit, how long does it remain, etc.) may have a negative counterpart for source countries (*Geberländer*). On whether external direct investment is a burden to the source economy, whereby production and workplaces are moved offshore, Protsenko and Vincentz say, "these questions cannot be answered exactly in quantitative terms," but it is possible to determine an upper limit. This must take into account whether the external investment occurs for reasons of cost advantage or is an expansion into new markets. While stressing the difficulties in arriving at precise figures, the authors estimate 190,000 workplaces had been created in six CEE states by the end of 1999 through German FDI specifically seeking lower-cost production. They state that no inference of equivalent or related losses in the German labor market could be drawn. Most surveys of investing enterprises, they claim, are of the opinion that investment projects represent mainly "capacity extension." Thereby "no workplaces in Germany would be lost." The authors refrain from a definitive statement of their own that no workplaces will be lost in Germany.[62]

[59] Vincentz, *Die außenwirtschaftlichen Beziehungen*, 36–40; Boeri and Brücker, "Enlargement," 13.

[60] Dicke and Foders, *Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen*, 26.

[61] Schüsselbauer, "Politik und Ökonomie der Erweiterung der EU," 9–10; Holger Bonin, Bernd Raffelhüschen, and Jan Walliser, "Germany: Unification and Ageing" in *European Economy: Generational Accounting* (Brussels: CEC, 2000), 57–70.

[62] Protsenko and Vincentz, *Direktinvestitionen und andere Kapitalströme.*

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There is a disparity between the benefits and costs for private enterprise and the directly measurable gains for the general public through eastern enlargement in toto, rather than trade or investment alone. For some other European projects, there is a "lack of correspondence between the initial beneficiary (the private sector) and ultimate donor (the government)."[63] The discrepancy may be widening. German commercial involvement is often encouraged and accompanied by direct or indirect state assistance, compounding public input and risk while lessening private risk. While concerned about reaction from its traditional constituency of workers, the Social Democratic party now presents itself as all in favor of competition and markets. Simultaneously, problem regions and sectors will be answered with "specific regional flanking strategies" from the federal government and the EU. The implicit promise is for more public money as a solution for uncompetitive business or industries.[64] This implies that German job losses will occur. Which country and/or strata will pay for most of the required flanking measures is unspecified.

Dicke and Foders evaluate economic effects as change in the total welfare of a member state, which is the sum of material welfare for all citizens. Ideal forms of welfare—security, freedom, equality, culture—are outside their frame of reference. They argue that customs unions may have welfare-reducing effects if a partial trade liberalization is accompanied by increased protection. Their analysis of public goods in the EU (law, security, competition policy, four freedoms) posits that these are not subject to rivalry in consumption. The size of the EU can then be infinite. Pure private goods (partly defined by rivalry of consumption) have an optimal size of one unit. EU funds are also private, because they are subject to rivalry of consumption (competition to receive). The EU offers a combination of public and private goods, and "the average good can be signified as an incomplete public good." A welfare improvement will occur when trade creation is higher than trade redirection. It is also likely if capital (money/knowledge) flows to new members. Then the welfare of capital importers and capital income (dividends/profit) of capital exporters rise. This depends upon how investment opportunities and risks are viewed in potential capital exporter countries. Less optimistically, uncertainty about economic development in the CEE will not be overcome merely by EU entry. The authors suggest an inauspicious outlook for how these countries will react to open competition.[65]

The 1981 and 1986 enlargements reduced West Germany's economic weight in the EU. They did not lead to statistically significant rises in imports or exports for Germany. Without trade creation and a connected improvement in provision of goods there is no additional economic benefit. Previous enlargements had fiscal consequences that translated into negative effects on welfare for Ger-

[63] Lily Gardner Feldman, "Germany and the EC: Realism and Responsibility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 531 (January 1994): 25–43, fn16.

[64] *Positionspapier der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion zur Osterweiterung.*

[65] Dicke and Foders, *Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen*, 4, 16, 29–30.

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many and other members. Rising net transfers and costs for the national economy through added taxes worsened the provision of goods for German consumers more than for others. There will be welfare losses as a result of integration in areas of agricultural, regional, and social policy. Germany will bear the largest loss, and tax increases will probably be introduced. In accordance with the Berlin Council of 1999 estimates, citizens of the EU15 will have an enlargement-related tax burden of €10.4 to €15.6 billion. Together with income loss from the additional contribution, the welfare loss is between €23.4 and €28.6 billion of which €6.1 to €7.5 billion pertains to Germany. Without savings in other budgetary areas, both private households and entrepreneurs face income cuts. Extra taxes will have negative macroeconomic effects on the national economy.[66] There are also concerns about the effects of enlargement on the Euro, including inflationary risks and debt levels. The *Bundesbank* proposed additional economic criteria for CEE states to meet before they enter the EU. Statements by the president brought the bank into conflict with the government's political imperatives.[67]

## Political Economy

Germany's European strategy combines cautious goals of enlargement and a concurrent reduction in its net contributions to the EU budget. Financial weight, often a decisive element in German foreign affairs, is no longer so readily available for external redistribution. Cofinancing of community expenditure is viewed as a means to assist German objectives, but has consistently been blocked by other nations, notably France. If a reduction in German contributions is not balanced with higher payments by others, enlargement will be underfunded. The amounts concerned are in the context of German and EU15 GDP relatively small, but some German politicians seem intent on demonstrating that it will not be Europe's paymaster any longer.[68] Stoiber claimed:

> The financial burdening of Germany is hardly reduced by the Berlin EU-Summit's Agenda 2000, despite the promises of the chancellor. The costs for the Eastern enlargement are assessed far too low at €68 billion until 2006. In the same period the fifteen member states claim ten times that much for themselves. If the agenda-package is not untied and repaired at the intergovernmental conference in 2004, there will be increased costs for Europe. There will be increased costs for Europe and thereby the main net payer, Germany, which will certainly strain our finances. We must determine a division of competences and a serious financing of the Eastern enlargement before the EU takes in the first states.[69]

[66] Ibid., 34–35, 41, 132–134.

[67] Christian Reierman, "Aktive Beratung," *Der Spiegel*, 4 December 2000, 132.

[68] Charlie Jeffrey and Vladimir Handl, "Germany and Europe after Kohl: Between Social Democracy and Normalisation," ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper 11 (Birmingham: Institute for German Studies, 1999). Quaisser and Hall estimate the costs of expansion for the five CEEs and Malta at 0.17 percent of EU GDP in 2004 with progressive increases. See Quaisser and Hall, "Making the European Union Fit for Eastern Enlargement."

[69] *Focus*, 22 December 2000.

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Total preaccession assistance proposed in the Agenda 2000 program was €21.84 billion. This is to be dispersed through the three major EU assistance programs: SAPARD (agriculture), ISPA (infrastructure in transport and environment), and PHARE (administrative reform, economic and legal requirements). Postaccession costs for 2002-2006 are €58.07 billion. This is a hopeful assessment in terms of costs and of starting and finishing dates. €39.58 billion are allocated for structural assistance, €12.41 billion for agriculture, €3.95 billion for internal policies, and €2.13 billion for administrative costs. This represents an expenditure of 1.27 percent of current EU GDP, reducing to 1.13 percent in 2006. To meet these costs, German contributions must rise by €3.6 billion, or 10 percent, in 2006.[70] Presently, it is not likely that this will happen. If the budget is to be balanced, the shortfall must be borne by other states, with the most likely candidates being Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece.

Hall and Quaisser propose that while "eastern enlargement is a worthwhile endeavor, we also believe that at present the EU is not in a position to cope with the consequences." Enlargement costs are estimated as increasing to consume almost 29 percent of total EU expenditure, or €34 billion in 2008. The authors argue that an Agenda 2007 is required, something the EU's decision makers were likely to have factored in as inevitable, even before the earlier arrangements were concluded.[71] In an extended study they are generally optimistic about the outcome of enlargement for Germany, though whether Germany actually benefits is dependent on a range of conditions subject to the vagaries of the international economy and international politics. In the list of potential budgetary outcomes, Germany could be faced with payments to the EU of up to 0.61 percent of GDP in 2007 and 0.73 percent of GDP in 2013. Following the authors' most extensive reform proposal, in the same years Germany would contribute 0.32 percent and 0.22 percent of GDP. They state that "the danger of additional cost explosions is especially high, because EU policies inherited from the past were more the results of political compromise than sound or even moderately rational decision-making" and that "horse-trading will likely increase" when it comes to deciding the "major cost-intensive policy issues."[72]

### *Agricultural and Structural Policies*

Enlargement has stimulated tensions between both current and prospective EU members. Net receivers attempt to maintain what they can of their receipts, while net payers strive to reduce their payments. Germany and some others want to shift funds from old recipients to new members. Further integration depends to a large extent on the receivers accepting change to a system whereby

[70] Wolfgang Quaisser, "Die Osterweiterung: Ein Europäisches Großprojekt mit Vielen Unbekannten," *Ifo Schnelldienst* 31 (20 December 2000).

[71] Quaisser and Hall, "Making the European Union Fit for Eastern Enlargement."

[72] Wolfgang Quaisser and John Hall, *Toward Agenda 2007: Preparing the EU for Eastern Enlargement*, Working Paper 240 (München: Osteuropa Institut, February 2002), 47, 59.

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"some member states have in recent years profited above average from community policy."[73] The two key areas are agricultural and structural policy representing over 80 percent of the budget.

The intense interstate bargaining on agricultural policy will become even tougher. There are three basic options: full application of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for current candidates upon accession, complete exclusion from direct agricultural subsidies, and a compromise of partial renationalization and reorientation of payments toward environmental goals and rural development. The third option is now effectively in operation as the outcome of negotiations between national politicians, the Commission, and agricultural and environmental pressure groups.[74] Most analysts agree that EU agricultural prices are too high and that many exports of these goods have only been possible through the provision of subsidies.[75] Changes will be enforced upon these arrangements during the next World Trade Organization (WTO) round. Land surface area used for agricultural purposes will increase by about 50 percent after enlargement, and people employed in agriculture will increase by about 100 percent. If CEE states are not excluded from CAP subsidy mechanisms by means of transition periods, guaranteed high prices will be a production incentive for farmers whose agricultural prices are currently at a much lower level. As a partial solution to financial problems, the European Commission aims to merge environmental goals into agricultural policy. A continuation of subsidies, if at a reduced level and under another name, will aim to minimize job losses and political strife, while ostensibly focusing on improved environmental outcomes. The reform discussion centers on reductions in price support and the national cofinancing of compensatory payments for farmers. In the long term, a retreat from price support cannot be avoided. Lower prices allow comparative advantages to develop and promote increased competitiveness for European agriculture, a better negotiating position for the EU in future WTO rounds, and an easing of the net-payer problem.

There is resistance to the goal of a competitive internal market for agricultural products. France's opposition to cofinancing is motivated by the realization that a change in this direction means that France will have to pay more to French farmers if their income levels are to be maintained. Since European integration began, Germany has funded much of the policy that French officials

[73] Claus Giering, *Solidarität und Kohäsion in der Europäischen Union*, Positionspapier der Forschungsgruppe Europa zur "Agenda 2000" (München: CAP, 1999), 9.

[74] Ewa Rabinowicz, "EU Enlargement and the Common Agricultural Policy: Finding Compromise in a Two-level Repetitive Game," *International Politics* 36 (September 1999): 397–417.

[75] Wolfgang Quaisser, "Der Agrarsektor in der Transformation von Wirtschaftssystemen: Grundlegende Probleme und Implikationen für die Osterweiterung der EU" in Ekkehard Buchofer and Wolfgang Quaisser, eds., *Agrarwirtschaft und ländlicher Raum Ostmitteleuropas in der Transformation* (Marburg, Germany: 1998), 5–34; Dicke and Foders, *Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen*, 18, fn21. The community agriculture market is not a true customs union, "merely a highly protectionist scheme to benefit community producers at the expense of community consumers and outsiders."

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continue to present as a community objective. Some studies argue that neither the community character of the policy nor the total assistance for farmers is in question. The prerequisites remain. Because national cofinancing occurs in other community policies and programs, this type of reform should not be interpreted as renationalization but as a fair distribution of burdens: "co-financing of direct payments to farmers is an insightful and effective start to improvement of the net-payer position of some member states."[76] Converting 25 percent of Community subsidies into cofinancing arrangements would mean a yearly reduction in payments of €700 million for Germany. It would also mean that France, Spain, and Greece must reckon with an increase of up to €500 million to be funded from their national budgets. Contrary to some views,[77] Germany is not opposed to CAP reform because of concerns about reductions in income for its farmers. Along with the UK, Germany supports reform, primarily as a means to reduce its overall net payments.

Meanwhile, candidate countries expect a share of the same pie and hope for full access. Estimates on the costs of extending the CAP to encompass the five CEE states are around an extra €10-11 billion per annum.[78] This cannot be achieved under the present budgetary regime. Not extending the full CAP sends a political signal to CEE states not to orient their agricultural industries toward entry into the subsidy culture of the EU. Enlargement under these circumstances would indirectly deliver Germany an improved financial perspective. At the same time, other conflicts would likely intensify. Poland has declared the implementation of administrative and institutional adjustments necessary for Poland's participation in all CAP mechanisms and applies for the following: full incorporation of Polish agriculture into the CAP; allocating to Poland the production quotas corresponding to the level of natural potential for environment-friendly agricultural production, and ensuring maintenance of stable income resources for the agricultural population; inclusion of Polish agrifood products market into the Single European Market. The Polish position declares that it is possible to find arrangements "enabling incorporation of the Polish agricultural sector and rural areas into the full range of CAP and structural instruments, including the participation of Polish farmers in benefits provided by price, income and structural measures. Therefore, we consider the right to direct payments arising from the *acquis communautaire* a common benefit accessible to Polish farmers after accession."[79]

Structural policy is said to "embody a founding consideration of European integration: economic and social cohesion." Regions with income levels at less

[76] Giering, *Solidarität und Kohäsion in der Europäischen Union*, 8–9.

[77] Phinnemore, "The Challenge of EU Enlargement: EU and CEE Perspectives," 80. There is a misinterpretation about the average of the five candidates' labor force employed in agriculture. Rather than 7 percent, it is 12–13 percent if the national levels are added and divided by 5, but closer to 20 percent if calculated by adding the total population of all countries.

[78] Ardy, "Agricultural, Structural Policy, the Budget and Eastern Enlargement."

[79] *Poland's Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations*, 75–85.

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than 75 percent of the EU average are eligible for structural funds as Objective-One regions. Cohesion funds are available for those under 90 percent of the EU average. Several analysts recommend a "concentration of means" to replace the "watering can" method. That "emphasis should shift from the present support of less-developed *regions* to the promotion of economic convergence among *countries*."[80] Incentives will also be introduced for enhanced use of funds. A concentration on promoting convergence at the macrolevel suggests that problems of resource distribution should be tackled directly by national solutions, which would replace or at least precede the implementation of further EU-wide plans. This proposal for a form of cofinancing would reduce German net payments. Without major reform or extended transition periods before full access to benefits, all candidates would be eligible for Objective-One funds, a financial scenario beyond present appropriations. The number of Objective-One regions must be cut, probably by applying a phased reduction of funding amounts. By 2006, several regions will drop out of the 75 percent and 90 percent categories, which could slow their progress toward similar income levels. If the old regions cannot operate as successful market economies without further extension to decades of assistance, when will they be able to? The same could be said for Germany's eastern regions, where the government wants to retain community support to avoid a worsening of its net contribution situation.

## Conclusion: Political Conflicts Intensify

Many actors involved in the enlargement project have referred to sweeping historical necessities, while seeking to secure their own interests. For most of the German public, eastern enlargement is observed as a costly and risky venture, not least because the costs may increase without defined end. There are also existential anxieties, which are more diffuse, difficult to qualify clearly, or quantify. There are concerns for societal security, not only workplaces and wages, but also the presence of more resident foreigners with different languages, cultural preferences and behavior, historical understandings, and group formations in the society. Support for international economic liberalization, which is hardly universal, is not necessarily accompanied by inclination to political integration and wide-ranging sociocultural interaction and change.[81] Moreover, there is no clear correspondence between who wins from the tax-payer-funded EU market and who pays for it. Even if the proposed structural and economic

[80] Giering, *Solidarität und Kohäsion in der Europäischen Union*, 9–12; Hall and Quaisser, "Making the European Union Fit for Eastern Enlargement"; Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Ready for Take off: Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union und die Reform der kostenintensiven Strukturpolitik" (paper presented at the conference on *Die Zukunft der Europäischen Strukturfonds vor dem Hintergrund der EU-Osterweiterung*, Berlin, 25 June 2001. (Emphasis added.)

[81] Patricia Goff, "Invisible Borders: Economic Liberalisation and National Identity," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (December 2000): 533–562; *Politische Studien* 379 (September/October 2001); Doliwska and Falkowski, *Polen und Deutschland.*

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reforms are undertaken in current members and candidates, economic difficulties and related social concerns will remain. Disparities and deadlock over agriculture may extend delays. The main problem areas include: despite reforms of cohesion funds policy, large gaps in socioeconomic conditions will persist; simultaneous enlargement and increased competition will exacerbate regional gaps in East and West; agricultural pricing is still a problem. There is a risk of WTO transgressions and possible tariffs on new members with border controls. Delinking income subsidies from production would make the CAP a virtual social policy. Western publics are biased against immigrants, and have an inordinate fear of increased crime. They are susceptible to political tactics linking internal security to enlargement. The incremental nature of EU reform may slow further after the first entrants make agreement on further enlargement even more difficult. Wars have caused Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria to fall behind.[82]

To stop delaying the expansion process was the central message among presenters at a Paris conference in 1999. Displeasure about prevarication on EU expansion commonly merges with normative appeals that constitute much of the argument for early-accession lobbies. Candidates' short-term interests are overlooked, but not those of current members, whose policy makers are blamed for inciting negative views among their populations. The charge is of a lack of political will among Western leaderships to enforce the "correct" direction and policies. "Short-term economic calculations, driven by narrowly focused cost considerations, are beginning to overshadow the historical dimension of EU expansion. . . . Loss of illusions and enthusiasm by Western policymakers has allowed the popular perception that accession is a negative sum to gain ground."[83]

There have been no definitive, positive signals to the average wage-earner and voter in net-payer Western European states that he or she will be conclusively advantaged during and after this process, which will require decades to complete. Full enlargement will not deliver much more opportunity beyond the concluded association agreements for market forces to expand growth and integration. Various subsidies do not improve the division of labor or provision of goods; changes in financial rules and community policies are required to avoid serious welfare loss for Germany. An extension of the *acquis* without strengthening markets will not result in welfare gains for old EU members.[84] Dicke and Foders suggest that a practical solution is a European free trade zone with full capital mobility. Why not pursue such a regime? The tacit answer is that other EU states expect an ongoing provision by Germany of around 60 percent of EU transfers, delivered through political arrangement, and not merely a borderless internal market. New members have similar expectations. Although politi-

[82] See Brusis, *Obstacles of Eastern Enlargement.*

[83] Andreff, "EU Accession Process-How Long Will It Last?"

[84] Dicke and Foders, *Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen*, 155–160.

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cians in Germany and CEE have often asserted the benefits accruing to Germany through its trade with the EU, its unemployment rate rose and remained around 10 percent for much of the 1990s, even surpassing 12 percent, as trade volumes were increasing.

Several analysts and politicians have argued that the top limit of the EU budget cannot remain at 1.27 percent of EU GDP, as is set until 2006. To fulfill numerous European tasks and to improve the contribution system, increases are needed in defense and security, research and development, and environmental protection, which benefit all members and relax imbalances in net payments. Giering stresses that to achieve this, the reform debate cannot become fixated on cost-benefit calculations. Instead, goals of peace, prosperity, and solidarity should be the basis of reflection, which will end the obsession with net contributions and create the impression of a just payments system.[85]

The German government's answers to an extensive range of questions from the parliament on enlargement are modest on some of the most pertinent themes. Political stability among Germany's neighbors as a precondition for peace, an expanded internal market with good growth prospects in the new members, an improved environmental situation, and better crime-fighting capacities and tourist industry possibilities are prominent among the listed advantages. A dynamic development of trade can be expected and progressive removal of remaining restrictions will strengthen cross-border (in a borderless market?) investment. The government could give no quantified prognoses on future investment activities of private enterprise for EU members or others, on which the success of the entire project largely depends. The outcomes of negotiations on agriculture and the composition of the budget after 2006 remain well concealed. No estimation can be given on amounts that new members will receive from social and regional development funds or for reductions in flows of structural funds to Germany from 2007. Immediate free access to work seekers from time of EU entry could burden some regional labor markets in Germany. In the medium and long term, however, "a substantial inward migration of labour is required to secure Germany's overall condition and a harmonised economic development." Concurrently, the government says it takes fears from member state populations about economic disadvantage, especially in border regions, seriously. "All things considered, during an interim phase disadvantages for wage-intensive businesses in border regions are to be reckoned with." Conversely, advantages will appear through the expanded market and stable economic structures.[86]

In an attempt to assuage concerns, Schröder embarked on a tour along the German eastern border in summer 2001, promoting enlargement to regions and communities, and experiencing first hand the anxieties of a population that has

[85] Giering, *Solidarity and Cohesion*, 12–13.

[86] Deutscher Bundestag, 14th Wahlperiode, *Antwort der Bundesregierung*, Drucksache 14/5232, 7 February 2001.

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greeted enlargement anything but euphorically.[87] In response to questions asked by the *Bundestag*, a foreign ministry document claimed that enlargement was "not an abstract political coercion" but about securing one's own interests. The document relies on continued strong growth in new entrants and the realization of increased chances for German commerce and industry through unified legal rules.[88]

Econometric models cannot capture the entire effect of an EU-perspective on the CEE transformation countries, which keeps them on course politically. Though this principally means ensuring that they continue to pursue a strategy of economic liberalization, the line of reasoning also connects with the "negative benefit of stability" thesis. Eastern enlargement of the EU may well promote political stability on the continent, though there is no compelling argument that antagonistic chaos will surely occur without it. What it means for German taxpayers, however, is that they must pay more into the EU budget indefinitely and without clarity on the likelihood or size of a tangible return. Although eastern enlargement is a unique case, the political scenario is a familiar one: in return for immediate costs and other effects undesired by much of the population is the promise by politicians of extensive longer-term gains.*

[87] Alexander Weilein, "Chancen und Ängste an der Ostgrenze" and Torsten Wöhlert, "in Zukunft Muss Es Heißen 'Go East and Come Together,'" *Das Parlament*, 17–24 August 2001.

[88] *Die Europäisches Union—Fragen zur Erweiterung* (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, 2001).

* Many thanks to Wolfgang Quaisser and Andjay Staniek, Osteuropa Institut, München, for their valuable assistance.

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# Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review Essay

NORMA J. KRIGER

Africa's roster of long-serving rulers is extensive.[1] Seventy-nine year old Robert Gabriel Mugabe's twenty-two-year rule in Zimbabwe assures him a place on the list. Mugabe, like many other durable African leaders, has been associated with large-scale violence against opponents, which has contributed to the population's impoverishment. On these basics, the authors of the three books under review agree.[2]

Robert Mugabe became caught up in African nationalist politics in white-ruled Rhodesia on a visit home from independent Ghana, where he had been teaching. In 1963, the nationalist movement split. Joshua Nkomo continued to lead the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), while Ndabiningi Sithole led the breakaway Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) with Mugabe as secretary-general. Opposed to racial equality, Prime Minister Ian Smith

[1] Past long-term rulers included Haile Selassie (Ethiopia), 44 years; Felix Houphouet Boigny (Ivory Coast), 33 years; Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), 32 years; Kamuza Banda (Malawi), 30 years; Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), 27 years; Sekou Toure (Guinea), 26 years; Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), 25 years; Daniel Arap Moi (Kenya), 24 years; Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon), 22 years; Jerry Rawlings (Ghana), 20 years. Despite democratization, long-term heads of state remain an important phenomenon. Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema has been in power since 1967, Angola's Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Equatorial Guinea's Obiang Nguema since 1979, Cameroon's Paul Biya since 1982.

[2] Martin Meredith, *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); Stephen Chan, *Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); David Blair, *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe* (London: Continuum, 2002).

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locked up leading nationalists, including Mugabe, in 1964 and declared independence from Britain in 1965 to be rid of its pressures. ZANU, recruiting chiefly from the Shona majority, and ZAPU from the dominant Ndebele ethnic minority in Matabeleland, had already established guerrilla armies in Zambia. In 1974, Smith came under regional pressures to negotiate a settlement and to release the men he had jailed. The negotiations failed. Mugabe soon escaped to Mozambique, then the main base for ZANU's rapidly growing army. By 1977, Mugabe had established himself as ZANU's leader. He favored a military victory but became a reluctant signatory of a British-supervised negotiated settlement in 1979.

In the 1980 election, Mugabe's party, renamed ZANU(PF), won a parliamentary majority and Mugabe became prime minister. The Marxist-Leninist who had promised to confiscate white land and hold war crimes trials called for reconciliation. He guaranteed white farmers that they had nothing to fear, he reappointed the heads of the Central Intelligence Organization, the police, and the army; and he appointed ZAPU leaders and whites to his cabinet. Mugabe won praise and international donor money. But he soon manifested his penchant for violence to attain total power.

His first victim was his old rival, ZAPU. After independence, a small group of insurgents, former members of ZAPU's guerrilla army, attacked civilians and state development projects, chiefly in Matabeleland. Beginning in 1983, the government sent in thousands of troops, who killed 6,000 to 20,000 civilians and tortured, beat, and brutalized many others. In 1987, the violence ended with the absorption of ZAPU into ZANU(PF). Mugabe had accomplished a de facto one-party state, a longstanding objective. A few days later a constitutional amendment made Mugabe president.

Between 1988 and 1999, the main issues were Mugabe's authoritarianism and economic mismanagement. In 1991, Mugabe adopted, at least in part, the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment medicine. Workers were retrenched, and real wages continued to decline yet Mugabe's corrupt cronies prospered. Mugabe used state machinery to repress nonthreatening opponents: university students; a new party formed by his ex-colleague, Edgar Tekere; journalists; and workers, who became the leading organized opposition in the late 1990s. Despite government deficits, Mugabe agreed to sizeable pensions for war veterans in 1997, and a year later he sent troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to support Laurent Kabila's government.

The next victim of Mugabe's large-scale violence was Morgan Tsvangirai's party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), formed in September 1999. In contrast to Mugabe's seven university degrees (he boasted only of his degrees in violence), Tsvangirai had left high school early to work. His power base was in the workers' movement, which he led from the late 1980s. In February 2000, the country voted on a ZANU(PF)-designed draft constitution, which increased presidential powers. At the last minute, Mugabe had inserted a clause which required Britain to pay for land compensation, failing which the govern-

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ment would confiscate white farms without compensation. Unexpectedly, a small majority of the electorate who bothered to vote opposed the draft constitution. This was the first electoral defeat for Mugabe and ZANU(PF). Mugabe blamed his new enemies—the MDC, whites, and Britain—and devised a violent strategy to prevent defeat in the upcoming parliamentary election.

The ruling party orchestrated the occupation of white farms to punish the farmers for their "no" vote and to prevent them and their workers from voting against the ruling party. Seizing white land was also supposed to win votes from the land hungry. The party paid both the veterans and those they mobilized to invade the farms, and the police and army provided logistical support. Any suspected MDC supporter was a potential target of party violence. High court orders to end the land invasions and remove people from the occupied farms were ignored. In June 2002, ZANU(PF) won sixty-two elected seats to the MDC's fifty-seven. But the ruling party still had a comfortable majority, because Mugabe had the power, acquired in 1990, to effectively appoint thirty parliamentarians.

Mugabe knew his party had virtually no support in Matabeleland or in the major cities and that Morgan Tsvangirai would pose a serious challenge in the upcoming presidential election, so the violent campaign continued. It moved to the urban areas in April 2001, with invasions of white-owned factories, shops, nongovernment organizations, private hospitals, and donor agencies. The goal was to punish whites for their MDC support and to win workers' support. White managers were marched to party headquarters, beaten up, held hostage, and money was extorted from businesses. More farms were occupied. The Supreme Court ruled that the land invasions and the so-called Fast Track land redistribution program were illegal. The government response was to verbally attack and physically threaten the judges (black and white) for their allegedly racist judgments. In December 2001, an enlarged and packed Supreme Court legalized the land seizures without compensation. In March 2002, President Mugabe was reelected without support in the urban areas or Matabeleland. The death toll since 2000 has been low compared with the 1980s' mass murders, but widespread torture, beatings, and terror continue. The 4,500 white farmers have been reduced to some 600 still on their land, meaning the destruction of livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of black farm workers too.

Martin Meredith, a British journalist with considerable southern African experience, skillfully weaves actors' voices into his comprehensive postindependence narrative. Meredith is also effective in showing patterns in Mugabe's rule: youth violence against his enemies, police support (active or tacit) for the party, contempt for the courts, racist statements against the white community, amnesties and pardons for perpetrators of party violence. Meredith's thesis is clear. From his days as ZANU's leader in exile, Mugabe has used violence to win and secure power. Meredith's title, *Our Votes, Our Guns*, draws on a speech Mugabe made in exile about the interdependence between guns and votes, and it is intended to highlight continuities between Mugabe's liberation war ideas

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about violence and power and his postindependence behavior. For Meredith, even the 1980 election was a vote for peace rather than enthusiastic support for ZANU(PF), because people knew that unless Mugabe's party won, the war would continue. Meredith sees Mugabe as interested in power for the sake of power, not for any visionary objectives.

Meredith's view of Western intervention in southern Africa is starry-eyed. He suggests that the West supported Mugabe in the 1980s despite his atrocities in Matabeleland, because of his anti-apartheid stance and his military support for the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique government against the Mozambique National Resistance rebels. Blair is more compelling, attributing the absence of international sanction to Mugabe's effective propaganda that Nkomo was in charge of the dissidents and that they were conniving with apartheid South Africa to overthrow Mugabe. Also, cold war politics made anti-Soviet leaders like Mugabe beneficiaries of the West. The main objection to Meredith's book, though, is its extensive citation from other sources without attribution. It constitutes blatant plagiarism. It is astounding that his publishers were not concerned about law suits. This book will certainly upset several authors when they see their hard won interview results quoted by Meredith as if they were his.

Formerly an international civil servant and now a professor of international relations at the University of London with many publications on southern Africa, Stephen Chan worked in different roles with the new ZANU(PF) government and has visited Zimbabwe annually since 1983. Chan maintains that even today, Mugabe seeks power not merely for its own sake but to implement a "romantic" vision (p. 4): "to create a new country, freed from Britain and white settlers, populated by new Zimbabweans" (p. 175). For Mugabe, land is not "merely a political instrument. . . . There is both an intellectual Afro-centrism to Mugabe and a cruder autarky. . . . He has both kept the international community second-guessing him and persuaded—in virtuoso diplomacy—many of his colleague presidents in Africa that his could be understood as a genuine policy of liberation" (p. 213). From Mugabe's 2002 actions, the West has learned that "Mugabe is a much more complex and extraordinary mover than it had expected or estimated. What he did was to accomplish a great political act. It was not a great moral act—except in the terms of his own autarky . . ." (p. 211). Chan finds other support for labeling Mugabe's record in office "mixed." Besides his reconciliation policy, Chan praises Mugabe's military support for the Mozambican government against the South African-supported rebels, his role in ending that conflict, and his chairmanship of the 1991 commonwealth summit in Harare, which subscribed to democratization.

Chan's objective is to provide a balanced account of Mugabe—to avoid demonizing him or seeing him as a prisoner of his violent past, as he alleges many Western politicians and British newspapers have done. In contrast to Meredith and Blair, Chan does not see the continuity in Mugabe's use of violence but suggests the unconvincing alternative that Mugabe "repeats himself in ever more complex and unpredictable ways" (p. 214). Chan's attempt at bal-

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ance actually reveals his pro-Mugabe bias. A few examples must suffice. Chan overlooks ZANU(PF)'s campaign of violence and intimidation in 1980, just as the Commonwealth Observer Group of which he was a member did. He writes: "Mugabe barely rattled a sabre, and worked the stump like any other, perhaps slightly and occasionally shrill, normal politician" (p. 16). Similarly, Chan downplays the large-scale violence that occurred before and after the 1985 election, so that the low-level 1990 electoral violence appears greater. Chan diminishes the impact of ZANU(PF)'s mass murder in Matabeleland when he attributes the 1987 party merger to the ZAPU leadership and Mugabe realizing their conflict was "a sideshow" compared to South Africa's threat to majority rule in the region. Chan dismisses the issue of vote rigging in the 2002 presidential election and attributes Mugabe's victory to calculated intimidation and a significant proportion of the electorate believing his message of the threat of neocolonialism. Given that Mugabe used every ruse to ensure he won the vote, even if Mugabe did not rig the vote count it is difficult to know how many votes, especially in the rural areas, reflected support versus terror.

On Britain and the land issue, Chan distorts. He claims that there were never the funds to purchase huge amounts of white land. Yet only 44 million pounds provided by Britain had reduced white land holdings by almost 30 percent. In 1997, according to Chan, the government paid 150 million pounds in gratuities to liberation war veterans—over three times the cost of purchasing nearly one-third of white-owned land. "This was not, in isolation, a huge sum," he says (p. 150). One must infer that funds were not the primary obstacle to the government purchasing more white farms. Moreover, Britain, the donor community, Mugabe's government, and others agreed in September 1998 that funds for a gradual land purchase would be provided on condition that the land was purchased on the market and distributed in a transparent way. Presumably referring to this agreement, Chan writes: "The Zimbabwean Government saw this as a conditionality which would mean Britain dictating the process of land acquisition, a cheek since it was British settlers in the first instance who had 'acquired' land in a somewhat less than transparent manner from the actually poor" (p. 153). The fact is that the Mugabe government had accepted the conditionality in 1998 and then backed off. Chan portrays the draft constitution's clause requiring Britain to compensate white farmers for land as Mugabe's appeal to be rescued against MDC competition in the upcoming election. I doubt it. Mugabe had no idea at that stage how much support the MDC had.

The most effective account is British correspondent David Blair's. From May 1999 until June 2000, when the government refused to renew his permit, he covered Zimbabwe for the *Daily Telegraph.* His opening description of a rally at ZANU(PF) headquarters organized by the war veterans' leader, Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi, brilliantly captures the aura of fear, intimidation, and actual violence in which journalists worked; ZANU(PF)'s racist rhetoric; the party's labeling of black opponents as "traitors" or "sell-outs"; and the stark wealth differences between the rally's leaders and their supporters. Blair takes readers

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to other ruling party rallies, to MDC rallies, to interviews with key characters, to MDC victims of ruling party thugs, to secret meetings with farm workers otherwise too frightened to talk, to white farmers and their families, and to a light-hearted glimpse of Fast Track land redistribution. The lies, half-truths, and distortions of ZANU(PF) leaders leave little doubt about their credibility. Blair seems on target when he suggests there is perhaps no diplomatic strategy that would budge Mugabe. Like Meredith, he does link Mugabe's liberation war violence to his postwar violence. His concluding thoughts on the parallels in political culture of the Smith and Mugabe regimes and in the personalities of these two leaders are provocative but have their limitations.

Blair sees Mugabe and his ruling cronies, like Smith's government, as suffering from delusions and fantasies about conspirators. To what extent Mugabe really believes his own rhetoric is an interesting question. The point, I think, is that Mugabe is a masterful propagandist, and here his liberation war credentials seem relevant. Blair's assertion that "by the close of 2001, Mugabe was totally isolated, not only from the developed world, but increasingly from his African neighbours as well" (p. 242) cannot be sustained. President Mbeki of South Africa, a crucial economic lifeline for Zimbabwe, still supports Mugabe, as do other African and Third World leaders. Like Chan, Blair believes that Mugabe does have an autarkic vision of "an independent, self-sufficient country, where the indigenous black people would till all the land and reward their leader by keeping him in power for ever" (p. 242). The comparison with Smith's autarkic vision is imperfect. Smith's regime was able to find ways, at least for many years, to promote a manufacturing sector as his white-minority-rule-forever objective increasingly isolated his country. Mugabe's efforts at ZANU (PF) rule forever have in two short years made Zimbabwe's economy the fastest contracting in the world, with nearly half its population facing starvation.

For all their focus on Mugabe's violence and hunger for total power, the authors fail to understand why Mugabe gave in to the veterans' violent and exorbitant pensions demands. Meredith thinks Mugabe capitulated because of the public exposure that his own colleagues had been looting a state fund for the war disabled. Blair suggests Mugabe was prescient. "Perhaps realizing that he would need these allies to withstand the challenges ahead, Mugabe agreed to their demands . . ." (p. 39). For Chan, "Mugabe was ready to deal roughly with the . . . veterans. Before the plans could be implemented, Mugabe and Hunzvi held a meeting . . . Hunzvi threatened to unleash anarchy, and not only divide the nation but divide it by depriving Mugabe of his spiritual heritage. The veterans would be standing as those who had fought for Zimbabwe, Mugabe would be called traitor to them and their cause. The identity of Mugabe's soul would be ripped from him" (p. 149). Chan brings us closer to understanding why Mugabe gave in to the veterans with his references to how both Mugabe and the veterans derived moral authority from the liberation war and to the veterans' threats of anarchy. But Chan misses why Mugabe could not implement his plans to "deal roughly" with the veterans. Led and dominated by vet-

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erans, the police and army were actually in cahoots with the veterans on the streets. Hunzvi had won their allegiance by promising that they too would receive pensions. Thus Mugabe had no forces to draw on to silence the veterans in the streets.

Especially for nonspecialists, the books have much to offer. Meredith's overarching narrative highlights patterns in Mugabe's behavior, Blair's account gives an intimacy to the drama of 2000–2002, and Chan never loses sight of regional and international dimensions. The books offer different perspectives on whether Mugabe sought power for its own sake or had other agendas, and whether Mugabe's liberation war violence and violence as head of state are linked or unrelated. Readers should be warned, though, that all the books are error-ridden.[3]

[3] For example, Meredith incorrectly states that Joshua Nkomo was demoted to minister in charge of the public service in 1981 (p. 61); Chan that Mugabe was imprisoned by President Kaunda in Zambia (p. 5) and that Moven Mahachi helped Mugabe to escape in 1975 (p. 184); and Blair that village collectives were the primary model of land resettlement (pp. 175–76).

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Lewis L. Gould

Foreword by Richard Norton Smith

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


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


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


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# Book Reviews

**Covering Clinton: The President and the Press in the 1990s** *by Joseph Hayden. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group. 168 pp. $55.00.*

If you find it fascinating to learn how Houdini managed to get himself into impossible situations and then magically managed to extract himself and escape to his next entanglement, this is your book. Joseph Hayden, a freelance writer and former journalist, tells the William Jefferson Clinton sequel. He starts with Clinton's 1992 run for the presidency and ends with the rainbow of speculations about the expresident's place in history.

The most astounding Houdini-like trick happened in 1992, when a badly flawed, obscure governor from a smallish southern state, who lacked support from his party's power structure, managed to propel himself into the presidency. How did he do it? How could he overcome the blemishes of rumors of corrupt real-estate dealings, evidence that he weaseled out of serving in Vietnam, and proof that he lied about engaging in repeated extramarital escapades and about using marijuana? Novel uses of peripheral media were at the heart of the trick. Hayden chronicles how a young team of inexperienced yet savvy advisers steered Clinton into new media venues like MTV, *Phil Donahue, Arsenio Hall*, and *Larry King Live*, as well as multiple town hall meetings. In these settings, his personal charm and uncanny ability to connect with people allowed him to win a large, loyal following.

By using these new media, Clinton traded the prosecutorial interrogations of traditional reporters for mostly respectful questions by young, star-struck audiences. What is more, these audiences gave him a chance to air his ideas about politics and policies in his own words, showing his impressive mastery of the field, rather than having his proposals paraphrased and often interpreted and even distorted by hostile, suspicious, cynical reporters.

Many mainstream commentators sneered at this soft, Oprah-style news that pulled at people's heartstrings and forged personal ties between the speaker and the audience, rather than inviting listeners to find faults with his policy proposals. Yet it gave Clinton the core of unwavering supporters that the would-be president so badly needed in 1992 and on many later occasions. The likes of James Carville, George Stephanopoulos, and Mandy Grunwald had invented an effective new style of political campaigning that would last beyond the 1990s.



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While the title of the book suggests that media coverage of Clinton is the main focus, this is not the case. Rather, this is a smoothly-written general account, laced with quotes from journalists and pundits, that targets the largely self-inflicted political troubles plaguing the Clinton presidency. Hayden records the boyish charm and political deftness with which Clinton extricated himself again and again from near-fatal political disasters. He also notes the president's good fortune of often benefiting from inept opponents. In the latter category, the 1996 election was a cakewalk, because Clinton faced a lackluster Republican opponent and because he was blessed with a robust economy, thanks largely to forces beyond his control. Newt Gingrich, the Republican Senate leader, who rode into power propelled by Clinton gaffes, in the end self-destructed thanks to Clintonesque flaws like political arrogance and politically damaging moves.

In most of these instances, the press, which Clinton feared and detested and often tried to manipulate, played a relatively minor role. This became especially clear during the 1996 election and during the Lewinsky scandal and subsequent impeachment procedures. A major reason for press impotence was Clinton's success in personalizing his relationship with the public and in persuading majorities to accept his framing of political events. Images based on strongly-felt personal reactions to a politician invariably override contrary images featured in news reports. Still, when Clinton and his publics pass on, the warmth of human relations will dissipate and the final verdict about the Clinton presidency will be rendered in the cold light of dispassionate scholarship. If that light focuses on Hayden's text, it will show a presidency marked by superb style and acrobatic political flexibility but short on principled actions and sorely lacking in lasting substantive political achievements.

DORIS A. GRABER
*University of Illinois at Chicago*

**Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East** *by Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar. Boulder, CO, Westview, 2002. 228 pp. $24.00.*

For decades, the Arab world was forced to rely on national presses that were often monitored or controlled by authoritarian regimes or Western media, BBC, CNN, etc. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of Arab newspapers and satellite television stations. None has been more successful nor more controversial than al Jazeera. As Americans post-September 11 struggled with the questions, "Why do they hate us?" and "Why is anti-Americanism so widespread?" few realized that a powerful source of al Jazeera's success was its graphic coverage of the second intifada or Palestinian uprising. Arabs and Muslims across the world could have their morning cup of coffee or evening dinner and see live reports from Israel-Palestine or other parts of the Muslim world, often conveying a news coverage absent in the American media.

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Americans discovered al Jazeera during the invasion of the Taliban's Afghanistan, as it provided live coverage to the world. In the ensuing days and weeks American officials like Candoleeza Rice, head of the National Security Council, and Ambassador Christopher Ross, a longtime Middle East hand fluent in Arabic, went before al Jazeera's cameras in an attempt to explain American policy to the Arab and Muslim world. In *Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East*, Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar attempt to explain the Arab world's most independent and most controversial media.

The Qatar-based satellite station is a testimony to the globalization of communications and the ability of an outlet located in a small Gulf state to attract a global audience and enjoy a global impact. The authors' analysis of the origins, influential forces, and voices of al Jazeera and the nature of its programming goes a long way toward effectively addressing the question of whether it broadcasts independent journalism or is a platform for extremists. They emphasize the diversity of its founders and staff as well as the financial support and surprising independence the station has enjoyed from their patron, the emir of Qatar. The signs of al Jazeera's most important diversity and independence come from its programming, which has included interviews with not only Arab and Muslim voices but also with Israeli, American, and European guests. Its hard-hitting journalism has targeted Arab regimes as well as the Israeli and American governments. The station has addressed political, social, and religious issues that would never have been permitted by most Arab and Muslim governments: from Jordan's King Hussein's secret relations with Israeli leaders and exposes on Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, to debates between secularists and fundamentalists on politics, sex, and polygamy. As a result, al Jazeera has been praised for its free and open journalism, accused of being a mouthpiece for fundamentalists and extremists' pandering to anti-Semitism as well as anti-Islamism, and being influenced by the Mossad and the CIA. While the U.S. government had often praised al Jazeera as a rare and important example of the development of a free and critical media, its coverage and criticism of American foreign policy in Israel-Palestine and the conduct of the American-led war against global terrorism has drawn public and private complaints to al Jazeera's patron, Qatar, from the Bush administration.

El-Nawawy and Iskandar provide rich description and detail, enabling readers, especially those that have not watched or are unable to follow its Arabic programming to see the accomplishments and pitfalls, the positives and negatives, of al Jazeera's phenomenal success. That situation will change as al Jazeera begins its English programming. While celebrating its success and global impact, the authors do not shrink from addressing hard issues and criticisms, from al Jazeera's failure to cover Qatari politics to its bias and provocative politicized coverage. In particular, they provide substantial coverage and nuanced analysis of al Jazeera's controversial role in airing Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda taped interviews. However, too often al Jazeera's

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critics forget that similar questions have been raised over the years regarding the exposure Eastern media have given to hijackers and murderers. Moreover, they gloss over the serious questions raised post-September 11 of the stark differences between the more independent European and increasingly passive American media as well as their ideological biases—from liberal to neoconservative—of American newspapers and media such as the *New York Post, Wall St. Journal, New York Times, The Nation, New Republic, Weekly Standard,* Fox News, and CNN.

One of the lessons of post-September 11 is the importance of the media as a communicator and interpreter of news as well as a formative influence on public opinion. The failures and dangers of a lack of a free press are obvious in many Arab and Muslim countries as well as the need for governments in America and Europe to communicate their message more effectively to the Muslim world. The increased talk of the need for democratization in the Arab and Muslim worlds and attempts of some governments to proceed along a path to democratization will underscore both the importance of the media and continue to draw attention to the example and track record of al Jazeera. *Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East* provides an excellent starting point for understanding the changes and challenges that are underway.

JOHN L. ESPOSITO
*Georgetown University*

**The Stakes: America and the Middle East, the Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace** *by Shibley Telhami. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2002. 204 pp. $24.00.*

Shibley Telhami, who holds the Anwar Sadat chair at the University of Maryland, is a prolific writer, researcher, and public commentator with an unusual gift for both policy analysis and rigorous theory building. This book, a popular commentary rather than an academic treatise, surveys American policy in the Middle East and provides a real-time critique of the U.S. war against terrorism.

Telhami argues for a "prudent" exercise of American power in managing the complex set of interests and threats (terrorism, Iraq, energy security, and Arab-Israeli peace) that monopolize the foreign policy agenda. "The nature of the threat revealed by the horror of 9/11 cannot be addressed through coercive power alone" (p. 3). Telhami's approach stands in stark contrast to the go-it-alone, transformative outlook common inside the Bush administration. "It should be clear that although power is an important asset for prudent diplomacy, it is not a replacement for diplomacy" (p. 169).

He criticizes the Bush White House for both its tendency toward unilateralism and its focus on the "supply" side of terrorism while ignoring the "demand" (that is, root causes). Telhami also takes Bush to task for missing an

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opportunity after September 11 to "build a comprehensive new treaty regime . . . mandating a strong collective response to attacks on civilians" (p. 10). His critique is also normative. Telhami says American "moral authority" is undermined by applying different standards to actions taken by Israel and the Palestinians.

Telhami goes to great lengths to place the new terrorist threat in a political rather than a religious context. An entire class of moderate Arab leaders—those willing to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism—is increasingly hemmed in by restive, anti-American publics denied even the most basic rights of political participation. He argues that an effective strategy against terrorism must address popular political frustrations and respond to the crisis of legitimacy sweeping the region. The legitimacy and participation dilemmas, argues Telhami, are heightened by the media revolution epitomized by television networks like al Jazeera. Still, he is cautious about prospects for democratization and pessimistic about liberal values taking root.

Explaining the politics of oil, Telhami says the U.S. acts as sole guardian of Western energy interests, guaranteeing the flow of oil to energy-hungry Europe and East Asia. Even though America's energy security policy initially focused on denying Soviet power, Washington came to challenge regional hegemons as well—first Iran in the 1980s and then both Iran and Iraq in the 1990s.

This eloquent, yet succinct volume does have its drawbacks. Telhami's attempt to provide a framework to explain "root causes" is, at times, reductionist. "Public despair and humiliation" (p. 14) and "helpless dependence" (p. 63) are not unique to the Arab world. No one would dispute that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical to stabilizing the region, yet Telhami overstates the conflict's centrality and its interconnectedness with terrorism, Iraq, and other problems besetting the Middle East. This may be partly due to his reliance on public opinion data. The Palestine issue, though central to Arab rhetoric and symbolism, is not at the substantive core of the Arab political agenda, as is oil politics and Islamism. Still, Telhami does offer a balanced assessment of the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and provides a nuanced explanation of the psychology of the conflict (for example, Palestinian victimization and Israeli insecurity).

Arguing for more public diplomacy, Telhami says Washington could do a better job explaining its policies and disseminating information on American culture and values. However, by shifting the debate from substance to form, Telhami distracts from his own arguments about the consequence of real policy decisions. A stepped-up public diplomacy campaign also raises issues of credibility.

The book concludes with a riposte against current beltway thinking that American hard power can be used to promote a democratic and liberal order. Telhami is wary of schemes to reshape the region. Instead, Washington would be better served to "cooperate, assist and inspire" other states (p. 184). As

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both an up-to-the-minute primer and a sweeping critical analysis of American policy and the Middle East, *The Stakes* is as valuable as it is economical.

SCOTT LASENSKY
*Council on Foreign Relations*

**Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security** *by David Cole and James X. Dempsey. New York, New Press, 2002. 238 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Today, frightened politicians demand the impossible—a domestic and international counterterrorism system so extensive that it will uncover all terrorist cells and interdict all attacks before they can happen. What we are likely to get instead is bureaucratic bloat with numerous agencies competing with each other, drowning each other in more information than they can possibly digest, and so often recycling rumors and speculations without source notations that they come to be accepted as fact.

As this timely and important book explains, the new homeland security system is likely to be less effective than a more narrowly focused combination of intelligence work abroad and law enforcement at home. It is also likely to be more destructive of civil liberties than anything experienced in the worst days of J. Edgar Hoover. After the embarrassing disclosures of the 1970s, most Americans thought that the FBI had gone back to being a law enforcement agency. Guidelines required its agents to suspect some sort of criminal activity before investigating political or religious groups. Wiretaps and burglaries conducted on less than probable cause were to be directed against agents of foreign powers only, that is, embassy spies. Walls of separation were supposed to keep the CIA, the National Security Administration, and the army from spying at home, while the FBI was not to evade the Fourth Amendment again by covertly using free-wheeling intelligence operations to collect legally admissible evidence for trial.

No more. Most of these walls are down, crumbling, or full of holes. Cole and Dempsey demonstrate that the FBI disregarded its own guidelines soon after they were adopted and well before the Bush administration, Congress, and the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court of Review gave them virtually cart blanche in the wake of September 11. Today the chief targets of the new surveillance are noncitizens, but the powers asserted are broad enough to encompass all Americans who support Middle Eastern charities, worship Allah, or oppose presidential wars. Since September 11 as many as 2,000 resident aliens, many with American wives and children, have been detained for months under harsh conditions without criminal charges or access to bail. A number have been subjected to secret proceedings and deported. However, not one of them appears to have been involved in, let alone convicted of, terrorist activity.

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The emphasis of this book is on two laws: the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 and the so-called Patriot Act of 2001. Both loosen legal standards for initiating intelligence wiretaps set by the already relaxed FISA of 1978. The 1996 act permits the deportation of aliens, mostly from Islamic societies, largely on secret allegations about anti-American opinions or associations and without proof of terrorist activities. The Patriot Act extends the guilt by association test to the point where the slightest association with a charitable organization labeled terrorist by our government can result not only in deportation, but prosecution for the vague crime of giving "material support" to terrorism. No specific intent to aid terrorists is required. Nor may detainees challenge the information that led the government to blacklist the charity in the first place.

But the most dangerous change has been technological, not legal. Information that used to take gumshoes thousands of hours of door-knocking to collect now can be accessed in nanoseconds by computer "data mining" by government hackers, roaming around in legally unprotected travel records, bank accounts, and e-mail messages is on the brink of destroying what little is left of the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. government is rapidly acquiring the domestic intelligence apparatus of a police state with the support of conservative judges and liberal politicians.

The authors do not just deplore these developments. They explain how our government could actually fight terrorism more effectively by respecting constitutional rights. This is a book every citizen should read and act upon.

CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE
*Mount Holyoke College*

**The Final Frontier: America, Science, and Terror** *by Dominick Jenkins. New York, Verso, 2002. 312 pp. $25.00.*

A salient feature of political discourse in the United States during the last ten to fifteen years has been the absence of any compelling and coherent alternative view from the left wing of American politics. Any ideological divide in politics and arguably in society in general seems to have narrowed. We are left with a gray center, where it is unclear where one position stops and another begins. Gone are the days of aggressive manifestos from the left, such as Howard Zinn's *Postwar America*, in which the crimes of the state are detailed and the plight of its peoples are chronicled.

It is curious that the left wing of American politics, or even those in the center, one supposes, have not responded more aggressively to actions undertaken by the Bush administration that accrue more authority to the state at the expense of individual liberties. It is equally curious why there have been no calls for greater clarity in the so-called war on terror, in which neither the adversary is defined nor an end state described that will allow us to measure progress or even judge when victory is at hand.

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Anyone wanting to read an interesting but dense book providing an unabashed left-wing view of all these issues would find Dominick Jenkins's book good food for thought. It is actually somewhat refreshing to read something putting forth a coherent argument positing that America and its conspiratorial political, social, and scientific elites are somehow responsible for the world's ills.

Jenkins's vehicle for covering the material is to first delve into the World War I-era arguments advanced by the chemical warfare service, scientists, and the political elite that the United States should develop chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. Jenkins recounts how the interests of these different communities were then packaged and sold to the public as part of an argument that it was America's duty to perpetuate and spread the liberal capitalist ideal around the world. The interesting hook into the book's opening section is a description of a training mission mounted by Billy Mitchell in 1921 over New York that demonstrated the vulnerability of American cities to aerial and chemical attack. Mitchell wanted to show that the oceans that once protected the homeland were now no defense to potentially horrific destruction. It makes for an eerie and poignant opening for the book, noting the connection to the September 11 attacks.

Jenkins's tool to unveil the nature of the elites' arguments is extensive use of content analysis from articles and speeches made by the military, scientific, and political elites of the day. Various passages are lifted from the utterances of such people as Elihu Root and General Amos Fries to support Jenkins's argument asserting the confluence of interest among these elites, their desire to perpetuate their own control over the unsuspecting masses, and their common interest in pursuit of global empire. The strength of this first half of the book is in Jenkins's meticulous research in chronicling different strands of a very interesting period in American history: the debate over issues associated with the development of chemical weapons; the search to define America's role in the post-World War I world; and the emergence of a military as a special interest group arguing for a more permanent mobilization of American society to support the armed forces.

But the fastidiousness of Jenkins's research is also one of the book's greatest liabilities and serves to deaden what is otherwise an interesting intellectual proposition. Readability is important. The first two-thirds of the book are frankly overwritten and over-researched. After an interesting opening, noting some interesting parallels between now and the 1920s, the book devolves into a turgid read, and the reader finds himself laboring through the dissection of seemingly innumerable articles and speeches all knitted together in a complicated, convoluted, and labyrinthine web by the author.

The book picks up speed again near the end, when Jenkins finally gets to the post-September 11 period, when, he notes, all the forces set in motion during the 1920s have come home to roost. Terrorists have seized the very weapons we created and insisted were necessary for global stability. The ruling elites are now firmly and irrevocably bent on perpetuating their own existence,

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controlling the unsuspecting masses through a despotic and corrupt political system, and pushing the American global empire beyond anyone's wildest dreams—all to the detriment of humanity. But unfortunately, by this point in the book exhaustion has set in and the force of the argument is lost.

Whatever one might think of left-wing interpretations of history and the causative paradigms upon which they are founded, there is educational and intellectual value to the arguments. Jenkins has mastered the paradigm, but he could have done better at packaging his message for the unsuspecting reader.

JAMES A. RUSSELL
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA*

**Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formation** *by Andrew Rudalevige. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. 296 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $18.95.*

Presidential leadership is a broad term encompassing a number of roles, including head of state, chief executive, party leader, chief diplomat, and legislative leader. It is the role of legislative leader that Andrew Rudalevige examines in *Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy*. As he seeks to find what skills presidents need to employ to move their legislative proposals through Congress, Rudalevige finds that centralization of decision making within the White House often leads to failed legislative initiatives. Presidents, according to Rudalevige, should incorporate a broad range of advisers in developing their legislative strategies, rather than rely on a small cadre within the White House.

Rudalevige's thesis stems from a growing body of literature within presidential leadership studies that presidents have increasingly expanded their White House staffs to create large in-house domestic and foreign policy advisory structures. To some degree, these large staffs have become counter-bureaucracies that develop both the policy and the legislative strategy that meets some part of the president's political agenda. Policies are often developed in a vacuum with minimal input from the departments, members of Congress, or congressional committee staff. In other words, the expertise from other institutional sources is often ignored by White House staff as they develop their legislative initiatives. Rudalevige examines the centralization of legislative policy making in the White House, testing the degree to which White House staff are successful in their legislative initiatives with minimal input from the departments or Congress.

His conclusion is that "centralization [of White House policy making] undercuts presidents in the legislative arena. Even controlling for the other factors known to matter for success, a centralizing strategy hurts presidential proposals" (p. 16). The important point that Rudalevige notes is that when presidents centralize their legislative policy apparatus in the White House, they exclude

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important sources of information in the policy development process. The departments provide far more expertise on policy issues than the White House staff, yet the White House staff continually distrusts the departments for fear that they have become coopted by their own constituencies.

Every president since Nixon has focused policy-making and legislative apparatus in the White House, choosing to minimize the input from either the departments or from Congress. The result has been an insular policy development process in the White House. White House staffs decide what policies presidents need to satisfy their campaign promises and their political agenda, and then work within the walls of the White House to create the requisite programmatic and legislative initiatives. The problem is that many programs fail in Congress because the White House staff never learned to gather enough information as they wrote their legislative proposals. Nor did the White House staff learn how to bargain among the various players for those key pieces of the program that they want to keep intact. As a result, Rudalevige finds that when White House-developed legislation moves through Congress, the proposals are easily dismantled by opponents with more knowledge of the issues, both from the departments and from Congress.

Rudalevige finds that members of Congress become particularly obstructionist when they have little input into legislation that emerges from the White House. One of the best quotes in the book is one made by Senator Lyndon Johnson during the Eisenhower administration to explain how Congress likes to be consulted in the development of key legislative initiatives. "You can put an awful lot of whiskey into a man," noted Johnson, "if you just let him sip it. But if you try to force the whole bottle down his throat at one time, he'll throw it up" (p. 113).

In order to exercise presidential leadership over the legislative agenda, the evidence put forth by Rudalevige indicates that presidents must broaden their information and their bargaining networks before they initiate legislation. This well-written and well-researched study substantially adds to the body of literature on presidential leadership, broadening our knowledge of how the White House staff can be most effectively used for moving the president's policy agenda forward in the legislative arena.

SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW
*Gettysburg College*

**Predicting Politics** *by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2002. 170 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $21.95.*

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (BDM as he is known among political scientists) has written a very provocative book, one aimed at the academic specialist, to be sure, but so highly readable as to be accessible to the conscientious general reader interested in foreign and international affairs. This short book is provoc-

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ative because it utilizes the tools of the historian and social scientist, usually deployed to understand some accumulation of past events, but here used in order to forecast the future. We scholars are much more comfortable with explaining empirical regularities that have already revealed themselves—using mathematical models, statistical estimations, and qualitative arguments in an effort to tease out explanations of the past from a competing array of theories and conjectures. A pundit or pollster perhaps goes out on a limb making predictions about events that have not yet occurred, but even here the event in question is typically quite precise and only just over the horizon. Scholars tend to be considerably more reticent. BDM, on the other hand, is a top-drawer scholar who has also made a career in forecasting. He shows his stuff here in order to convince us that just as economists have their clients, psychologists their patients, and sociologists their consultancies, political scientists are capable of marketing high-end analytical work from their own field to a user community of corporations, banks, and government bodies. The chapters of this book are to some extent a personal account of BDM's odyssey in forecasting.

By way of a roadmap, there are seven chapters in the book, each of which could stand alone as an essay. The first and third are more philosophical and methodological, providing an outline of how a social science forecaster may transform a closely argued theory into an operational methodology for what a statistician would call "out-of-sample predictions" or what in ordinary language are known as forecasts. BDM treads delicately here for two reasons. First, some of the methods and data are proprietary—owned by Decision Insights, Inc., a New York-based consulting company that has a long and successful track record of forecasting major political, economic, and social events. The occasional glimpses provided by BDM into the world of high-level sociopolitical consulting are of great interest to this reviewer and a useful exposure for many political scientists to the possibilities of doing first-rate consulting. Second, the transformation of game-theoretic arguments into an operational quantitative methodology does not constitute bedtime reading. So BDM treats this material lightly (perhaps too lightly), referring the interested reader to other of his papers and books for further elaboration. This is probably the right judgment call, but it will require many readers to put doubts and queries to one side.

Between these two chapters of forays into the methodology of forecasting is an exemplary illustration. In the second chapter, the reader is invited to return in time to early in the twelfth century in order to examine the strategic interdependence of church and state that produced the Concordat of Worms in 1122. BDM wishes, in a manner that is spectacular given its time and place but does not invoke any contemporary controversies, to demonstrate the usefulness of strategic thinking. In this case it involves the respective obligations of church and kings to one another. The pope, the Holy Roman emperor, and several other kings cut a deal that, BDM demonstrates, had long-run consequences for the Church, the papacy, and the emergence of the nation state in Europe. This, claims BDM persuasively, suggests that endogenous

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choices and strategic interaction are keys to analyzing historical events. An appreciation of the interconnected fortunes of participants leads one to focus on path interdependence, rather than path dependence. Strategic interaction, not merely the historical route by which an event is reached, determines the qualitative features of that event.

The remaining chapters develop this forecasting philosophy in heady, stimulating contexts—predicting the end of the cold war, forecasting the consequences of global democratization (with special attention to Russia and China), and pondering the future of war. BDM is careful to convey to the reader exactly what is required for good forecasting, on the one hand, and the data limits that apply, on the other. These chapters will certainly engage the international relations scholar, but also the reader of current affairs.

There are things to criticize. BDM makes much in the later chapters, for example, of the importance of democracy for economic growth, with the growing democratization of the early twenty-first century boding well for the world's future prosperity. A parallel connection between democracy and the declining frequency of war, the so-called democratic peace hypothesis, is also taken up. My hunch is that what is really important here is governmental respect for and protection of property, something necessary for the growth of domestic savings and foreign direct investment. It is the rule of law, not democracy per se, that matters. Democratic selection of leaders may be one of the most effective mechanisms for commitment to the rule of law, but not the only such guarantor of property rights. It does not surprise me that a "democracy" variable has a significant amount of statistical explanatory power, even if it is no more than a proxy for property-rights protection.

This is a quibble about interpretation, and there are surely others. But what is amazing about this book is the author's ability to convince the reader of the possibility of sociopolitical forecasting; to detail some of the twists and turns in developing a robust methodology for doing this; and finally to illustrate its plausibility, its power, and its potential.

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
*Harvard University*

**The Contours of American Politics** *by Jon Roper. Oxford, UK, Polity Press, 2002. 232 pp. Cloth, $62.95; paper, $26.95.*

In this brief book, Jon Roper attempts to encase American political institutions within the context of American political culture. He especially emphasizes the American religious experience, which he maintains has shaped American expansion, American hostility to centralized political authority, American foreign policy, and contemporary American conflicts over race, gender, and church/state issues. There is much to admire in Roper's interpretation. On balance, however, this is an unsatisfying book.

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Roper writes well; the book never fails to sustain reader interest. Although it contains few fresh ideas, the book manages to synthesize much conventional wisdom. Its chief substantive contribution lies in its attention to previously ignored religious phenomena that promote both progressive and reactionary politics in the United States. Roper also refers to much popular and high culture, suggesting—but never demonstrating—complementarity between American politics and American literature, film, and entertainment television. Finally, two of Roper's concepts are promising—the "politics of nostalgia" (heavy reliance on the past to frame contemporary politics) and the "politics of spectacle" (media-driven, entertainment based, politics). He is correct that weak ideological polarization along conventional left-right grounds favors these two kinds of politics.

Unfortunately, major defects outweigh the book's virtues. Roper ignores much relevant recent (and not so recent) research on American political culture and religion. On the latter subject, he makes no use of works by James Davison Hunter, Robert Bellah, Aaron Wildavsky, and Robert Wuthnow, among many others. Beyond religion, he does not incorporate the well-known work of Jennifer Hochschild, Tali Mendelburg, Martin Gillens, and Michael Dawson on race or Robert Putnam on political participation, among many others. The absence of important recent literature seriously weakens the analysis.

Not surprisingly, Roper produces a dated, superficial picture of American political culture, rooted in Louis Hartz's version of American exceptionalism. The usefulness of this concept today is problematic; for example, Graham Wilson has shown that there is a heavier reliance on statutory regulatory policy in the United States than in Western Europe, a fact that disputes the exceptionalism thesis, which predicts the opposite.

Roper also fails two crucial theoretical challenges. The first is to connect American political culture clearly to American political institutions. Roper suggests, but never establishes, such connections convincingly. The book is in fact schizophrenic. The early and late chapters concentrate on American political culture; the middle four chapters, constituting more than half the book, describe in textbook-like fashion American political institutions. One strains to discover linkages between the institutional chapters and the chapters on political culture.

Second, Roper does not solve the "consensus-dissensus" problem in characterizing American political culture. Is the United States best described by consensus or dissensus in its political culture, or is there a discernible, complex combination of the two? Roper tries to have it both ways, even within the space of two pages. For example, he asserts that "there has been a fragmentation in American political culture" (p. 196) over the last forty years. Yet, he writes that "a sense of continuity . . . still connects contemporary American political thought to its origins . . ." (p. 198). Reconciling these contradictory positions eludes the author.

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Perhaps no short monograph should be expected to deliver an integrated, theoretically sound, substantively novel analysis of political culture and political institutions in the United States. Certainly this book is not up to the task. One admires the author's ambition, but not his execution.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN
*The University of Wisconsin–Madison*

**The Rise of Southern Republicans** *by Earl Black and Merle Black. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002. 442 pp. $29.95.*

The 1948 Dixiecrat rebellion marked the beginning of the end of the Democratic solid South. From the end of Reconstruction to 1948, voters in the eleven states of the old Confederacy routinely gave their votes to Democratic presidential and congressional candidates. In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower carried Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, the first Republican presidential victories in the South since the 1928 contest between Herbert Hoover and Al Smith. In 2000, George W. Bush carried all eleven southern states. In 1950, the South's Senate delegation included no Republicans and twenty-two Democrats, while the House delegation included two Republicans and 103 Democrats. After the 2002 midterm elections, Republicans held thirteen of the South's twenty-two seats in the Senate and seventy-five of the region's 131 House seats.

Earl and Merle Black, both well-known political scientists, seek to explain this transformation in the electoral fortunes of the Republican party. In two previous books, the Blacks focused on the relationships among social and economic developments and political change (*Politics and Society in the South*) as well as on the South's pivotal role in presidential politics (*The Vital South*). In this book, they marshal a vast array of demographic, electoral, and polling data to identify the forces contributing to the expansion of the Republican party's presence in the South's congressional delegation.

In examining the story of the Republican rise, the Blacks tell us several related stories. First, they explain how successive generations of southern Democrats built the solid South. Second, they look at the efforts by Republican presidential candidates, beginning with Eisenhower, to first win the votes of white southerners and to ultimately win their loyalty to the Republican party. Third, the authors tell us how federal civil rights legislation sparked a far reaching transformation of southern politics, a transformation that saw the Republicans replace the Democrats as the party of choice among white southern conservatives. Finally, the Blacks show us how southern Democrats adapted to changing political realities.

The Blacks attribute the Republican ascendancy to the interplay of demographic, economic, and political forces including the in-migration of middle and upper class whites, who did not share the native white southerners' historic antipathy toward the Republican party, the out-migration of substantial num-

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bers of African Americans, the region's increasing urbanization, and the growth of the region's economy with the concomitant growth of its middle and upper classes. The political factors include the Republican party's decision to use opposition to federal civil rights legislation to attract white voters enraged by the national Democratic party's support of minority rights; the cumulative impact of successive Republican victories in presidential elections; and Ronald Reagan's success in mobilizing the Christian right on behalf of Republican candidates.

The Blacks conclude that "When the Republicans' southern breakthrough finally came in 1994, . . . it intensified and nationalized the two-party battle for control of Congress" (p. 39), a conclusion supported by the fiercely fought 2002 elections. They also conclude that the same trends contributing to the Republican rise will likely ensure a future characterized by continued two-party competition in the South, a conclusion also supported by the results of the 2002 election. Finally, the Blacks conclude that the South's prominent role in national Republican politics all but guarantees the conservative agenda pursued by the region's Republicans will "continue to pervade national politics" (p. 404).

The Blacks have a complex story to tell, and they tell it exceeding well. Unfortunately, like much contemporary social science writing, the book relies primarily on aggregate data and secondary sources. Consequently, it lacks the passion and insights one might gain from talking directly with the participants in the dramatic events of the last half century.

DAVID M. BRODSKY
*The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga*

**Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947** *by Sumit Ganguly. New York, Columbia University Press, 2002. 200 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.50.*

In 1986, Sumit Ganguly published his dissertation, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, a volume that has remained a useful source of information and interpretation, especially for students approaching this singularly conflict-ridden region. This book brings matters up to date by discussing the two countries' now overt nuclear programs and their several conflicts and near-conflicts around the turn of the millennium, but it strives for greater depth as well as reach. In a methodological preface, Ganguly modestly disclaims any skills as a diplomatic historian; nor is he writing military history, although in some sections, notably the 1971 war, there is excessive recounting of military specifics. As a positivist political scientist, he seeks to explain the unending conflict in South Asia in terms of "standard and novel historical research" (preface). His focus is on, first, the mixture of religion, ideology, and nationalism (culminating in the dispute over Kashmir) that provides a structural underpinning for the conflict; and, second,

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those continuing specific weaknesses that make it nearly impossible for India and Pakistan to overcome the structural factors. On top of these, he examines the specifics that turn a predisposition to conflict into the actual series of wars that the two countries have fought. This is a program that Ganguly carries out quite well.

The book is basically evenhanded in its treatment of India and Pakistan. Ganguly metes out criticism where it is due, and there is certainly more than enough to go around. His discussion of Pakistan's persistent failure to assess risk adequately and of India's mishandling of the internal affairs of Kashmir are exactly on target. This is undercut, unfortunately, in the first chapters by a breathtaking lack of sympathy for the very idea of Pakistan that is couched in inappropriate polemical rhetoric. *The Origins of War* handled these matters with much more nuance.

There is little in this book that will be new to the specialist; the familiar tale is told concisely with generally solid interpretation, if not the novel historical approach promised. It draws to good effect on work that Ganguly has done recently in related areas, especially the politics of that part of Kashmir that is held by India. His command of the relevant literature, much of which has appeared in the last several years, is brought usefully to bear. Although Ganguly occasionally draws on interesting propositions from international relations theory, that is not his principal concern. There is much more that could usefully be said in areas such as systems analysis, games theory applications, and conflict management. Those interested in such things will find Ganguly a good starting point and source of material, but wider applications must be sought elsewhere.

There is occasional sloppiness of detail: whether in 1971 one could have called Sikkim an "independent monarchy" in any strategic sense is perhaps open to discussion (p. 61). But negotiations between Ayub Khan and the East Pakistanis in early 1969 focused not on military rule but on revising Ayub's Basic Democracies system that had succeeded military rule. The Sino-Pakistan border agreement made possible the building of the Karakorum highway; it had nothing to do with the Tibet-Xinjiang road, which had been built through Indian-held territory.

Overall, *Conflict Unending* is a welcome successor to much-worn copies of *Sources of Conflict* on library shelves. There is no better concise presentation for those seeking a grounding in this sadly still current subject.

THOMAS PERRY THORNTON
*Johns Hopkins University*

**Future Trends in East Asian International Relations** *edited by Quansheng Zhao. Portland, OR, Frank Cass Publishers, 2002. 260 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $24.50.*

This book attempts to situate the international relations of East and South-East Asia a decade into the post-cold war and to a much lesser extent since the

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September 11 terrorist attacks. The editor concludes and several contributors largely assume realism captures the crucial trends in the region, focusing on state- and especially major-power-centered military security. Quansheng Zhao identifies the rise of the United States and China and the relative decline of Russia and Japan as the power distribution shift to which the region and its neighbors must currently adjust. Zhao sees the potential for a new cold war between the United States and China as *the* key issue in the region, a relationship that Brantly Womack characterizes as asymmetrical, where the weaker state's sense of vulnerability is exacerbated by the insensitivity of the stronger state. Thus, a central issue for the region will be the management of the supposed tensions between intensified multilateralism and enduring U.S. unilateralism (with selective "minilateralism") identified by contributors Robert A. Scalapino and Michael J. Green.

Yet Scalapino suggests that Asian governments' focus on domestic, mainly economic, issues makes interstate relations more positive and major-power war less likely than previously. The volume's most interesting contributions concern the international impact of domestic political change, informal politics, nontraditional security, and state identities, for which realism cannot satisfactorily account. Thus, Victor D. Cha challenges the irresponsible and rogue state paradigms in arguing that Asian governments seek nuclear weapons partly for prestige and respect, which they accept includes the duty not to use these weapons. Phil Deans shows how parliamentary associations in Japan circumvent the international isolation of Taiwan maintained by China's political and economic clout, creating "virtual diplomatic relations." Danny Unger argues that increasing political participation and accountability in much of the region coincides with increased economic openness and a decline in state-managed economies, one reason why the 1997 financial crisis actually increased integration into the global economy. Finally, M. Shamsul Haque blames the realist and neoliberal growth paradigms and U.S. unilateralism for blocking the multilateral cooperation needed to confront Northeast Asia's growing environmental insecurity, including, ironically, its exacerbation of traditional security concerns.

The editor's concluding chapter brings together these realist and alternative pictures of East Asian international relations. However, it does so largely by preferring the former and relegating that latter to the nonsecurity realm, sidestepping potential challenges to the very premises of realism. Still, Zhao says averting a U.S.–China cold war largely depends on less confrontational U.S. policy facilitating an internal transformation of China: realism requires a liberal caveat. Overall, however, the preoccupation of the chapters on conventional security with the potential for major-power confrontation inhibits serious exploration of alternative perspectives suggested by the book's nonrealist contributions—and even more strongly by the growing critical international relations and political economy scholarship on the region excluded from the volume. This is not to minimize the seriousness of the region's conventional security

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problems. Rather, it is to suggests that major-power confrontation is not inevitable and that movement away from realism within the academy would be a small step away from the precipice. It would reveal how realism itself constructs the region's precarious security terrain. It would direct researchers and policy makers to the myriad issues essential to meaningful, inclusive security. It would encourage analysis of the diverse nonstate actors already shaping the region's future in ways largely invisible. It would use Westphalian assumptions—allowing for the identification of alternative perspectives and paths forward. To his significant credit, the editor has begun this task by including nonrealist perspectives. However, much remains to be done.

SUSAN HENDERS
*York University, Toronto*

**Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy** *by Steve Breyman. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001. 364 pp. Paper, $23.95.*

In the fall of 2002, Germany's governing coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens (*Die Gruenen*) remained in power because of its paper-thin election victory sealed by a surprisingly good electoral performance by the Greens. After trailing in the polls for much of the campaign, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder managed to divert voters' attention from the Federal Republic's economic ills to the threat of military actions against Iraq to remove weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein's regime. Voters' categorical "no" to Germany's participation in and any support of military moves against Iraq, even if under the auspices of the United Nations, won Schroeder and his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, a well-respected leader of the Greens, decisive votes. Schroeder's refusal to support the Bush administration's Iraq policy resonated with many Germans' deep-seated fear of war.

Steve Breyman mentions this fear (in his view a result of the Vietnam War, not the Nazi legacy) as one factor that made the country a fertile ground for peace activists in the 1980s and bred a new national identity. "Rather than militaristic pride in country," he writes, "postwar West German generations identified with a nonnuclear Europe, freed from the deadly embrace of overbearing superpowers" (p. 234). The author describes how the mass movement's message of peace, its rejection of violent protest, its support by leading intellectuals, theologians, novelists, artists, actors as well as prominent figures and rank-and-file members of the Social Democratic party moved the SPD to an antimissile position and an implicit declaration of independence from Washington.

Two decades later, without being pressured by a comparable peace movement, Chancellor Schroeder rejected the Bush administration's Iraq plans with a similar statement of independence albeit in the different geopolitical

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circumstances of the post-cold war era. The chancellor's position must have pleased the author, who warns in the book's closing chapter that "[e]ternal vigilance is needed to protect the movement's achievements because they are vulnerable and fragile to erosion" (p. 276). Noting that more recently former peace activists were disappointed by the popular support in the United States and elsewhere for post-cold war military interventions, especially with respect to the Gulf War and economic sanctions against Iraq, Breyman is nevertheless hopeful that the values of the international peace movement of the 1980s have become part of the "collective culture."

This may well be true in the case of Germany, where the movement affected the Social Democrats in the 1980s and beyond and was instrumental in building support for the Greens, whose grassroot activists entered the Bundestag in 1983. The Greens evolved into a viable political party and a forceful voice for peace, human rights, environmental protection, and economic and social justice in the domestic and global setting. But in the American setting, there is no comparable evidence of the peace movement's lasting legacy—especially not in the aftermath of the events of September 11.

Breyman's interesting account of the West German movement's struggle against the deployment of euromissiles from 1979 to 1986 focuses especially on the evolution in the relationship between the peace advocates and the anti- and pro-deployment wings of the SPD, but he gives also a detailed account of its effects on the relationships between and policy positions of Washington, Moscow, Bonn, and Brussels in the wake of the 1979 double-track NATO decision concerning the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe, most of them on West German soil.

The author reveals up front that he was an activist in the antimissile movement and remains active in several environmental, peace, and justice movements and organizations. His analyses and assessments never leave any doubt that they reflect the views of a committed participant, not a detached observer. The same is true for the foreword by Helen Caldicott, a prominent activist in the peace movement, who concludes that "the world was saved from nuclear Armageddon—not by Reagan and his cronies 'outspending' the Soviet Union, but by the passionate, persistent, often brilliant work of millions of people worldwide."

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
*Columbia University*

**Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife** *by Ronald Bruce St. John. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. 296 pp. $47.50.*

In the mid-1980s, *Time* magazine ran a cover describing the Libyan ruler Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi as "the most dangerous man in the world." At a time

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when the Soviet Union merited designation as the "evil empire" and memories of Hitler and Stalin were still very much alive, this was a remarkable claim, though given the hysteria that attended U.S.–Libyan relations, it was not implausible. Yet barely fifteen years later, the mantle had fallen to another tyrant, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and at the opening of the new century, few Americans had any idea what Qaddafi had been up to in recent years. The omission of Libya from the George W. Bush administration's post-September 11 "Axis of Evil" came as a surprise to most casual observers, but it was by no means inadvertent.

As Ronald Bruce St. John amply documents in this comprehensive and thorough, if somewhat colorless, review of U.S.–Libyan relations, the recent history is quite instructive. (Much of the *two centuries of strife* was actually the 160 years or so between the piracy wars of the early 1800s and the last several decades, during which time the two countries had no contact at all, and St. John gives that history its perfunctory due.) St. John concludes, as many other analysts have, that American proclamations to the contrary, the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya did little to change Qaddafi's policy: "his support of state-sponsored terrorism might now be more circumspect, but he remained adamantly opposed to the international status quo and determined to employ all of Libya's resources to overthrow it" (p. 139). As the United States itself was to claim, he attempted to develop weapons of mass destruction, and Libya was at least tangentially involved in the downing of the civilian passenger Lockerbie and UTA flights in the late 1980s. St. John's treatment of the Lockerbie affair is appropriately guarded about Libya's culpability; many analysts still believe that it was a collaborative operation involving non-Libyan—probably Palestinian—actors as well.

The first Bush administration, in trying to assess and meet the post-cold war threats to the United States, developed the strategy of isolating "rogue states"—of which Libya was an exemplar, along with Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's 1993 Regional Defense Strategy document embodied a shift from global containment to regional assertiveness. Libya's failure to produce the Lockerbie suspects for trial ended in UN sanctions. As St. John points out, this was only the second time the UN imposed sanctions for failure to comply with Security Council resolutions, the first having been prompted by Iraq's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait.

The Clinton administration extended the experiments with UN sanctions on both Iraq and Libya. In the Libyan case, and perhaps in part because there were specific and easily achievable actions the Libyan government could take—the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects—the UN sanction regime accomplished what the U.S. bombing did not: a substantial change in Libyan foreign policy. The Organization of African Unity, led by South African President Nelson Mandela, a longstanding comrade in the struggle against racism and imperialism, encouraged Qaddafi to deliver the suspects and called for lifting the sanctions. In 1998, Qaddafi agreed to the trial, and the UN sanctions were suspended.

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Low-level contacts between the United States and Libya commenced at the end of the Clinton administration. To Libya's disappointment, in August 2001, the act governing the separate U.S. sanctions, which covered both Libya and Iran, was extended by the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless, merely a month later, Libya provided lists of terrorist suspects to the CIA, as the United States prepared to mount its "war on terror" after the attacks of September 11. Libya proved to be a surprisingly useful ally in that war. Although domestic politics falls largely outside St. John's purview, he does report evidence of the domestic unrest throughout the 1990s, and much of this opposition was linked to al Qaeda; Libya and the United States then faced the same opponents.

St. John's story ends with the September 11 attacks. Since then, low-profile contacts have continued and the Libyans have begun discussions about providing compensation to the families of Lockerbie victims—a substantial lobby group surprisingly absent in St. John's discussion of U.S. foreign policy. Despite these several lacunae, this is an extremely useful guidebook to recent U.S.–Libyan relations and implicitly a provocative case study of the relative merits of multilateral sanctions and unilateral military action.

LISA ANDERSON
*Columbia University*

**Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests** *by Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. 248 pp. $39.95.*

For students of international relations who may be asking questions about why the international system seems so dysfunctional, notwithstanding efforts by intergovernmental organization to maintain peace and security, this book presents contentious answers. Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr. sets out to demonstrate that robust, second-generation peacekeeping in the 1990s did not work in internal wars. This is hardly a new proposition, but the author presents a useful reminder of the distinctions between peacekeeping and other forms of military operation. The blanket term, "peacekeeping" was stretched into meaninglessness, particularly in the United States, which had virtually no experience of it during the cold war and hardly any understanding of it afterward. Curiously, however, Fleitz's insistence on a meaningful vocabulary does not extend to the term "peace enforcement," which is misleadingly employed to encompass the Korean War and the 1991 Gulf War.

The book examines in some detail various cases of misused peacekeeping. There is a degree of oversight regarding the negative role of the U.S. government and forces in some of the fiascoes, notably in Rwanda and Somalia. In regarding them as profligate, Fleitz also seems to perpetuate the myth about the costs of peace operations. On the contrary, at approximately 1/300$^{th}$ of the U.S. defense budget they actually amount to a drop in the ocean. However,

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the main burden of the author's critique is directed at U.S. involvement in such operations at all. His strictures are not leveled at peacekeeping per se, which in its traditional, blue helmet role, he considers to be commendable. Rather, what was reprehensible was the distraction from national interests (as imagined by Fleitz) and the business of military competence that was apparently caused by U.S. involvement in peace support operations. There are of course many ways in which policy elites can construct the meaning of national interests and in which these interests can be pursued. Fleitz's prescription is for the United States to focus on its combat power, using the UN when it serves a particular purpose such as counterterrorism.

The book does not, therefore, dismiss the UN as satanic, but its early years are represented as a hotbed of intrigue against the United States. The subversion of UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and the UN's use as an instrument of U.S. policy in the cold war and afterward hardly fit with this argument. For scholars interrogating the crises of the international system the book's argument can be interpreted as reinforcing a variety of fundamentalism that constructs a Manichean world of fateful struggle. The United States is here depicted as a progressive, democratic, and freedom-loving state, though seemingly from Fleitz's evidence to be constantly fearful of the "evils" outside in spite of its massive military power. Evidence that would challenge the construction is conspicuously but unsurprisingly absent from such narratives as U.S. support for Israeli policy toward Palestinians; U.S. support for human rights-abusing dictatorships and guerrilla movements such as the Marcos, Samoza, and Pinochet regimes; Savimbi's UNITA; and the Taliban and Hussein's Iraq. The author was an analyst for the CIA and worked closely with the Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton administrations.

MICHAEL PUGH
*University of Plymouth, UK*

**Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia** *by Louis Sell. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2002. 392 pp. $34.95.*

Understanding how Slobodan Milosevic came to power, what he did with that power, and how the international community responded to the challenges Milosevic posed sheds light not only on what went so wrong in Yugoslavia but also on what can be done to prevent similar disasters. Louis Sell, a former foreign service officer with eight years of service in Yugoslavia, has the kind of background that permits him to craft a compelling account of the Milosevic legacy. More than a biography, *Sloboban Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* offers a readable account of both the domestic Yugoslav side of the country's collapse and the history and consequences of international interventions in the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Central to Sell's account is the thesis that Yugoslavia in the mid-1980s was a "functioning multiethinic society" (p. 33) and "not inevitably doomed to

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disappear" (p. 33). It took power-hungry, self-serving politicians like Milosevic to violently tear the country apart. While Milosevic takes top billing as the villain in Sell's narrative, he shares the stage with his wife, Mira Markovic, and other Serbian chauvinists, in particular the Serbian intellectuals in the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) whose 1986 Memorandum "constituted the intellectual underpinnings for the destruction of Yugoslavia" (p. 46). The international community, Sells finds, is also blameworthy for ignoring the portending debacle in Yugoslavia and then "rediscovering Yugoslavia—but too late" (p. 144).

The book is at its best when Sell incorporates firsthand accounts drawn from his years in Yugoslavia: Serbs and Croats singing nationalists songs to each other in 1974 and being stopped by police; Serbian women in Kosovo keening hysterically over the death of a Serb army recruit shot dead by an Albanian conscript. The book could have benefited from more detailed firsthand accounts. However, Sell's unwillingness to tread too far into the first-person is not a major drawback. He skillfully draws upon extensive interviews as well as on previously published work, including that of Milosevic's Serbian biographer, Slavoljub Djukic.

Milosevic appears in Sell's account as a narcissist who is at the same time an affable drinking buddy and a ruthless power-hungry tyrant. "Take away Slobodan Milosevic's interest in power and the man is pretty much a cipher," Sell declares (p. 171). A mediocre student from a dysfunctional family, Milosevic through sheer hard work and single-minded pursuit of power clawed his way to the top of a decaying Yugoslav political system. "One element of Milosevic's genius for retaining power," Sell remarks, "was his ability under pressure to make tactical concessions that over the long-run act to defeat his enemies" (p. 260). A political chameleon with no moral compass, Milosevic has the ability to masterfully charm and manipulate international diplomats while ruthlessly pursuing his own personal goals. Sell adroitly observes that one of the few constants in Milosevic's personality is mendacity, noting that "few political leaders share Milosevic's capacity not only for lying but also for actually appearing to be believing their own lies" (p. 173).

One of the very best lines of this well-written book concerns the irony in the international community negotiating with Milosevic over a peace plan for Bosnia. "The arsonist was enlisted to extinguish the fires he himself created," Sell writes (p. 168 ). Adding to the absurdity of the situation, after Milosevic became the guarantor of peace in Bosnia, NATO troops bombed him into submission over Kosovo, and then international prosecutors hauled him to the Hague for war crimes trials concerning both Bosnia and Kosovo. How did this happen? This close study of Slobodan Milosevic succeeds in helping us answer this question.

JULIE MERTUS
*American University*

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**Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law** *by Brian D. Lepard. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 528 pp. $55.00.*

This is a capacious monograph on a hotly-debated, multifaceted topic with major current implications. Elucidating the complex web of issues that undergird humanitarian intervention demands understanding of coexisting, complementary, yet sometimes discreet themes. The methodological elements analyzed in this interdisciplinary probe embrace every possible dimension of modern public life and contemporary philosophical discourse.

This study thus needs to weave skillfully a variety of compelling normative and practical concerns. These problems include how American foreign policy is conceptualized, formed, and executed; what the United Nations Charter, subsequent jurisprudence, statutes, and decisions of international bodies, substantially and procedurally, provide for such contingencies; and how the Security Council, along with related UN agencies, decide and operate. What are the viable options available to leaders, activists, and diplomats before they are within their respective powers in authorizing a humanitarian intervention, and on which legal and administrative grounds may coercive force be used.

Attendant to that investigation is the need to articulate the relevant principles of international law. This entails the study of the growing body of humanitarian law that helps decide what gross, systematic violations of fundamental human rights warrant military intervention. A realistic strategy for enforcement must, therefore, confront the core elements affecting the practice of global politics in an era in which mass media instantly brings photos of distant calamities to comfortable, primarily Western audiences, who in turn demand immediate action to resolve the crisis from their own governments.

While most scholars agree that a multilateral expedition is preferable to unilateral interventions, control of troops and the reintroduction of peaceful conditions ("nation building") is easier when more impartial institutions and disinterested countries are involved. A framework for the command and composition of multinational forces to be employed in such engagements is also a controversial aspect.

Brian D. Lepard, an associate professor of law at the University of Nebraska, successfully answers the enormous challenge of sorting out these intricate, seemingly insoluble obligations. He is pleading in essence for a cautious universal patriotism. It would offer help to needy and vulnerable groups based on reasonable, pragmatic criteria that would duplicate the care and concern sovereign states exhibit toward their own citizens through a trust theory of government and limited state sovereignty.

This treatise is methodologically sound, informative, and well-researched. For example, Lepard superbly identifies and delineates several layers of human rights and argues for the need to defend the most essential of them.

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The book closely analyzes recent brutal conflicts, drawing lessons from delays in response and deployment of United Nations, American, and other forces in recent atrocities across the globe. These human tragedies include the Balkan wars, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Haiti. Lepard analyzes the manner by which the UN and the United States decided to intervene. He shows why and how they subsequently did change some regimes and improve situations in certain oppressive states and troubled regions.

This compendium offers a judicious balance between law, international relations, and history. Intricate legal, political, and ethical issues are comprehensively reasoned and argued. The writing is sophisticated, yet can be read by laypersons and undergraduates. It is buffeted by figures, for example, on what may constitute customary international law and on what are the principles of general law in this context. This book includes a ten-page useful glossary, nineteen pages of selective bibliography, and a highly-detailed index.

The primary audience for this type of scholarship would likely be specialists in related fields of international relations, international law, international organizations, and the like.

ITAI SNEH
*John Jay College, City University of New York*

**Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.–Mexico Boundary** *by Joseph Nevins. New York, Routledge, 2002. 286 pp. Paper, $17.95*

**Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration** *by Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2002. 256 pp. $29.95.*

Together, these volumes add significantly to the literature on Mexican migration. Both are free of the uninformed claims and inflammatory language that characterizes so much of the literature on this topic. For example, neither engages the debate regarding the "quality" of immigrants' argument made by George Borjas and Peter Brimelow. Moreover, by locating Mexican immigration within the context of the effect that globalization has on nation-state boundaries, Nevins exposes the bankruptcy of Samuel Huntington's ideological anti-Mexican immigrant stance

Although both are historically rooted, these studies differ significantly in their conceptualization and objectives. Massey et al. focus primarily on the origin and evolution of Mexican migration and argue that recent U.S. policies have disrupted well-established practices to create the contemporary immigration crisis. Their ultimate goal is to suggest policy alternatives to manage Mexican immigration in the future. Nevins takes a more historical and broader focus to show that the contemporary immigration crisis reflects U.S. state-building processes and is also largely a product of American politics. His

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objective is to convince the reader that the processes that have given rise to the current crisis must be abandoned in favor of policies that recognize the limits of historically defined state prerogatives.

*Beyond Smoke and Mirrors* begins with an excellent overview of the theoretical literature on migration. It links that literature to four questions: Why do people migrate? What are the forces in receiving societies that draw migrants? What are the motivations, goals, and aspirations of the migrants? What are the social and economic structures that arise in the course of migration that connect sending and receiving countries? Massey et al. clearly demonstrate that no one theory answers all of these questions satisfactorily, and the authors argue that to explain international migration requires a synthetic approach to theory construction that incorporates insights from each of the dominant theoretical formulations in contemporary studies of migration.

Their review of the history of Mexican migration makes clear how various U.S. interests have competed to define legal and illegal immigration as part of the effort to control overall patterns of Mexican migration. The authors argue that political debates and legal enforcement efforts aside, a migration regime developed following the termination of the Bracero program that met the needs of migrants, Mexican society, and the U.S. labor market. In other words, in what became a highly ritualized routine, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nominally controlled the border and arrested and returned large numbers of undocumented workers, the majority of whom everyone knew would continuously pursue reentry until they were successful. This pattern continued until the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was enacted in 1986 in response to increasing public concern over the flood of illegals.

Contrary to expectations, the authors note that IRCA's major accomplishment was not to reduce the number of immigrants and undocumented workers. Instead, by making it harder to cross the border, IRCA's main effect was to reduce return migration. That is, the cost of crossing the border became so high that once in the United States, undocumented workers reduced the frequency with which they had previously returned to Mexico. IRCA, in other words, converted them into residents from sojourners.

Fueling this transformation was a campaign linking undocumented migration to a three-pronged threat to national security. As a group, undocumented immigrants were described as flooding the nation; individually, they were referred to as invaders and terrorists. The ease with which they entered produced the image that the border was so porous that it was facilitating drug smuggling by immigrants as well as by organized crime. Massey and his coauthors argue that these images came together to create the demand for a new immigration regime that led to the destruction of the arrangements that had functioned so well since the end of the Bracero program. Ironically, this new approach was developed to prevent further integration with Mexico while the push was on to fully integrate the U.S. and Mexican economies via the North American Free Trade Agreement.

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To set the stage for its policy recommendation, the study lists eight "scientific truths" about immigration such as "international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development but from development itself" and "immigrants are generally responding to a strong and persistent demand that is built into the structure of postindustrial economies" (pp. 145–146). As further legitimization of its sound policy recommendations, it couches these in the language of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its principal recommendations include increasing Mexico's quota of immigrant visas to 60,000 from the 20,000 that all countries receive as well as 300,000 guest worker visas. The latter would pay a $300 fee that would generate over $1 billion annually that would be used to help finance Mexican development and decrease emigration over time. Additionally, a guest worker program would generate great savings by reducing the cost of enforcing border security and employer sanctions.

Nevins's *Operation Gatekeeper* deals with many of these same issues even though its focus is much sharper. Specifically, he analyzes how the "illegal alien" was created and became central to immigration issues. His argument is nestled in the politics of American state building. The effort to control immigration, which includes defining who has the right to be here and who must be kept out, cannot be separated from the on-going struggle of the United States to define and protect its borders. This provides an explanation for border enforcement that supercedes the globalization of the national economy and culture. As evidence of the legitimacy of states to pursue such policies, Nevins notes that Mexican officials are collaborating with U.S. efforts to slow emigration.

Their value notwithstanding, it is troublesome that neither study examines how Mexican politics affect emigration. Neither asks how economic and political policies of the Mexican state influenced emigration. Could the state have adopted national development plans that would have slowed migration? Did the state use its development plans to reward its political supporters and punish its critics and opponents? Could a less corrupt state have developed a regime such that citizens would be willing to contribute to the creation of a more prosperous and just society rather than exit the nation in search of a better life? Massey et al. (like other sociologists and economists who study migration) can offer no answer to these questions, since their analysis ignores how the policies of sending and receiving states can influence migration. Given that Nevins's focus is on how U.S. politics affected immigration, it may be unfair to expect him to address how internal Mexican politics affect emigration. Nonetheless, given his political concerns and his acknowledgement that Mexican politics also affects these issues, it is a loss that he did not also consider the effect Mexican politics have on emigration per se. More significantly, this omission reinforces the dominant but mistaken perspective that characterizes the otherwise

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excellent study by Massey et al. that states have virtually no role in shaping migration and that the Mexican state in particular has no responsibility for the unfortunate fate that so many of its citizens must endure.

RODOLFO O. DE LA GARZA
*Columbia University*

**Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America** *by Daniel J. Tichenor. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. 392 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.95.*

This is a very good history of American immigration policy over the last two centuries, and the most systematic, detailed, and well-structured overview available today on everything from Chinese exclusion in the 1880s to Third World inclusion after 1965.

Having said this, the price to pay for the historical sweep and great attention to detail, the two really big virtues of this book (especially in their combination!), is a certain fuzziness of the theoretical agenda. Naturally, the approach is historical-institutionalist, which to me is a residual term for everything not rational choice. Tichenor offers a scheme of four factors that structures the narrative—"historically changing political institutions," "policy alliances," "privileged expertise," and "international pressures" (p. 10). At one level, this is a useful scheme to bring some order to the massive history that is being unfolded here. But how useful is it as an explanatory tool? In an ironic way, it makes history disappear, and a grinding repetition of the self-same possibilities takes its place.

Let me illustrate this with respect to "privileged expertise," one of the elements of the four-factor scheme. In my view, the eugenics and "scientific" racism informing the 1924 National-Origins Act was the only time that expertise (or rather what passed as such) had really shaped or at least legitimized policy. The eugenics debate surrounding the National-Origins Act was an instance of what James Scott called "high modernism," the rational planning of society *more geometrico*. While nauseatingly present in the Dillingham Commission at century's beginning, there is no inch of knowledge-based social engineering in the Hesburgh and Jordan Commissions at century's end. The whole project of high modernism had faltered in the meantime, also because society became more autonomous and sophisticated. Even a half-witted twenty-first-century man or woman knows that for every expertise there is counterexpertise. This neutralizes privileged expertise as a factor shaping immigration policy, or at the very least it now has a greatly reduced status. The four-factor scheme is incapable of catching this fundamental difference over time.

The "central puzzle" of this book is "why . . . expansive and restrictive policy regimes have emerged from American immigration politics over time"

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(p. 2). Here the same cyclical, schematic view is present again. To me, there's only one fundamental break in American immigration policy: the change from an ethnoracial to a nonethnic, universalist policy in the mid-1960s. Everything else is footnotes. Tichenor shows, absolutely correctly, that expansionism and a universalist immigration policy prevailed in the 1990s over some challenges to this, but he attributes this to "path dependence." Short of path dependence, the xenophobia or racism inherent in America's multiple traditions is lurking around the corner. That's the Americanist-cum-political-scientist blinded by the tools of his craft. All countries in the West, not just the United States, turned away from ethnoracist immigration policies at about the same time, as much as all of them had practiced such policies at an earlier time. Since World War II, there has been a fundamental rupture in Western culture with the demise of "scientific" racism and nationalism and the rise of universal human rights norms. It's not just path dependence and sunk costs that prevent a roll-back, but a fundamental cultural principle that even Peter Brimelow (a notorious polemicist on Third World immigration) has to take for granted.

Don't misunderstand me. This is a very good book, whose quality is proved by the very disagreement that it may provoke. It will be my book of choice on American immigration policy.

CHRISTIAN JOPPKE
*Russell Sage Foundation*

**The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena** *by Thomas Borstelmann. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002. 370 pp. $35.00.*

During the fifty-five years or so since World War II, it has been unusual for the federal government to give its undivided attention to civil rights and rarer still for foreign policy toward southern Africa to occupy center stage. Almost never did policy makers link American civil rights to the world-wide advance of decolonization and majority rule. Yet as Thomas Borstelmann argues, these two movements were inescapably intertwined. While the attention of American governments, at least into the 1990s, was riveted on the Soviet Union and the activities of its allies and clients, an enormous change was occurring out of focus, a development that the author argues is in many respects more important than the defeat of Soviet communism. To follow this alternative history, from the apex of white supremacy in the early twentieth century to the present, is to recognize that America had "emerged as the multicultural leader of a multicultural world" (p. 271).

The question Borstelmann tries to answer is how this momentous change came about: what forces, intentional or not, combined to loosen the grip of white supremacy in America and in the Third World. Building on his earlier study of civil rights and apartheid during the Truman administration (*Apar-*

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*theid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War*, 1993), he argues that the issue of anticommunism had a profound effect on progress toward racial justice. Opposition to Soviet advances meant the need to court allies like former colonial powers and white supremacists in Southern Africa. At the same time, Harry Truman and his advisers sought to woo emerging Third World nations.

Borstelmann's new work extends this analysis through the twin collapse of communism and apartheid in the early 1990s. While the story extends to the present, his primary interest is in presidential administrations from Truman through Johnson. The period after 1972 receives far less attention, in part because civil rights had become established in the United States, and perhaps because the forces that eventually undermined apartheid had begun their long march. On his stage, the cast of players is fascinating because most of them were forced to play conflicting roles. Thus Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter, who to one degree or another were committed to advancing civil rights in the United States, compromised their efforts because of internal opposition, public opinion, and the sacrifice of their best intentions to policies and alliances demanded by the cold war. On the other hand, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Richard Nixon were less apt to understand American blacks, but sometimes had to act on behalf of civil rights. Borstelmann's heroes (if there are any) are southerners like Carter and Bill Clinton, and to a lesser extent the two other southern presidents of the period, Truman and Johnson.

The wild card in this story, of course, is the cold war. American competition with the USSR gave rise to grave contradictions: alliances with racist, anticommunist southern senators and white supremacists in southern Africa, and, on the other hand, policies encouraging Third World nations to accept American models of democracy. Inevitably, this is a complicated story, and not surprisingly, the author finds ironies at every turn in policy.

The result is a fine and subtle book, well researched, and written with energy and passion. It is filled with interesting anecdotes and skillfully drawn presidential portraits. Still, the book raises questions. Didn't the efforts of American presidents to manage the rights revolution at home and abroad actually succeed after all despite his criticism of their compromises? And is the author entirely correct in his optimistic declaration that prejudice and discrimination in America are now outside the mainstream?

JAMES GILBERT
*University of Maryland*

**Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and Their Practices** *by Fritz Plasser with Gunda Plasser. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. 424 pp. $64.95.*

The study of election campaigning has developed in leaps and bounds over the past twenty years or so. Long sidelined as the preserve of journalists like

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Theodore White or campaign consultants producing kiss-and-tell accounts of how they secured victory for their candidate, the professional political science community tended on the whole to steer clear, preferring instead to focus on electoral outcomes. From about the late 1980s onward, the election campaigns began to move center-stage, coinciding with the dealigning tendencies of voters that necessitated greater attention to why they were more inclined to change their vote from one election to the next and developments in political science that made such analysis possible. As with so much else in political science, much of the research has focused on tendencies in the United States, with a growing number of publications tracking a process of change in how parties and candidates fight elections.

Comparativists are interested in exploring how campaigns have been evolving in other countries, and the degree to which there are similarities with the U.S. trends. Inevitably, this has drifted into the more general political science debate about the "Americanization" of politics, about whether the United States is blazing a trail (in this case, in terms of campaign practices) that other countries must inevitably follow. Fritz Plasser is one of the most prominent scholars working in this area, and this book, the first ever comparative monograph on election campaigns, is the logical conclusion of his years of research of this question.

The principal contributions of this book are twofold: it presents hard evidence on different campaign practices across the world; it includes a definitive review of, to my mind, just about everything that has been written on this subject. The main data source is the "Global Consultancy Survey," a survey of 592 campaign practitioners (campaign consultants and party staffers) in forty-three countries that was carried out between January 1998 and August 2000. There is reference to an additional in-depth survey of twenty-four "leading American overseas consultants" (p. 9), and the authors also make extensive use of various summary indicators of the wider electoral environment (for example, electoral laws, campaign finance, access to TV or the internet, and so on).

The book's fourteen chapters are arranged into three parts: exploring the theme of Americanization, and the institutional and cultural limits to this; assessing variations in campaign environments; and developing a global typology of campaign practices. The findings are persuasive, namely that the largely technologically-driven tendencies toward more professional campaign styles are constrained by cultural and institutional imperatives, including such things as the importance of parties, or restrictions on media access. This results, if anything, in a hybridization of campaign practices. In short, there is no single pattern of campaign modernization common to all countries, although some regional trends are apparent.

While there is much to be admired about this study, it is not without some blemishes. For instance, I would have liked to see more detail about the survey (an appendix setting out the questionnaire; more information on the respondents and the timing of the survey). The book could have done with

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more careful editing to cut its length (some of the chapters were repetitive); in places the authors were on shaky ground (especially in their categorization of electoral systems). But none of this should take away from the fact that this book makes a very important contribution to our understanding of how campaigns are changing across the world. It deserves to be read widely by scholars and practitioners alike, and for that reason I would urge the publisher to hurry up and produce a paperback version.

DAVID M. FARRELL
*University of Manchester, UK*

**Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability**
*2nd ed. by Mark J. Rozell. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002. 212 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $16.95.*

The first edition of this book appeared at a time when executive privilege, Rozell explains, had become "dormant." In the wake of Watergate, presidents were not eager to claim a privilege that helped send Richard Nixon out of town. Presidents from Gerald Ford to George H. W. Bush moved cautiously and with circumspection when denying documents to Congress. But the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Rozell notes, "changed all that." Each demonstrated a willingness "to reestablish the viability of executive privilege as a legitimate presidential power" (p. x). Clinton lost repeatedly in the courts, but his litigation strategy may have won him some time during the enveloping scandal that led to his impeachment.

On 12 December 2001, George W. Bush made his first claim of executive privilege, deciding to withhold documents related to FBI corruption three decades ago in its Boston office. To protect its informers, including some who committed murder, the FBI decided to let innocent people spend decades in prison. Certainly it was a curious and maladroit choice by Bush, making me wonder what his attorneys in the White House Counsel's office were thinking (or not thinking). Eventually, Bush was forced to back down.

These Clinton and Bush initiatives provided the impetus for Rozell's second edition. He wrote the first edition largely to rebut the influential writings of Raoul Berger, who called executive privilege a "myth." Rozell wanted to show that there were legitimate, if limited, reasons for presidents to invoke executive privilege. He hoped that presidents would resurrect the power, using good judgment. To his disappointment, Clinton and Bush chose battlegrounds and issues that "have done far more damage to this constitutional principle than if they had just followed the lead of their predecessors and avoided executive privilege as much as possible" (p. x).

Rozell explains the legal standards set forth by federal courts, especially the ones handed down during the Clinton years. Courts at times have a legitimate role in policing these disputes, but Rozell concludes that the confronta-

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tions between Congress and the executive branch are "best handled outside the courts through an accommodation process" (p. x). This position is on strong ground. Few of the disputes reach the courts, and when they do judges often try to push the two contending sides toward a solution they can live with. Whatever legal standards have been adopted by the courts are generally far too general to dispose of the concrete cases that make their way into court.

In the Watergate tapes case, Rozell points out that the Supreme Court "made it clear that when a claim of privilege is made to protect national security or foreign policy deliberations, that claim is often difficult for another branch to overcome in a balancing of constitutional powers" (p. 164). It might be difficult for the judiciary, which was the only issue at stake in the lawsuit. But the Court specifically noted that the case had nothing to do with congressional access. Under the Constitution, lawmakers are granted many specific duties and powers over national security and foreign policy.

Rozell has performed an important public service by placing these issues in a workable structure that recognizes the legitimate needs of Congress for executive branch documents, while at the same time explaining why presidents have the right at times to say no. The book is lucid, balanced, and tightly reasoned. Rozell relies extensively on documents located in presidential libraries and maintains a valuable network of scholars and practitioners, many from the congressional committees and executive agencies that were personally involved in confrontations over documents. The result is an excellent book that provides needed guidance on a topic that bedevils every administration.

LOUIS FISHER
*Congressional Research Service*

**Out of Bounds, Out of Control: Regulatory Enforcement at the EPA**
*by James V. DeLong. Washington, DC, CATO Institute Press, 2002. 120 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $8.95.*

This provocative book asks if the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement procedures and activities are consistent with the rule of law. James DeLong defines two models of regulatory enforcement. The first is the compliance model, where the job of agency enforcers is to help the regulated community comply with the rules. The second is the law enforcement model, which regards the private sector as a collection of profit maximizers who will seize any opportunity to break the rules. DeLong argues that while some EPA programs utilize the compliance model, most adhere to the law enforcement model.

Any balanced analysis of all of EPA's many programs would come to the opposite conclusion. In my view, a lack of balance is the major problem with this work that views all of EPA's programs through the lens of its enforcement activities. For example, EPA's water supply, underground tank, sewage treat-

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ment, and toxic waste clean-up programs tend to focus most of their resources and effort on nonenforcement issues, and less than 25 percent of EPA's resources are devoted to enforcement.

DeLong considers much of EPA's enforcement practices to be arbitrary. He notes that strict compliance with EPA regulations is extremely difficult, because environmental requirements are so complex. Thus, EPA is in a position to take action against virtually any regulated entity it chooses to attack. According to DeLong, the agency has total discretion over whether to treat a particular offense as a serious criminal case or a minor administrative matter. In his view, enforcement activities are thus inevitably arbitrary, and this arbitrariness not only violates the rule of law, but also undermines environmental protection. His analysis appears to assume that enforcement resources in EPA are infinite, that EPA regulators do not work for the president, that the courts do not play a role in the regulatory process, and that EPA never loses enforcement cases.

DeLong asserts that EPA has adopted a policy of using the enforcement process to revise and extend laws and regulations, a development that he believes has serious implications for the concept of the rule of law. According to DeLong, if EPA learns that companies are interpreting an ambiguous rule in a manner of which it disapproves, it issues an interpretation and applies it retrospectively, arguing it has only clarified what was always the companies' duty. Rulemaking this way short-circuits the formal regulatory process. The heart of this work's argument is that the EPA uses the enforcement process to make new law. Again, this argument assumes that EPA's actions are not reviewed by the courts.

The book also examines the tension created by the bifurcation of enforcement authority between the EPA and state governments. DeLong believes that this divided responsibility has encouraged partisan grandstanding, double jeopardy, and confusion in the regulated community. He believes that without EPA, states would emphasize compliance rather than enforcement, encourage companies to fix their own problems, and view enforcement as a last resort. The book concludes with an analysis of potential reforms to the system.

The value of this book is that it promotes a reexamination of EPA's enforcement program. The author is correct in noting that there are problems with regulation as a means of influencing corporate behavior, and these problems should be discussed. However, a true debate would be better served by a book that is less biased and misleading, and puts enforcement in the broader perspective of U.S. environmental policy. In the third of a century since EPA was established, it has stimulated real progress in addressing our environmental crisis—an accomplishment ignored in this book.

STEVEN COHEN
*Columbia University*

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**The Accountable Juggler: The Art of Leadership in a Federal Agency** *by Beryl A. Radin. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Books, 2002. 160 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

After spending a career studying the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and working there twice, Beryl Radin has written about how HHS fits into the broader political world. Using a hypothetical HHS secretary nominee preparing for his confirmation hearings as a narrative tool, Radin describes the accountability challenges that come with running a department with 60,000 employees who administer more than 300 programs and over $400 billion in annual appropriations.

Accountability is often thought of in terms of constraints—political, fiscal, legal, or professional—or efficiencies. These types of accountability operate differently on the people and programs within the agency. The complexity of the accountability and management challenges at HHS become apparent when you consider the breadth of its policy portfolio. HHS administers programs as diverse as Medicare and Medicaid, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Administration on Aging.

The juggling metaphor in the book's title refers to the challenge of keeping in the air the many policy and political balls that must be juggled to keep HHS functioning. On the policy side, HHS juggles policy implementations that are intraagency, interagency, and intergovernmental. It also juggles various policy instruments, from an array of different types of grants to nonprofits and local governments, to the direct provision of services. These policy relationships are also different based on the culture of the units involved; the scientific and medical culture at the Center for Disease Control or Food and Drug Administration is different from the culture at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

On the political side, the juggling requires equal deftness, as HHS balances demands from interest groups, the White House, and Congress. Any one of these groups is demanding enough; Congress alone requires HHS to submit detailed budget information, testify at oversight hearings, and work in crafting legislation to reauthorize programs such as Head Start. Yet all of this must be done with an eye toward carrying out the president's agenda and not offending important interests.

All of this plays itself out in the management of the department, as the secretary has to learn how to lead such a disjointed entity. Leadership is key, because traditional management is difficult; the organizational structure for almost all of HHS is already established, and the secretary has little power to change the personnel except at the very top of the organization. Furthermore, the new political appointees that the administration brings in often conflict with career civil servants; it is up to the secretary to lead everyone in the same direction. This means that there needs to be a strong management team in the office of the secretary and strong management information systems, which is often a weak point in federal departments.

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What are we to make of the juggling act that an HHS secretary must do? Radin recommends that HHS leaders must keep five things in mind: the life and death nature of many HHS issues, the controversial nature of many HHS programs, the cooperative nature of many of its programs, the existence of well-developed professional cultures throughout the agency, and that the diversity of HHS programs and services result in its fragmented nature as an organization.

This book provides a detailed look behind the curtain at just how complicated it is to run a federal department. Radin's book is not full of answers about how this should be done, but it clearly lays out why there are no easy answers to the management and accountability challenges at the federal level. People wanting to work as managers in federal agencies would be well served to read this book so they can avoid the pitfalls so many fall into.

THAD E. HALL
*The Century Foundation*

**Building Civic Capacity: The Politics of Reforming Urban Schools** *by Clarence N. Stone, Jeffrey R. Henig, Bryan D. Jones, and Carol Pierannunzi. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2001. 197 pp. Paper, $16.00.*

The Civic Capacity and Urban Education Research Project was perhaps the most anticipated comparative study of school politics and policy done in several decades. The principal investigators assembled a fine team of researchers. The research was supplemented and fortified with in-depth interviews of school activists, school personnel, and business leaders. This book is the final product of that collective effort. The research team looked at the school policy in eleven cities, including black-led cities (Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, and Washington, DC), machine-descendant cities (Boston, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis), and sunbelt cities (Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco). They found five strands of education politics: revenue, classroom composition, school-community interface, bureaucratic politics, and classroom interaction.

Did these strands contribute a syndrome of failure? They suggested that education is a high-reverberation policy subsystem. Such subsystems are "characterized by frequent reshuffling of mobilized stakeholders, multiple and strongly-felt competing values and belief systems, deeply held stakes by both educators (the professional providers of education) and parents (the consumers) and ambiguous boundaries making the prospects for establishing a new equilibrium more problematic than is normally the case" (p. 50). In other words, the forces that operate in the school policy arena preclude a new policy settlement or equilibrium. Without a policy settlement, meaningful dialogue and mobilization is difficult, and a syndrome of failure is inevitable.

The cities in this study have tried to overcome this failure syndrome by engaging their civic capacity. Defined as a bringing together of all the stakeholders in a joint mobilization for change, civic capacity can be the flywheel for school

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reform. After reviewing such factors as population and race, income and education, cities versus suburbs, and the fiscal context, they concluded that inner-city schools are disadvantaged in their capacity to facilitate their civic capacity.

*Building Civic Capacity* is not as pessimistic as my book, *Black Mayors and School Politics.* Though not overly optimistic about the prospect for school reform, the authors admit the "politics of urban education takes place in an ill-structured problem space" (p. 103). Because there are multiple understandings of what the school problems are and because schools compete with other urban problems for political attention, the task of reform is even more daunting. The research makes two interesting findings. First, elites in highly mobilized cities are more likely to be "in tune" with the "winds of reform" than lowly mobilized counterparts (p. 122). They are also more likely to seek internal solutions than their less mobilized counterparts. Second, educators are less critical of the status quo, but support incremental change. Here again we see a divergence of opinions about the problems among stakeholders.

It is refreshing to read scholars who admit that bureaucratic inertia or a dearth of ideas are not the only obstacles to school reform. They identify the real barrier to reform—politics. There are simply too many policy disagreements and too little sustained civic mobilization. However, a one-time citywide mobilization is not enough; there has to be continuous and institutionalized coalition building. This is why Stone et al. counsel patience and realistic goal setting.

In summary, this book has much to recommend it. It links the policy analysis literature to the empirical research in urban politics. These education policy analysts were careful not to focus on a single causal explanation for the failure of school reform or to suggest that civic capacity is a panacea. Stone et al. recognize in their research that a deeper causality probe is indicated. Overall, this is an outstanding piece of scholarship, and students of school reform will find a cornucopia of insights in this book.

WILBUR C. RICH
*Wellesley College*

**Vicious Cycle: Presidential Decision Making in the American Political Economy** *by Constantine J. Spiliotes. College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 2002. 212 pp. $39.95.*

Examining the influence of the president on the U.S. economy is a perennial research topic in political science. The voluminous literature on the topic generally takes one of two approaches. The first is an historical approach to presidential studies, examining presidential archives for explanations for why a particular president acted as he did. The second is a rational choice-political economy approach, searching for quantitative relationships between presidential decisions and macroeconomic indicators. In *Vicious Cycle*, Spiliotes at-

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tempts to straddle these two approaches to understand why presidents make the economic decisions they do. He sets out two tasks he hopes to accomplish: an examination of how institutional responsibility influences presidential decision making, and the start of a dialogue between the two different approaches to studying presidential economic decision making. Several problems aside, Spiliotes largely succeeds in these tasks.

*Vicious Cycle* is divided into two parts. The first develops a theory of institutional responsibility in economic decision making, while the second presents four case studies that demonstrate how a sense of institutional responsibility influenced various administrations. Institutional responsibility is "an institutional mandate for sound macroeconomic management" (p. 10). Spiliotes hypothesizes that a sense of institutional responsibility develops as presidents become acclimated to their role as the chief macroeconomic policy maker, and this sense of institutional responsibility can lead presidents to make decisions not in line with their partisan goals, leading a Republican to fight unemployment or a Democrat to fight inflation. Spiliotes finds empirical evidence that presidents are more likely to pursue macroeconomic policies that run counter to their partisan goals as their term wears on, and when there is unified government with both Houses of Congress controlled by the same party as the president. While the concept of institutional responsibility is appealing, Spiliotes is a bit vague about what exactly it is. At some points, institutional responsibility can be taken to mean a president's sense of duty for maintaining the health of the economy, while at others presidents wish to portray themselves as "responsible" because voters reward competent economic managers (p. 67). No doubt some of this lack of clarity is due to the difficult task of navigating a path between a rational choice and narrative approach to study presidential economic decision making.

The development and empirical tests of the theory of institutional responsibility also lack a discussion of the interaction between the president, Congress, and the Federal Reserve. The role of these institutions is an important influence and constraint on presidential decision making, as Spiliotes's case studies make clear. For example, before the midterm election of 1966, Lyndon Johnson relied on a tight monetary policy by the Fed to control inflation rather than raise taxes. While Spiliotes is correct to point out that LBJ's refusal to raise taxes ran counter to his partisan goals, the actions of the Fed were a critical component of this decision.

Despite these concerns, Spiliotes makes a convincing case that presidents do develop a sense of institutional responsibility, and this influences their economic decision making. He is also successful in his second task, that of opening a dialogue between researchers from different traditions of studying presidential decision making. The criticisms of *Vicious Cycle* presented here should in this light be interpreted as minor stumbles, inevitable when attempting to forge a new path between established research methods.

GARRETT GLASGOW
*University of California, Santa Barbara*

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**The Great Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson—The Fierce Battles Over Money and Power that Transformed the Nation** *by Steven R. Weisman. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2002. 448 pp. $27.00.*

This book covers a lot of ground, much already well plowed. Steven Weisman sifts through a sixty-year period to unearth the events and individuals responsible for the passage of the federal income tax in 1913. He begins with the Civil War and ends with Woodrow Wilson's presidency, with an epilogue that brings us up to tax law today. Along the way, he sketches colorful personalities and anecdotes without doing much in-depth analysis. Weisman suggests that the switch in public finance from tariffs to the income tax arose from a struggle between two views held by the American public. Our sense of justice and equity supports progressive taxation of individual income. But we also consider material riches a reward for virtuous hard work that should belong to us.

Three times from 1860 to 1920, the balance tilted enough to favor adopting an income tax, despite objections by the "wealth as virtue" crowd. President Abraham Lincoln and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase pushed through the first taxes in desperate attempts to finance the war. Weisman couples accounts of these successes with references to the greenback movement, power struggles between Chase and Secretary of State William Seward, the Emancipation Proclamation, battles at Manassas, the New York draft riots, and the death of Lincoln's son. In four chapters, Weisman also offers thumbnail sketches of three important figures: Senator John Sherman, Confederate Treasury Secretary Christopher Memminger, and first Internal Revenue Commissioner George Boutwell. Especially intriguing is the account of how Boutwell and his underlings determined what was taxable. Here, for example, began the mortgage interest deduction. These first income taxes disappeared during Reconstruction.

The second drive for an income tax began after the financial upheavals of the Golden Age, the accumulation of major fortunes, and the Panic of 1893. Standard bearer William Jennings Bryan suffered defeat after the Supreme Court ruled an income tax was unconstitutional. In this two-chapter section, Weisman touches on monetary controversies, the Homestead strike, the influence of Justice Stephen Field and financier J. P. Morgan, the populist movement, and the triumph of William McKinley. He also gives details of Frances Cleveland's inauguration garb.

The final thrust culminated with the Sixteenth Amendment and enactment of the modern-day individual income tax. Again, a panoply of personalities peoples the scene: Teddy Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Andrew Carnegie, Robert LaFollette, Joseph Cannon, Woodrow Wilson, and Wilson's Treasury secretary (and sometime son-in-law) William McAdoo. Wars helped fuel the movement—first the Spanish-American, more importantly the Great War. Simultaneously, states passed inheritance and income taxes, and William Taft rammed through a corporate tax.

This is a sprawling account, faithful to the historical record, well-researched, nicely written, and timely. But I found it superficial. For example, other coun-

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tries struggled with the opposing views of wealth that Weisman emphasizes, but he does little to explain why—or even if—the United States is a unique case in its historical approach to public finance. Nor does he analyze in any depth why the balance tilted when it did, preferring instead the strong-personality approach.

Where Weisman could have done more is to examine what was occurring in the states during the ratification movement. Several states that opposed the 1894 income-tax law switched to support the Sixteenth Amendment. Weisman only touches on the case of New York. Here is one explanation he might have explored: the switching states received disproportionate shares of increased federal dollars toward naval construction and veterans' pensions. Congress, through its discretionary power in allocating expenditures, may have played a critical role in building the coalition that passed the amendment. Whether Weisman would accept this argument or advance another is something we don't know; he simply did not dig very deep.

JENNY B. WAHL
*Carleton College*

**Woodrow Wilson: Profiles in Power** *by John A. Thompson. London, Pearson, 2002. 288 pp. Paper, $15.95.*

John Thompson has written a concise and persuasive account of Woodrow Wilson's political leadership. Although he includes the highlights of Wilson's life, his book is more analytical than biographical. The central issue for Thompson is the way Wilson used political power and the degree of success he enjoyed in guiding the American people toward embracing reform at home and playing an active role abroad.

The Wilson that Thompson portrays is neither an inflexible ideologue nor a pure idealist. The author sees Wilson as a pragmatic politician who understands that he must tailor his policies to meet the needs and desires of the American people. "If you want to win," Wilson observed in 1907, "you have got to fish for the majority" (p. 52). Thompson sees Wilson's policies as largely the result of his efforts to translate his understanding of public opinion into specific measures to advance the nation's welfare. Thus Wilson's conversion from conservatism to progressivism grows out of a similar shift in public attitudes in the first decade of the twentieth century. Similarly, Thompson plays down the supposed transition from the New Freedom to the New Nationalism during Wilson's first term, pointing out the president was never bound by any rigid political position.

Appropriately, Thompson is most interested in Wilson's emergence as a world leader with the advent of World War I. Here again the author finds little evidence that the president had fully formed views on international affairs, which he then tried to impose on the nation and, later at the Paris Peace

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Conference, on the world. Rather, Thompson argues convincingly that Wilson's foreign policy positions grew naturally out of the issues he encountered and the mood of the American people. His one-sided neutrality was a response to the reality of British control of the Atlantic, while his condemnation of German submarine warfare reflected the overwhelming revulsion of the American people to the loss of civilian lives in the sinking of the *Lusitania.* Wilson won popular support and reelection in 1916 by stressing the theme of "peace with honor," and when Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, he felt he had no choice but to give honor priority. Even the idealistic rhetoric of his war message was more of an effort to build a national consensus than an expression of his own inner convictions.

Thompson is quite effective in presenting Wilson as a flexible and realistic politician and in discounting those who portray him as an authoritarian political leader or as a psychologically-flawed ideologue. Yet Thompson's flattering view of Wilson does not account for the president's failure at Paris nor the subsequent Senate defeat of his beloved League of Nations. A leader whom the author claims knew the importance of creating a consensus completely misjudged both the nationalistic goals of his wartime allies and the partisan fury of his Republican opponents. Thompson sees this unfortunate outcome as the result of a continuing dilemma for American presidents—how to reconcile the inevitable conflict between international and domestic realities. But in the aftermath of World War I, Wilson failed on both counts: he helped craft a disastrous peace treaty and then was unable to gain Senate approval for its one redeeming feature, the League of Nations.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
*University of Texas at Austin*

**Rich Democracies: Political Economy, Public Policy, and Performance**
*by Harold L. Wilensky. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002. 892 pp. Cloth, $85.00; paper, $45.00.*

Harold Wilensky has been a leading figure in the field of comparative welfare states for nearly half a century. His and Charles Lebeaux's famous distinction between residual and institutional welfare states, first made in 1958, is still cited. It inspired the three-fold typologies developed by Richard Titmuss (residual, industrial-achievement performance, institutional-redistributive) and Gøsta Esping-Andersen (liberal, conservative/corporatist, social democratic). Wilensky was the first to tell us that the United States is a welfare state laggard, an idea that joined with Seymour Martin Lipset's work to become an interdisciplinary subfield for the study of American exceptionalism. He also first observed the rising tide of tax and welfare backlash that presaged major welfare state restructure in the 1990s. The list of Wilensky's publications over the years is

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wide-ranging and enormous, and every bit of it feeds into this latest book—a tome that reflects his long and distinguished career.

For those already familiar with Wilensky's work, this book offers nothing new; many chapters draw heavily on or even summarize earlier publications. But for both these readers as well as those who are novices to the field (despite the size, the material should not be too daunting), the book provides a useful synthesis of theories and data (much of which is from the 1970s and 1980s, however) on various dimensions of welfare state development, "output" (spending), and performance. As usual in Wilensky's work, the focus is the nineteen industrialized democracies that have remained consistently rich over the years.

What ties the chapters together is the search for commonalities despite diversity among these countries, or, to put it differently, to discover and explain why these countries have remained consistently rich (and democratic), how they have used their wealth, and with what consequences. Unfortunately, Wilensky continues to phrase his driving question as one of convergence versus divergence, which places the whole enterprise at a level of analysis that is too macroscopic given the historical timeframe here (mostly post-World War II) and forces him to answer in favor of convergence, thereby demoting his wealth of information on differences and overlooking other dynamics of social change. The overall argument is commonplace by now: as countries advance industrially, they experience increased levels of occupational mobility and education; they become richer and spend and tax more, which results in even higher levels of occupational mobility and education, leading to more social equality; new social and political values emerge to complement these features of "modernity."

Wilensky is keenly aware of the several differences among welfare states. He notes that he has developed "hypotheses to explain differences (even some divergences) among nations once they adopted the programs common to all" (p. 215), and he elaborates these in Part II of the book. Analysis of these differences allows him to say that the key to welfare state "success" (if not simply national wealth) is centralized government and its counterpart in strong, centralized labor and employer federations. But differences represent variations on a theme; they are best captured as different types of political economy.

Wilensky tackles some recent issues in welfare state development, above all retrenchment in the 1990s and growing irrelevance in the face of globalization. He rightly disagrees that the welfare state is passé, arguing that the contradictions and trade-offs between welfare state spending and economic productivity are fuzzy. The welfare state is persisting. Although some of its specific features are ever changing, it is an integral part of modern society. In the rich democracies, voters and governments strike their own balance between collectivism and individualism—even in the United States, whose exceptionalism is a matter of degree within the liberal type of welfare state.

MARY RUGGIE
*Harvard University*

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**From Identity to Politics: The Lesbian and Gay Movements in the United States** *by Craig A. Rimmerman. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2002. 239 pp. Cloth, $69.50; paper, $19.95.*

This book is a useful survey of the recent evolution of the lesbian and gay movement in the United States. It outlines the movement's three main approaches to political activism: electoralism and lobbying, litigation, and unconventional politics. It also contains a chapter on the Christian right as an opponent of the lesbian and gay rights movement in the United States. The main goal of the book is to evaluate the extent to which the movement's current strategies have advanced the position of lesbians and gay men in American political, social, and economic life. Rimmerman suggests that the top-down, elite-driven politics of lobbying, electoral politics, and litigation have had mixed success at best for the movement. He calls for lesbian and gay activists to focus on grassroots coalition building incorporating other issues such as class and race, which would move the movement beyond the simple identity politics of gay rights. This call from identity to politics anchors the analysis presented in the book.

Rimmerman surveys the main theoretical approaches to interest group and social movement politics including pluralism, resource mobilization, the political process model, and new social movement theory. However, his goal is not to assess which of these perspectives is most analytically powerful for the analysis of the movement; rather, he is interested in the ideological and normative implications of these theories for lesbian and gay strategizing in the U.S. context. The chapter on electoral and interest group politics, for example, is organized around the concept of assimilation, referring to the risk of assimilation through participation in the mainstream politics. Rimmerman argues that mainstream strategies have not worked effectively for the lesbian and gay movement. He provides a number of important case studies of recent moments in lesbian and gay movement history such as AIDS organizing, the marriage litigation, and the ups and downs of the Clinton presidency. He also provides a very useful survey of the main lesbian and gay lobby and electoral organizations such as the National Lesbian and Gay Task Force and the Human Rights Campaign. In the end though, Rimmerman is pessimistic about the chances for political success of the movement. While he critiques mainstream approaches, his concluding chapter points out that there are many obstacles to grass-roots coalition politics as well.

Despite the strategic focus of the analysis, Rimmerman's book provides much fodder for theoretical analysis. For example, his analysis of the role of the courts emphasizes the impact of early court decisions on the political demands of the movement. The conduct/status distinction, which shapes lesbian and gay politics down to Clinton's "don't ask/don't tell" policy was refracted through the prism of legal decision making. Another example is the impact of consumerism on lesbian and gay politics, which reinforces the privatization of lesbian and gay

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identities to the advantage of professionalized Washington-based lobby groups. However, Rimmerman's policy discussions around the assessment of the Clinton legacy might have been strengthened by more systemic attention to internal movement dynamics and community debates over policy directions and goals.

As a comparative politics of lesbian and gay movements emerges through national case studies such as this one, it is becoming clear that two main factors impede the movement's success, compared to similar cases: the strength, financing, and organization of the evangelical Christian movement and the relative permeability of American political institutions. These two factors have made the United States a relative laggard with regard to the recognition of lesbian and gay rights. In this challenging political context, Rimmerman rightly emphasizes the need for local organization to counter the well-financed evangelical movement. In his conclusion, he calls for the lesbian and gay movement to shift from interest group politics to a radical deepening of democratic citizenship. It remains to be seen if lesbian and gay activists will heed the call.

MIRIAM SMITH
*Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada*

**The Supreme Court in the Intimate Lives of Americans: Birth, Sex, Marriage, Childrearing, and Death** *by Howard Ball. New York, New York University Press, 2002. 262 pp. $35.00.*

This book does not break much new theoretical ground, but it does provide a thorough summary of the trajectory of current case law on the legal regulation of U.S. citizens' intimate lives. Ball skillfully lays out the tension between individual liberties such as privacy, autonomy, and familial decision making on the one hand and the state's desire to protect vulnerable citizens and uphold its ethical visions on the other. He works through this tension in five different doctrinal areas: marriage, family construction and privacy, abortion, childrearing and parental autonomy, and euthanasia.

One significant theme in the book is the Court's inability to develop a workable standard for applying substantive due process. Ball worries about the doctrine's problematic and uneven application in cases involving gays and lesbians, women, and children. He notes that developing systematic interpretations around traditional categories and areas of protection is fundamentally at odds with using the doctrine to protect the traditionally disempowered. For many legal scholars, this tension leads to a commitment to use the forward-looking doctrine of equal protection rather than the historically-rooted methodology of due process to expand progressive individual rights. Ball does not address this move explicitly, but his summary shows that such a strategy is uncertain at best in the current conservative climate.

Ball is on his strongest ground in describing the political and human elements driving the consideration of these cases. He reminds us that Supreme

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Court justices "are human beings and most of them respond humanely to the poignant issues that have come to them" (p. 216). Even the justices themselves admit making mistakes, perhaps the most notable being the series of errors resulting in *Bowers v Hardwick*: first, Justice Brennan's ill-considered vote to hear the case and then Justice Powell's substantive vote, which he later recanted privately, in favor of upholding sodomy laws used to inhibit homosexual sex. Ball's discussion shows that judicial choices are determined neither by rigid adherence to legal principle and precedent nor by political positioning along a one-dimensional right-left spectrum.

Ball could have incorporated more discussion of another traditionally disempowered group lacking access to fundamental rights that others take for granted: the poor. Poor people turn up at some points in Ball's analysis; he discusses cases allowing limits on public funding for abortions and some cases addressing the conditioning of the exercise of fundamental rights on the payment of fees. He does not, however, deal as explicitly as he could with the systematic undermining of privacy, liberty, and equality that the poor experience.

Some mistakes detract from the book's overall careful tracing of doctrinal evolution. Ball inexplicably states on pages 90 and 95 that *Roe* came down in 1972, though he clearly knows that the decision was released in January of 1973 (p. 100–101). He correctly notes that the Court in *Frontiero v Richardson* in 1973 came within one vote of declaring gender to be a suspect classification triggering close judicial scrutiny as race does. He states shortly afterward, however, that "The Court never again came close to 'reaching out' to elevate sex to the 'suspect classification' level" (p. 39), a statement directly contradicted in *Craig v Boren*'s adoption of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based regulations (a standard confirmed in several later cases, most recently *U.S. v Virginia* in 1996).

Nonetheless, the book provides a valuable introduction to increasingly important and salient legal questions about the constitutional limits on the state's ability to shape intimate lives in the United States. Ball notes correctly that the lack of resolution on these issues heralds more conflict on the horizon. As rumors of impending retirements among the justices swirl, many will continue to worry about the judicial resolution of cases concerning intimate freedoms for some time to come.

JULIE NOVKOV
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**Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence Against Women: A Cross-National Comparison** *by S. Laurel Weldon. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002. 304 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

For an unerringly scrupulous crafting of an argument, this study cannot be surpassed. Graduate students from any subfield in political science will be well

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advised to consult this book to appreciate how an important argument is set out, its key terms defined, its concepts specified, and its evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented. Readers will also learn from the stellar capsule reviews of important literatures on comparative method, social movements, feminist movement politics, the new institutionalism, structural approaches in political science, as well as aspects of policy analysis.

The subject of this book is a cross-national comparison of policies that address violence against women. Comparing thirty-six democratic political systems, S. Laurel Weldon poses the question of why some governments are more responsive to violence against women than others. Weldon concludes that the states that are most responsive are those with "mutually reinforcing interaction between women's policy agencies and strong, autonomous women's movements" (p. 209). Her argument is, in brief, that women's movement activism counts (although not so much through lobbying efforts as through the discursive influence of movement politics) and that such activism proves important as part of a broad interactive relationship with institutional reforms. The variation in policy responses, Weldon argues, can be best understood through a structural analysis of the mutual influences of movements and institutions.

Weldon builds her argument in an exacting and methodical fashion. Government responsiveness to violence against women is measured along seven dimensions that include legal reforms that deal with wife battering and sexual assault; the provision and funding of shelters and emergency housing and crisis centers; the existence of government-sponsored programs to train service providers and other professionals; the existence of a central agency that monitors national policies among other measures. When compared along these dimensions, some surprises emerge: Canada, Australia, and the United States rank high among the more responsive political systems; but some of the countries with expansive welfare policies—Sweden and Finland for instance—have unpredictably more "stunted" responses (p. 32).

Proceeding to a consideration of a sequence of explanations, Weldon assesses and rejects other possible accounts: the role of culture, levels of political development, the presence of strong parties on the left. Nor is the level of policy response a result of the numbers or visibility of women. What Weldon finds, rather, is that structural differences are key to understanding policy variation. Responsiveness is a function of how women's policy agencies have come to life through institutional reforms that are shaped by movement demands. For Weldon, this kind of structural analysis is decidedly not agency-less. Movements and policy institutions emerge from contingent and peopled histories.

As ambitious as a thirty-six-country macrocomparative approach is, there may be something lost by having to eschew country case analysis. By Weldon's measures, for instance Scandinavian states are significantly less ready to respond to violence against women than Ireland, France, Israel, the United States, and other non-Nordic democracies. Could this counterintuitive finding be

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explained in part not by the movement-institution account Weldon suggests but by a different institutional explanation, perhaps visible only through closer case study? In India, for instance, it is sometimes argued that women raise issues about domestic violence under the rubric of dowry threat. To do otherwise would be to admit to revelations too deeply shameful. By analogy, could it be that Scandinavian states need to do less directly to name and address issues of violence against women, in part because domestic violence in stronger welfare states (with subsidized housing, more equitable income, and more generous health care) has afforded responses under a different institutional rubric?

In the end, what I found most powerful about *Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence against Women* was Weldon's formulation of a structural account of policy responsiveness. As Weldon cautions, "The impact of social movements on the policy process is only superficially similar to the impact of interest groups or policy entrepreneurs, and cannot be reduced to these concepts" (p. 189). Instead, what Weldon lays out is a model of a broader discursive change through which movements shape institutional reform and which she compellingly names as "structural" in character. In a cogent if brief summary of how this structural analysis differs from other critiques, Weldon takes on the well-established work of scholars like Kathy Ferguson and Catherine MacKinnon and notes that, "it is not the bureaucratic nature of the state per se that results in biases against disadvantaged groups" nor can the "bias in the state be traced to its functional relationship to social structures as in some feminist accounts" (p. 190). Rather, what Weldon would have us explore is the multivalent and variable experiences of movements in their relationship to institutions both influencing and influenced by past histories of inequalities. This is an ambitious and meticulous book from which scholars of policy change will profoundly benefit.

MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN
*Cornell University*

**The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories** *by David Kretzmer. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2002. 262 pp. Cloth, $65.50; paper, $21.95.*

In this critique of Israel's Supreme Court decisions related to the territories seized in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Hebrew University Professor David Kretzmer examines the relevance of international law with particular emphasis on Geneva Convention IV. Specific chapters deal with cases brought to the Court concerning establishment of Jewish settlements and Israeli development projects that infringe on Palestinian properties, residency and family unification of Palestinians, demolition of Palestinian homes, and deportation of Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

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In dealing with these cases, the Court has acted as the High Court of Justice, which enables individuals to appeal directly to the Supreme Court without having appeared before any lower judicial body. In this capacity the Supreme Court can deal "with matters in which it sees need to grant a remedy for the sake of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal" (p. 11). Under this provision of Israel's Basic Law, the Court can order any government authority or agency to act or refrain from an act the Court considers lawful or unlawful.

Most cases related to the occupied territories have involved interpretation of Defense (Emergency) Regulations inherited by the government of Israel from the British mandatory government. The regulations granted extraordinary power to the security authorities, enabling them to infringe on civil liberties such as those now implemented by Israel's occupation authorities—arrest and imprisonment without trial, house demolitions, deportation of Palestinian residents of the territories, imposition of curfews, and collective punishments.

Kretzmer maintains that the Court's approach in "all decisions on validity of the Defense Regulations has been narrow formalism. The Court has not perceived itself as a judicial body that should play an expansive role in trying to protect basic rights against violation by government, but as a body that must support the foundation of military legislation in the Occupied Territories" (p. 124).

Within Israel and among its protagonists abroad, a controversial issue has been whether or not the Geneva Convention is applicable in Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The convention applies to territories occupied during war, that is, in situations of "belligerent occupation"; however, the government of Israel generally refers to the West Bank and Gaza as "administered" rather than "occupied," thus not subject to the rules and regulations of "belligerent occupation." Nevertheless, the government stated that it adheres to the humanitarian provisions of the Convention. The Supreme Court position on applicability of the Geneva Convention has been more ambiguous. Thus, for example, the Court acted against establishment of Jewish settlements on private land requisitioned for military purposes. But it "legitimized the settlement policy by accepting that establishment of civilian settlements may be regarded as a military need, by refusing to interfere with use of state land for settlements . . ." (p. 187).

Kretzmer observes that the difficulties of military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza "have been aggravated by the ambiguous attitude" (p. 197) of the government and much of Israeli society toward the idea that these are occupied territories according to international law rather than territory that by right belongs to Israel. Paradoxically, when government lawyers appear before the Court they often attempt to justify actions by the authorities on the basis of the international law of belligerent occupation. On the political level, the territories are treated as colonies, their resources and markets exploited for the benefit of the home country with clear distinction between the "natives"

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and the settlers. However, when faced with legal challenges, government lawyers resort to international law of belligerent occupation enabling the authorities to impose restrictions on the rights and liberties of the Palestinian inhabitants. Kretzmer maintains, "the authorities generally enjoyed the support of the Court in circumventing these restraints" (p. 197).

Kretzmer supports his observations and conclusions with extensive reference to cases brought before the Court and citations from Israeli jurists and judges.

DON PERETZ
*Binghamton University, State University of New York*

**Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East** *by Michael B. Oren. New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 446 pp. $30.00.*

Although prodigiously researched and written with a strong narrative drive, Michael Oren's history of the 1967 Six Day War in the Middle East is a highly flawed book. To be sure, there are some important contributions. In particular, military historians undoubtedly will appreciate the detailed discussions of the war's battles, which constitute about a third of the book. Of greater value to those interested in political history are the fascinating discussions of the policy-making process inside the Israeli and American governments, made possible by the author's impressive use of declassified documents, supplemented by a number of interviews with former policy makers in both countries. While there are no startling revelations or new information that require revisions in the standard interpretations of Israeli and American policy, the details and direct quotes from the documentation certainly enrich our historical knowledge and understanding.

That said, the author's ideological predispositions result in both misleading accounts of factual issues and unacceptable omissions in analysis. For these reasons, the book is likely to resurrect a number of Israeli myths that have been long discredited by the Israeli "new historians." Revealingly, it is primarily the motives rather than the findings of the new historians that are attacked in the book's foreword—"a wave of revisionist writers, Israelis mostly, have sought to amplify Israel's guilt [in the Arab-Israeli conflict] . . . or even [question] the legitimacy of the Jewish state" (p. xiv). This gratuitous slur serves only to reveal Oren's real agenda. In particular, here are just some of the major problems in his account:

- In his discussion of the background to the 1967 war, Oren omits or lightly slides over crucial aspects of Israel's policies and behavior, especially its treatment of the Palestinians. The emphasis is on Palestinian guerrilla attacks rather than on the well-established fact that they were precipitated by the Israeli expulsion ("exodus" is the badly misleading term used by

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Oren) of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians before, during, and after the 1948 war for Israeli independence.

- Similarly, in his discussion of the escalating conflict between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, Oren tends to play down the significance of Israel's military provocations ("activism" is his preferred euphemism) as well as its refusal to engage with serious Egyptian and Syrian proposals for a political settlement.
- Despite extensive reports by other Israeli historians and journalists, Oren denies that a significant portion of the hundreds of thousands of Syrian and Palestinian civilians who left the Golan Heights and the West Bank in the aftermath of the 1967 war were either expelled outright or "encouraged" to leave in a variety of ways by the conquering Israeli armies. Rather, the author again speaks of the Arab "flight" or "exodus."
- Most crucially, Oren's account is both superficial and misleading in its brief discussion of the consequences of the war. There is little or nothing about the escalating conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the wake of the establishment of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, nor about the early efforts by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat of Egypt as well as Hafez Assad of Syria to reach a political settlement with Israel, primarily conditioned on the complete Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian and Syrian territory captured—and later settled—in the war.

For these reasons, the overall effect of *Six Days of War* is to minimize the full truth, namely that the consequences of Israel's pre- and postwar policies, especially its territorial expansionism and repression of the Palestinians, have created a disaster not only for Israel but for regional and perhaps even world peace.

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

















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
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


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